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ABSTRACT  
   
Recently, philosophers have charged that Aristotelian-based virtue 
theories are empirically inadequate because the conception of character in which 
they are grounded is largely unfounded by findings in psychology. These 
philosophers argue in favor of situationism, the theory from social psychology 
that situational rather than dispositional differences among individuals are in 
large part responsible for human behavior. Situationists dispute the existence of 
traits that remain consistent across time and diverse situations and argue that 
features of situations can better explain and predict human behavior. After 
analyzing the psychological literature and historical cases put forth as evidence 
for situationism as well as the basic premises grounding arguments against 
situationism, I make some conclusions about the best responses to situationism. I 
agree with situationists that Aristotelian-based virtue and character are not quite 
empirically adequate but disagree that human behavior owes more to situational 
rather than dispositional determinants. Basing my theory on literature from 
social psychology, I argue instead that a concept of character grounded in social-
cognitive theory is more psychologically realistic and can explain and predict 
human behavior and ground a character-based virtue theory. A social-cognitive 
conception of character would highlight the dynamic role between situations and 
individual psychological factors like beliefs, values, desires and the way that an 
individual perceives a situation. I sketch out a non-ideal theory of virtue based in 
a social-cognitive conception of character that is partially dependent on social 
networks for its maintenance and is fragmented, or contextualized to particular 
types of psychological situations. However, fragmented and socially dependent 
virtue is not an optimal type of virtue because it is vulnerable to situational 
  iii 
features that place strong psychological pressures on agents to behave in various 
ways, including ways they would not have normally endorsed. I agree with 
Aristotelian virtue ethicists that argue that a type of practical wisdom can help to 
counter the often unwanted and dangerous influence of these strong situations 
but also maintain that some measure of moral luck is inevitably involved, even in 
the development of practical wisdom. 
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Chapter 1 
SITUATIONISM: THEORY AND SIGNIFICANCE 
  
In the last few decades, virtue ethics has regained a prominent place as 
one of the three major ethical theories in the field of normative ethics. Although 
virtue ethics theories can vary quite widely, many of these theories are founded in 
a traditional conception of character grounded in Aristotelian virtue ethics.1 
According to Aristotle, a virtue is a disposition to perform the right action, for the 
right reason, from a firm and unchanging character.  
 Virtues are essentially moral character traits. If an agent has developed 
the virtues, he knows what action is the right one to perform in a situation and he 
performs that action out of a consistent disposition to do so. Since the agent 
behaves consistently to his virtues from situation to situation, he will behave 
distinctly from others who have a different character (different or no virtues) 
because his specific character traits determine his behavior across all situations. 
Perhaps most importantly for our discussion, virtue ethics is a normative theory 
so it prescribes what people ought to do to be moral, namely, develop good 
character by developing the virtues.  
 However, situationism, a theory from the field of social psychology that 
has since gained recognition in philosophy, challenges the idea that there is such 
a thing as character. Situationism is the view that features of situations can have 
                                                   
 1 For examples see: See Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New 
York; Oxford UP, 1993), 27-120; Robert M. Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in 
Being for the Good (New York: Oxford UP, 2006); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1999); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
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a powerful influence on the production or constraining of human behavior. 
Consequently, situational features are on average better predictors than character 
traits of how an individual will act in a particular situation.2 Situationists dispute 
the existence of traits that remain consistent across time and diverse situations. 
Any consistency in an individual’s behavior can be explained by referencing 
similarities in situational features. Moreover, situational features that can affect 
behavior are not always morally relevant or important and often seem to operate 
completely beneath conscious notice. 
Situationists largely base their arguments on a number of experiments 
from social psychology that purportedly show that variation of small contextual 
factors can result in significant differences in behavior, which then result in 
cross-situational behavioral inconsistencies. If people had character traits that 
were stable across time and consistent across situations, they would exhibit 
corresponding stable, consistent behavior across situations, not behavior that 
shifts along with varying contextual factors; since the social psychological 
literature shows this is not the case, it seems that people do not have character 
traits that are stable across time and consistent across situations.  
Situationism is problematic for Aristotelian virtue ethics theories that rest 
on the supposition that there is such a thing as character. If it turns out that 
environment is a stronger determinant of behavior than character, then the idea 
of developing moral traits in order to be moral is based in a mistaken view of 
human behavior. 
 After examining and responding to data from personality research, 
philosophical responses to situationism, and situationist evidence, I hope to 
                                                   
2 See Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of 
Social Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1991), 1-26. 
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propose a more psychologically realistic concept of character that can help 
explain, if not predict, human behavior and can ground a character-based virtue 
ethics. While my primary focus is on the problem situationism creates for 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, I will also theorize about the general implications of 
situationism on theories based in Aristotelian virtue ethics or character.3  
 In this chapter I give a brief history of situationism, from its origins in 
character education, to its role in the evolution of personality psychology, and 
finally to its recent emergence in normative ethics. I also analyze the theory of 
situationism and the significance of its findings for virtue ethics and other areas 
like personal responsibility and moral agency.  
 
A Brief History of Situationism 
Hartshorne and May 
  In 1922, the Institute of Social and Religious Research chose two 
researchers, Hugh Hartshorne, a professor of Religious Education, and Mark A. 
May, a psychology professor, to undertake an inquiry into character education.4 
One of their projects in this inquiry was a study of deception on elementary and 
secondary schoolchildren. In order to study the “honest” behavior of their child 
subjects, May and Hartshorne tested the children for instances of deceptive 
behavior.5 Three of the behaviors that they looked at were: 1) willingness to steal 
                                                   
3 I will use the words “virtues” and “character traits” interchangeably in this paper. If 
Aristotelian virtues are a type of character trait, then as long as situationists can prove 
character traits do not exist, they are by extension proving the virtues do not exist. 
 
4 See Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, Studies in the Nature of Character I: 
Studies in Deceit (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928). 
 
5 Hartshorne and May, Studies in the Nature of Character, 377-78. Hartshorne and 
May define honest behavior as “a behavior which does not resort to subterfuge to gain its 
ends.” They contrast this to deceptive behavior. They define a deceptive act as one that 
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change left on a table in an empty classroom, 2) willingness to lie to avoid getting 
another child in trouble, and 3) willingness to cheat by adding false scores on a 
test where detection seemed impossible.  
Hartshorne and May observed the dishonest behavior they were testing 
more than once, varying the circumstances slightly each time. For example, when 
they tested the children’s willingness to cheat on several similar classroom tests, 
in one situation the experimenters gave the children the answer key after the 
children had taken the test but allowed the children to score their own tests. In 
another situation, they gave the children the answer key before the test and 
merely instructed the children not to look at the answer key until after they had 
completed the test.  
Hartshorne and May were surprised to discover that the correlations were 
strikingly low between a single type of dishonest behavior in two situations with 
only slightly varying circumstances. A child might cheat on one test and not do so 
on the next. Hartshorne and May concluded that the consistency of an 
individual’s honesty was a function of the situation in which he was placed, 
insofar as 1) the situations had common elements, 2) he had learned to be honest 
or dishonest in them, and 3) he had become aware of their honest or dishonest 
implications or consequences.6 A child might behave consistently honestly or 
dishonestly depending on how similar the two situations were or whether those 
situations were ones where the child had learned to be honest or dishonest in 
                                                                                                                                           
“implies a conflict of wills with regard to either means or ends or both and the 
concealment of either the act or its intention or both in order to gain the end or utilize the 
means concerning which the conflict has arise.” The dishonest behavior they were testing 
included cheating, stealing, and lying.  
 
6 See Hartshorne and May, Studies in the Nature of Character, 380. 
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them by being punished or rewarded or, more generally, by being made aware of 
the good or bad consequences of their behavior. 
Hartshorne and May found that correlations in behavior among tests 
lowered the more the situational context of the two tests differed from one 
another. For example, for the deceptive behavior observed, Hartshorne and May 
noticed that a child that copied on one answer key was likely to copy from a key 
on another test, but copying from a key did not make that child more likely to 
cheat by adding on scores.  
Hartshorne and May concluded that honesty was not an “inner entity,” a 
trait one could possess, but more a function of the situation. An individual 
behaved similarly in different situations in proportion to how alike the situations 
were, how much those situations had been experienced as occasions for either 
honest or dishonest behavior, and how much the individual had categorized them 
as opportunities for deception or honesty. 
 
Walter Mischel 
  Surprisingly, Hartshorne and May’s conclusion drew little attention from 
psychologists until Walter Mischel’s book Personality and Assessment brought 
attention back to it in 1968. In Personality and Assessment, Mischel pointed out 
that one could rarely predict individual responses to specific situations by 
referencing individual traits. Although Mischel analyzed studies already well 
known to researchers working in the field, including Hartshorne and May’s, his 
personality assessment text shook the very foundations of personality research.  
 Although Mischel had merely intended Personality and Assessment to be 
a survey of the available theoretical approaches in personality psychology at the 
 6
time, he discovered that many of the studies he analyzed had come to the same 
conclusion: trait-based behavioral predictability was very low, low enough to 
question basic assumptions about behavioral consistency held by personality 
psychologists and laypeople alike.7 This was because correlations in behavior 
from one situation to another were lower than anyone had expected.  
More broadly, Mischel’s work called into question personality theory, the 
dominant approach in social psychology at that time. Mischel challenged the very 
old and basic assumption that personality psychologists (also called 
personologists) had been working under: the assumption that behavior was the 
product of traits.8 Personologists speculated that traits like extraversion and 
openness to experience could help explain, understand, and predict the behavior 
of an individual. Traits were stable across the individual’s life and could reliably 
explain and (to an extent) predict his behavior across various situations. 
According to Mischel, most definitions of personality hinged on the 
assumption that an individual’s behavior is consistent across many conditions. If 
an individual possessed the trait of extraversion, for example, he would act 
consistently with that trait across different situations that elicited that trait to 
varying degrees. Personality psychologists established the consistency of traits by 
looking at evidence of obtained correlations between behaviors measured across 
similar situations. However, after reviewing the literature on intellectual ability 
and achievements, moral behavior, and a number of other measures, Mischel 
                                                   
7 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 95. 
 
8 See Walter Mischel, Personality and Assessment (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1968) for full discussion. 
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concluded that the assumption that there are personality traits that held across a 
number of situations and contexts was mistaken. 9 
Mischel found that the data on moral behavior provided no support for 
the belief in a trait (like honesty) that would drive behavior across differing 
situations. Instead, people seemed to develop subtle discriminations depending 
on many considerations. For example, people might behave consistently or 
inconsistently from one situation to the next depending on the outcomes of that 
same behavior in different situations; or they might behave inconsistently 
depending on whether their behavior was an emotional reaction as opposed to an 
intellectual or cognitive one.10 So for example, a person might be able to do 
consistently well on a number of exams testing a cognitive ability like reasoning 
but might react differently in similar situations depending on the emotion 
attached to certain situational features.11  
Mischel concluded that there was simply no good evidence for the 
consistency of behavior across different situations. There was little empirical data 
showing individuals acting consistently across situations that elicited the same 
trait to different degrees. In fact, people’s behavior seemed to vary from situation 
to situation, even where there were only minor changes in situational features.  
                                                   
9 Mischel, Personality and Assessment, 13-36. Mischel also reviewed authoritarian 
personality, rigidity, intolerance for ambiguity (characterized by resistance to reversal of 
apparent fluctuating stimuli, early selection and adherence to one solution in perceptually 
ambitious situations, seeking for certainty, rigid dichotomizing into fixed categories, and 
fixed closure), and the tendency to yield to social norms and pressures.  
 
10 See Mischel, Personality and Assessment, 178-85. Mischel does not define 
intellectual or cognitive behavior but his discussion implies he is talking about behaviors 
that require reasoning or analysis.  
 
11 For example, Mischel mentions a woman who was terrified of birds and feathers 
but only when she encountered the real objects, not in response to verbal descriptions or 
thoughts of them. 
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While Mischel was not claiming that predictable or measurable individual 
differences did not exist; he called into question the assumption by personality 
theory that one could predict that behavior would be cross-situationally 
consistent.12 Perhaps the most important thing that Mischel pointed out was that 
the correlations between trait scores derived from standard personality 
assessment scales and objective behavioral outcomes were also very low. 
Individual behaviors could rarely be predicted with any correlation higher than 
the .30 barrier and most correlations were even lower. This held true even for 
traits like “delay of gratification” that personologists believed to be a dispositional 
difference that was cross-situationally consistent. Even traits like delay of 
gratification seemed to depend on context, or at least, on how the subjects 
perceived the situation. 
 
Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett 
In the early 1990’s, social psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross 
published The Person and the Situation, a textbook summarizing the person-
situation debate that began raging in psychology after Mischel’s book was 
published. On one side were personologists claiming that personality traits could 
explain and predict behavior, while on the other were situationists claiming that 
situational factors were better determinants of behavior than dispositional 
factors. 
 In The Person and the Situation, Ross and Nisbett evaluated the diverse 
theories and experiments that situationists had cited as evidence in favor of a 
                                                   
12 While Mischel did believe there were individual stable differences in behavior by 
different individuals, he parceled this out in a different way by doing away with cross-
situational consistency and replacing it with stable individual response patterns that 
result from dynamic interactions between an individual and his environment. I will come 
back to Mischel’s view of personality in chapter 4. 
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situational approach and analyzed some of the initial responses to situationism 
from personologists. Ross and Nisbett also looked at lay psychology, which 
tended to be personological, and its sources and errors.  
Ross and Nisbett wrote in the introduction of The Person and the 
Situation that they offered the textbook as a guide for situationism for non-
psychologists as well as an open invitation to those in other disciplines to join the 
dialogue and contribute what they could. Ross and Nisbett hoped not to tear a 
larger rupture between personological and situational approaches but to explain 
how they compared to one another. They closed the book with a sketch of what 
they believed a more powerful conception of personality would probably look 
like, suggesting possible avenues of research for those interested in theorizing a 
more empirically sound conception of personality. 
 
Owen Flanagan 
  Around the same time, philosopher Owen Flanagan began to call for 
some measure of psychological realism in normative ethics. Being interested in 
both philosophy and psychology, he noticed that although normative theories 
made many claims about human nature (assumptions on which many of the 
theories were often based), ethicists working in philosophy paid little attention to 
the work being done in psychology and other human sciences. In his book on the 
subject, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism, 
Flanagan brought some of the situationist arguments taking place in social 
psychology to philosophical inquiry. 
Flanagan was interested in the relationship between psychology and 
ethics, specifically in advocating a form of psychological realism, or a 
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“constraining [of] ethical theory according to findings in psychology about 
cognition, the self, moral development and situational sensitivity.”13 Flanagan 
contended that a good look at what was known about human nature undermined 
not only overly rationalistic ethical theories but was also problematic for virtue 
ethics. 14 According to Flanagan, even though virtue ethicists were more realistic 
than deontologists or consequentialists because they asserted that moral 
behavior and decision-making probably had more to do with traits and 
dispositions than general-purpose rules or principles, virtue ethicists had 
underestimated just how much virtues and vices were situationally sensitive.  
  
John Doris 
  Following Flanagan’s call for psychological realism, philosopher John 
Doris has recently challenged virtue theories based in an Aristotelian conception 
of character by citing situationist findings from social psychology. In his book, 
Lack of Character, Doris agrees that ethical theories need to be constrained by 
findings in psychology and argues that ethical theories that rely on what he terms 
the “traditional conception of character” as a fundamental assumption do not 
meet this criterion.  
 
                                                   
13 Owen Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991), 15.  
Elsewhere in the book (Flanagan, 32), Flanagan frames his discussion of 
“psychological realism” in terms of minimal psychological realism, which is defined as: 
“[making] sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the 
character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to 
be possible for creatures like us.” 
 
14 In other words, any theory that required the agent to go through a process of 
reasoning before making moral decisions or acting in moral ways, such as deontological 
theory and consequentialism, two other currently dominant theories in philosophical 
normative ethics. 
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The Situationist Thesis 
 Since I base my discussion of the impact of situationism on Aristotelian 
character largely on John Doris’ account of situationism, this section is largely 
about his account. I make extensive use of Doris’ account because he has the most 
comprehensive philosophical account of situationism.  
 
Globalism15 
Doris refers to Aristotelian or “traditional” character traits as “global.” 
According to Doris, the traditional conception of character has the following 
three criteria: 
1) Consistency: character and personality traits are reliably 
manifested in trait-relevant behavior across a diversity of 
trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in 
their conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in 
question. 
 
2) Stability: character and personality traits are reliably 
manifested in trait-relevant behaviors over iterated trials of 
similar trait-relevant eliciting conditions. 
 
3) Evaluative integration: In a given character or personality 
the occurrence of a trait with a particular evaluative 
valence is probabilistically related to the occurrence of 
other traits with similar evaluative valences. 16 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
15 John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2002), 22. I take the use of the term “globalism” from Doris’ book.  He 
sets this up as a contrast to situationism. 
 
16 Doris, Lack of Character, 22-23. Doris says that “both characterological [that is 
character-based] moral psychology and personality psychology are typically committed to 
the first 2 theses, consistency and stability. The idea of evaluative integration is rather 
less prominent in personality psychology than in characterological ethics.” 
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Consistency 
 The most important of the three conditions, the consistency condition, 
captures the idea that if a person has some trait X, compassion for example, then 
they will exhibit that trait by acting compassionately in a number of different 
situations, not just in one or two.17 Moreover, trait-relevant behavior should be 
consistently displayed across situations that vary in terms of how likely they are 
to elicit that trait.  
According to Doris, some situations are more conducive to certain trait-
relevant behaviors than other situations. Doris never explains what he means 
when he says a situation is “conducive” to some trait-relevant behavior other than 
saying that they are situations where most individuals would respond with the 
trait-relevant behavior. However, some conditions that might make a situation 
more conducive to trait-relevant behavior are: 1) it is evident to the agent that a 
certain trait-relevant behavior is required, 2) performing the trait-relevant 
behavior is of low-cost to the agent or high cost to the victim (or both), or 3) there 
is a great amount of pressure exerted (in some form or other) upon the agent to 
perform the trait-relevant behavior. 
Peter Singer’s famous example of the child drowning in a shallow pond 
would be an example of a situation highly conducive to compassionate or helping 
behavior. 18  All you have to do is wade in and pull the child out. You may get a 
little muddy in the process but that is a relatively low cost to you compared to the 
high cost to the child of your failing to act. This situation meets conditions 1 and 2 
                                                   
17 Since Doris and other situationists argue most strongly against this condition, I’ll 
examine it at greater length than either of the other two. 
 
18 An example given by Peter Singer in “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 230. 
 
 13
from above: it is obvious what moral action should be taken, the action itself is of 
low cost to you, and your inaction would be of very high cost to the child. 
Considering these factors, it is probable this situation would elicit compassionate 
or helping behavior from most people, i.e., it is conducive to compassionate 
behavior. 
 However, compassionate behavior in this situation by itself would not be 
evidence for having the trait of compassion since contextual factors have made 
this a situation highly conducive to compassion. Consistency requires displaying 
trait-relevant behavior across situations with varying degrees of conduciveness to 
traits, not just in situations highly conducive to trait-relevant behavior.  
 What is more important is whether people who would save the child in a 
situation conducive to compassion would continue to act compassionately in 
other situations and show “individuating behavior” or “behavior that is outside 
the population norm for a situation.”19 In other words, would people who acted 
compassionately in a situation conducive to compassion continue to act 
compassionately in situations that are not particularly conducive to 
compassionate behavior?  
 Doris calls situations not conducive to particular traits “diagnostic” and 
defines them as situations “unfavorable enough to trait-relevant behavior that 
such behavior seems better explained by reference to individual dispositions than 
by reference to situational facilitators.”20 Doris states no conditions for diagnostic 
situations, though from the test cases in the next chapter I infer that diagnostic 
situations are situations where: 1) it is unclear that compassion is the right 
                                                   
19 Doris, Lack of Character, 19. 
 
20 Doris, Lack of Character, 19. 
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response in a situation, or 2) acting compassionately is unduly costly to the agent, 
or 3) there is great pressure not to act compassionately. 
 Doris uses the idea of diagnostic situations to define “robust” character 
traits. A person has a robust character trait if that person can be “confidently 
expected to display trait relevant behavior across a wide variety of trait-relevant 
situations, even where some or all of these situations are not optimally conducive 
to such behavior,” i.e., where at least some of the situations are diagnostic. 21   
Doris and other situationists doubt that people possess robust traits at all 
but allow for the possibility of “temporally stable, situation-particular “local” 
traits that are associated with important individual differences in behavior.”22 
Local traits are highly contextualized traits that are relatively stable across an 
individual’s lifetime (but not across different situations). For example, Alan does 
not possess the character trait of bravery across a variety of situations, he 
possesses the trait of bravery in x, y, and z situations (e.g., in the face of battle, 
wild animals, and heights but not necessarily across all situations).23 The more 
dissimilar the situations, the lower the consistency correlations are between 
them.24 However, this contextualized trait of bravery might be one that Alan 
displays throughout his lifetime. 
 As evidence for the existence of local traits Doris draws on the results 
from social psychologists like Newcomb, and Hartshorne and May showing the 
                                                   
21 Doris, Lack of Character, 18-19. 
 
22 Doris, Lack of Character, 23. 
 
23 Doris, Lack of Character, 62. At one point Doris says even this definition isn’t 
narrow enough because it is features of the situation and not John’s character that 
determine his behavior after all, so one might have to hedge it further and say, John is 
brave in the face of gun battle but not battles with cannons or at sea, etc.  
 
24 Doris cites Hartshorne and May’s study as evidence for this. 
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low cross-situational consistency of behavior with respect to traits like honesty, 
talkativeness, or even aggressiveness.25 As Hartshorne and May found out, a 
single person seemed to display one trait across x, y and z situations but not in p, 
q, and r situations. The predictability of individual responses in specific 
situations was quite low, calling into question the assumption that individuals 
displayed behavioral consistency across situations.26 Intent on finding some 
behavioral consistency, Hartshorne and May began asking questions about 
people’s behavior in specific contexts, for example “at parties” or “when around 
coworkers.” They found that low consistency correlations all but disappeared; 
people displayed consistent behaviors in specific contexts.27 For example, Smith 
might act consistently politely around his coworkers or around people at the 
grocery store, but his polite behavior in those contexts would not necessarily 
generalize to other contexts. 
 
Situationist Claims 
 Doris sets out to argue for three situationist claims, one against each of 
the three conditions for global character. First, against consistency, Doris says: 
behavioral variation across a population owes more to 
situational differences than dispositional differences 
among persons. Individual dispositional differences are 
not so behaviorally individuating as might have been 
supposed; to a surprising extent it is safest to predict, for a 
particular situation, that a person will behave in a fashion 
similar to the population norm. 28 
                                                   
25 See Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 95-102. 
 
26 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 95. 
 
27 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 98. 
 
28 Doris, Lack of Character, 24. 
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He argues for this claim by citing a number of cases where the behavior of the 
subjects seems to be due to situational pressures instead of dispositional 
differences. Doris’s idea is that if subjects had robust personality traits they 
would have demonstrated robust traits in the experiments instead of acting 
similarly to the rest of the subjects in the study (i.e., the population norm). Doris 
uses compassion as a sort of test case for his theory.29 He defines compassion as 
“a stable and consistent disposition to perform beneficent actions; failures to 
behave compassionately when doing so is appropriate and not unduly costly are 
evidence against attributing that trait.”30 
 
Stability 
 The second defining feature of global character is that character should be 
somewhat stable across time.31 Doris has this to say about stability: 
people will quite typically behave inconsistently with 
respect to the attributive standards associated with a trait, 
and whatever behavioral consistency is displayed may be 
readily disrupted by situational variation.32 
                                                   
29 Doris, Lack of Character, 28-30. The idea seems to be that as long as it is true of at 
least one character trait, it is true of all of them and so we must also reject the globalist 
conception of character and robust character traits. 
 
30 Doris, Lack of Character, 29. The discussion will be framed using Doris definition 
of compassion. In the psychological literature I reference to respond to his claims, the 
discussion is framed in the broader term of prosocial behavior. However, this seems to be 
getting at the same kind of behaviors Doris is concerned with as prosocial behavior is 
generally defined as “voluntary behavior intended to benefit another.” (For a discussion 
of prosocial behavior see Nancy Eisenberg, Tracy Spinrad and Adrienne Sadovsky, 
“Empathy-Related Responding in Children,” in Handbook of Moral Development, eds. 
Melanie Killen and Judith G. Smetana (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2006), 375-392). 
 
31 Doris, Lack of Character, 29. Doris says that, “situationism rejects the first and 
third globalist theses, while allowing a variant of the second.”  Situationists seem to argue 
most strongly against conditions one and three. 
 
32 Doris, Lack of Character, 24. 
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It varies only slightly from what he has to say about consistency because Doris 
believes stability is measured by consistency of behavior over a period of time.  
However, Doris accepts local traits can be stable across time. He argues 
that though an individual may be inconsistent in acting bravely or 
compassionately across a variety of situations, he may consistently act bravely 
across all situations with features x, y, and z, even across the space of many years. 
However, this sort of stability does not show the type of cross-situational 
consistency purportedly required by the Aristotelian conception of character.33  
  
Evaluative Integration 
Doris’s position toward evaluative integration is the following:  
personality is not often evaluatively integrated. For a given 
person, the dispositions operative in one situation may 
have an evaluative status very different from those 
manifested in another situation; evaluative inconsistent 
dispositions may “cohabitate” in a single personality. 34 
According to Doris, a single individual may have very different, perhaps even 
seemingly contradictory, character traits. For example, Matt may be courageous 
but also unjust and tyrannical, or he might be generous but not particularly 
compassionate.35 Doris refers to traits as having certain “valences” but never 
defines this term. From his discussion of the Aristotelian idea of the 
inseparability of the virtues, I infer that valences refer to virtuous traits like 
                                                   
33 Behavioral stability across time will turn out to be an important component of my 
proposed conception of character grounded in personality psychology research. I come 
back to stability in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
34 Doris, Lack of Character, 24. 
 
35 These are my examples, not Doris’s.  
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bravery, temperance, generosity, etc., versus vices like cowardice and 
stinginess.36 
 The idea of evaluative integration is that if an individual has at least one 
virtue, it is likely he will have other virtues. Doris argues that evaluative 
integration is false because we do find apparently conflicting traits within a single 
personality. We also find people who have one virtue (in isolation) and seem to 
lack the others.37 Doris’s definition of evaluative integration was his attempt at 
capturing something like the inseparability of the virtues, the idea that virtues are 
usually found together. According to this idea, the virtues cannot exist 
independently of one another so in order to have any one of the virtues 
completely you must have all of the virtues. 38 
 Aristotle claimed that one could not have one virtue in isolation; one 
could only be virtuous if one had all the virtues. This was because Aristotle 
believed that one of the requirements of virtue was practical wisdom: the 
intellectual virtue of being able to deliberate well, choose the best action in a 
situation, and be able to understand why that action was the best one.39 Aristotle 
held that one either did or did not have practical wisdom; one could not have 
practical wisdom in degrees. If one had practical wisdom as well as the moral 
                                                   
36 See Doris, Lack of Character, 20-22. 
 
37 Personality psychologists don’t hold anything like a unity of the virtues theory. This 
is strictly from the virtue ethics literature. 
 
38 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford UP, 1998), 
158, 1144b30. 
 
39 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, 142-43, 1140a25-, pp. 1140b30; 154-158, 
1143b18-1145a11. See for Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom. 
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virtues, then one had full virtue. 40 If one lacked practical wisdom, then one could 
not be fully virtuous.41   
 
Implications of Situationism in Other Fields 
 The truth of situationism does not merely affect Aristotelian or character 
based virtue ethics. Situationism has far-reaching consequences for numerous 
other areas outside of normative ethics. Below, I give a brief overview of how 
situationism is a problem for these other areas.  
 
Character Education 
 Situationism poses a problem for theories in moral education based in 
Aristotelian virtue ethics or character. At the beginning of the 21st century, moral 
education programs were on the rise in numerous schools, receiving federal 
funding.42 One of the dominant approaches in moral education is a type of 
character education associated with Aristotle.43 The assumption behind many of 
these character education programs is that in order for an individual to become a 
                                                   
40 These are virtues that one learns by habit. I will come back to moral virtues and a 
more thorough look at Aristotle’s definition of virtue in the fourth chapter. 
 
41 Although Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, 157, 1144b17) says that one might 
still have something called “natural virtue” if one lacks practical wisdom. However, 
because natural virtue lacks practical wisdom, one would not necessarily be consistent in 
acting virtuously because one would not properly understand why one should act 
virtuously of what virtue truly required in different situations. 
 
42 See Darcia Narvaez, “Integrative Ethical Education,” in Handbook of Moral 
Development, ed. Melanie Killen and Judith G. Smetana (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2006), 705, 
and Larry Nucci, “Education for Moral Development,” in Handbook of Moral 
Development, eds. M. Killen and J.G. Smetana (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2006), 659. Nucci 
writes that character education has risen so quickly in the past few years, one of his 
colleagues Ryan, refers to it as the “character education bandwagon.” 
 
43 See Narvaez, “Integrative Ethical Education,” 703. The other approach is associated 
with Kant through psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral reasoning. 
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moral person he must improve his character.44 Character is believed to be an 
internal disposition responsible for human behavior; in order to improve one’s 
behavior one must first improve one’s character. However, if features of a 
situation are the main drive behind human behavior, trying to improve one’s 
character for the sake of acting morally seems like a pointless exercise.  
 
Knowledge of the Causes of Human Behavior 
 Situationism is a problem not only for Aristotelian virtue ethicists but also 
for laypeople attempting to explain or predict behavior by referencing robust 
character traits. Generally, a person’s character is supposed to distinguish him 
from other people because the specific arrangement of character traits he has 
varies from that of other people. It is also supposed to determine how that person 
will act from situation to situation. We expect that people will behave consistently 
with their character across a variety of situations, including situations that 
require moral behaviors or actions. 
 
The Fundamental Attribution Error 
 Situationists believe that due to a failure to recognize the truth of 
situationism and the problem of cross-situational behavioral consistency, the 
majority of people, especially in Western cultures, tend to make what 
situationists have termed “the fundamental attribution error.”45 In their  book, 
                                                   
44 Most programs in moral education have a universal set of core values that the 
school as a whole is expected to emphasize, thus conveying a consistent message to the 
students about the best type of moral character. See Nucci, “Education for Moral 
Development”; Narvaez, “Integrative Ethical Education”; Edward A. Wynne and Kevin 
Ryan, Reclaiming our Schools (New York: Merill, 1993) and Edward A. Wynne, 
Character and Academics in the Elementary School (New York: Teachers College Press, 
1991) for more information on character education programs. 
45 Doris, Lack of Character, 105-106. 
 21
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcoming of Social Judgment, Nisbett and 
Ross defined the fundamental attribution error (FAE) as:  
the tendency to attribute overt behaviors to corresponding 
personal dispositions, thereby underestimating the causal role 
of environmental influences relative to such dispositions and 
overestimating the degree of cross-situational consistency in 
individual’s behavior.46 
 
Basically, the fundamental attribution error is our tendency to explain an 
instance of the behavior of other people by reference to dispositions or traits 
while paying little or no attention to the context of the situation. So for example, 
if I see someone acting rudely to their waiter, I assume that the person is 
behaving rudely because they have a disposition to be rude instead of analyzing 
the situation as a possible source of explanation for the rude behavior.  
 The fundamental attribution error also includes our tendency to assume 
consistency of behavior from one situation to the next. For example, I have a 
tendency to assume that because one of my colleagues is very polite and 
thoughtful around the office, he is also polite and thoughtful across other areas of 
his life. The character traits that situationists assert do not exist are the very same 
traits that we use to explain, predict, and evaluate each other’s behavior on a day-
to-day basis. This tendency to assume cross-situational behavioral consistency 
fails to recognize the situationist claim that human behavior is largely a product 
of situational features rather than personality or character traits. If there are no 
character traits to speak of and it is these traits we are using to try to explain and 
predict people’s behavior, we are not only seriously misunderstanding people’s 
                                                                                                                                           
 
46 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcoming of 
Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1980), 120.  
See also Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, p. 4. Ross and Nisbett 
define the FAE as: people’s inflated belief in the importance of personality traits and 
dispositions, together with their failure to recognize the importance of situational factors 
in affecting behavior. 
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why people behave the way they do, we are also setting ourselves up for 
disappointment or shock when somebody does not act the way we expect. 
 This suggests a lack of knowledge of what really drives human behavior, 
including our own behavior. If situationism is correct, then not only are we failing 
to recognize the true causes of human behavior, we are unable to predict not only 
the behavior or others but our own as well. If we assume that because of our 
strong character we are able to take on some situation that usually has a strong 
influence on people, such as situations with a great amount of temptation or 
pressure to behave in a certain way, we might be setting ourselves up for failure 
by not realizing just how strongly situational influences affect our behavior. 
Although psychologists have noted that we tend to reference character traits to 
explain behavior more when we are judging the behavior of others than our own, 
some of the debriefings from some of the experimental cases cited by situationists 
suggest a lack of self-knowledge.47 Many of the subjects in the experiments 
seemed baffled by their own behavior after the fact and seemed unable to assess 
correctly the influence of situational factors on their behavior.  
 
 
 
                                                   
47 See Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 139. Ross and Nisbett explain 
that they believe Fritz Heider’s explanation of this phenomenon (Fritz Heider, The 
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958), 54): the idea that people 
commit the fundamental attribution error more when judging the behavior of others than 
their own because when we observe another person, an actor, the actor is the “figure” and 
the situation is the “ground.” People are active and interesting and so our attention is 
focused on them while the situation seems static and we know only the vaguest details of 
it (especially how the actor is perceiving that situation). However, in our own situation, 
since we cannot see the “actor” in that situation but merely the situation itself, the 
situation is the figure and so we are more inclined to cite the effect of situational factors 
on our behavior.  
See also Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference, 123. 
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Moral Agency and Responsibility 
 It is important to note here that the situationist evidence is problematic 
on its own, apart from the situationist thesis concerning traditional character 
traits.48 While the situationist thesis primarily attacks the traditional conception 
of character and is problematic for character-based theories, the historical cases 
and social-psychological experiments that situationists cite pose a problem of 
their own. As we will see in the next chapter, the situationist evidence shows that 
subtle situational factors can affect human behavior without the conscious notice 
or approval of the agent, sometimes pushing the agent to act in ways he would 
not have endorsed otherwise.  
 Situationism poses a problem for theories of moral agency and 
responsibility from two different fronts. On the one hand, if we really lack 
knowledge about the causes of our own behavior, as the situationist evidence 
seems to show, this is problematic for any theories of moral agency that require 
identification with one’s motives for acting in order to attribute freedom of 
choice. If I do not know the motives of my actions, then I cannot identify with 
them. In addition, the situationist thesis is problematic for theories that require 
me to act out of a robust (or even global) character in order to identify with my 
actions. If having a robust character is not possible, then I cannot identify with 
my actions. 
                                                   
48 Dana Nelkin, "Freedom, Responsibility, and the Challenge of Situationism," 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29, no.1 (2005), 10. Nelkin makes a similar point. She 
argues we should distinguish between the threat posed by what she calls the “substantive” 
thesis of situationism concerning the role of traditional character traits in our behavior, 
and the situationist literature and what it shows independently of this thesis. For 
example, the situationist literature seems to show that situational features largely and 
unconsciously affect our behavior. This is not a point about character necessarily, but 
merely the observation that we may not be as free to act or as responsible for our actions 
as we believe ourselves to be. 
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Situationism is also generally troubling because it seems to show that 
situational features can override beliefs and values important to the agent. If 
features of environments can greatly influence human behavior without our 
conscious notice or endorsement, then at least some of the time we are not acting 
out of motivations that are important to us and as Dana Nelkin points out, in that 
case we are not acting as we would really like.49 Whether this means we are not 
acting for reasons we would endorse or that we are not acting out of the kind of 
character we would like to have, in either case, we are not acting out of the beliefs 
and values that are important to us.  
 Nelkin suggests that a more general problem is that the situationist 
evidence shows that situational features override our ability to respond to good 
reasons in various ways.50 So for example, psychologist Stanley Milgram that the 
subjects of his experiment (which we will look at in the next chapter) acted the 
way they did because they were responding to the authority figure of the 
experimenter in the room. In other words, the subjects acted out of a sense of 
obedience to the experimenter and failed to act out of a sense of duty or 
compassion to the supposed victim who apparently needed their help. Many of 
the subjects themselves later confessed to wanting to help the victim but feeling 
compelled to obey the experimenter and complete the experiment.51 This is a 
failure to act for good reasons. For many of the subjects, their own beliefs and 
values about not harming others gave them good reason to stop the 
                                                   
49 Nelkin, “Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism,” 18.  
 
50 Nelkin, “Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism,” 17-21.  
 
51 See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1974), 33, 53-4, 81-2. 
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experimenter, yet they failed to act on these reasons, feeling instead compelled to 
act out of obedience to the experimenter. 
 Our lack of knowledge about the causes of our own behavior and/or 
failure to act for good reasons under certain types of situational pressures leads 
to problems for any theory of moral responsibility that requires an individual to 
understand or identify with the reasons behind his actions in order to be morally 
responsible for them. If situational factors affect our behavior to a greater degree 
than internal dispositions and we are unaware of this, then we do not really 
understand the reasons behind out behavior. However, it is not merely theories of 
moral responsibility requiring identification with one’s motives for which a lack 
of self-knowledge or freedom would be problematic.  
 Theories of responsibility that require one to be in control of one’s actions 
in order to be morally responsible for one’s actions might also find the 
situationist evidence troubling. 52 If one must be in control of one’s actions in 
order to be morally responsible but situational features largely drive our behavior 
in a variety of situations, then we are not in control of our behavior in those 
situations and are not morally responsible in those situations.53 That means that 
we are not morally responsible in situations where situational features put great 
                                                   
52 For example, see R. Jay Wallace’s theory of responsibility in R. Jay Wallace, 
“Reason and Responsibility,” in Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral 
Psychology and Practical Reason, ed. R. Jay Wallace (New York: Oxford UP, 2006), 125. 
53 John M. Doris and Dominic Murphy, “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral 
Psychology of Atrocity,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31, no.1 (2007), 25-55. Doris 
and Murphy argue something along these lines in response to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. 
They argue that causal responsibility is not sufficient for moral responsibility; one must 
have some sort of self-control over one’s actions in order to regulate one’s behavior and 
be responsible for that behavior. Since certain situational conditions (for example, 
wartime conditions like those at Abu Ghraib or My Lai, which we will look at in the next 
chapter) might render without one’s normal “powers of self-control” and thus unable to 
regulate one’s behavior, one is not morally responsible for that behavior. Doris and 
Murphy define powers of self-control as “capacities that motivate and regulate behavior 
in light of the relevant cognition.” 
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pressures on the individuals in those situations to act a certain way rather than 
another, and that includes situations where agents committed violence or brutal 
crimes against innocent others. This last consideration brings up issues of moral 
luck. 
 If situational features can drive our behavior in powerful ways, sometimes 
overriding our moral beliefs or values, and we are not fully in control of the 
situations in which we find ourselves, then it is a matter of luck how moral we 
turn out to be. For example, if through no fault of my own I find myself in 
situations that exert a great deal of pressure on me to act in a way that I would 
usually consider immoral, then my failing to act morally in those situations will 
be a matter of luck. However, if acting morally is a result of my decision to act 
morally or a result of my having a moral character, my being a moral person 
would be more in my control. 
 
Normative Ethical Theory 
The lack of self-control of one’s behavior shown by the situationist 
evidence is more generally problematic for many normative ethical theories. Most 
normative ethical theories assume we are at least somewhat in control of our 
actions, otherwise there would be no point in dictating the types of actions one 
must do in order to be moral. If situationism is correct and situational features 
rather than internal dispositions often drive our behavior, then we are not really 
in control of our actions.  
The more general point is that even if we have a certain set of beliefs and 
values about what is important to us, if our desire to be moral can be overridden 
by subtle situational factors that act on us without our conscious notice, then we 
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are not really acting the way we would wish.54 We might adopt a set of rules (or 
just one rule) that we believe will help us to act morally, but if situational features 
act beneath our conscious notice we may not even get the opportunity to 
implement those rule(s). For example, suppose I believe I have a duty not to 
harm innocent people but certain types of situations can affect my behavior in 
such a way as to make me believe harm is acceptable in those situations.55 I may 
wind up not implementing the rule in a situation that demanded it and fail to act 
morally. 
Conclusion 
 The situationist thesis is problematic for virtue ethics theories grounded 
in an assumption that character is a real psychological structure that a person 
might possess. If situationists are correct, then our behavior has less to do with 
consistent internal dispositions than it does with features of the situations in 
which we find ourselves. Our character as well as the consistency of our behavior 
is called into question by this theory and the evidence given in its support. 
 Moreover, the situationist evidence is troubling apart from the situationist 
thesis because of what it purports to show about the effects of situational factors 
on human behavior. If a great variety of situational features can have subtle, 
                                                   
54 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 141. For 
example, Hursthouse argues that acting morally requires one to act for the right reasons, 
for their own sake. Although she argues for a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, she does not 
require that an agent act out of character but merely that he endorse the actions that he 
does and that he acts for the right reason (she argues there is a list of reasons that are 
acceptable as “right” reasons). Acting rightly also requires having the right emotions at 
the time of the action. However, if situational features can somehow push me to believe 
this is not even a situation requiring moral action, I may still fail to perform the correct 
moral action because I would not realize this is the type of situation requiring me to act 
morally at all. 
 
55 As we will see in the next chapter, this can happen in any number of ways including 
because I am made to believe there is something else more important than the harm 
principle, such as obeying authority (see the Milgram example, next chapter), or because 
I believe I am not really harming a human being or, even, that it is my duty to harm them 
(see My Lai and Abu Ghraib). 
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unexpected effects on our behavior without our conscious notice, overriding our 
beliefs and values in a number of situations, then we are far less in control of our 
behavior than we believe. As noted above, this has implications not only for 
virtue ethics but other normative ethical theories as well. It is also worrying for 
various accounts of moral agency, moral responsibility, and moral luck. 
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Chapter 2 
SITUATIONISM: THE SITUATIONIST EVIDENCE 
  
In this chapter, I give a thorough analysis of the experimental and 
historical cases that situationists cite as evidence for their theory. I examine the 
methods and conclusions of the experimental cases as well as the history and 
background leading up to the historical cases. For each case, I give a brief history 
and description of the methods and conclusions, specifying the situational 
influences that situationists claim are at work in each case. I then explain why the 
case is important evidence for situationism and why situationists argue that 
situational factors rather than dispositional factors are a better explanation for 
the behavior in each situation. I also discuss how the case is evidence for the 
situationist thesis described in chapter 1. 
 
The Experimental Cases 
 
1. Isen and Levin—“Cookies and Kindness” and “Dime in a Phone booth” 
The “dime in a phone booth” is the second part of an experiment with two 
studies conducted by Alice Isen and Paula Levin in the early 70’s.1 Situationists 
tend to focus mainly on this study, set up in the following way: in a shopping mall 
in either suburban San Francisco or Philadelphia, a confederate pretends to make 
                                                   
1 See Alice Isen and Paula Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and 
Kindness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21, no. 3 (March 1972): 385. 
The experiment included two separate studies with two related goals, one of which was to 
try to determine whether feeling good would lead to increased helping. 
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an incomplete call using a public telephone booth.2 In some cases, the 
confederate leaves the dime behind in the coin return slot, while in other cases he 
takes it with him. Naïve subjects in the control group were those shoppers who 
used the phone after the experimenter and did not find the dime in the coin slot, 
while shoppers who did find a leftover dime in the coin slot were the subjects for 
the experimental group. As the subject left the telephone booth, a female 
confederate walking in the same direction, but slightly ahead and to the side, 
dropped a folder full of papers in the subject’s path. The dependent measure was 
whether finding the dime in the coin slot had any positive or negative effect on 
the helping behavior of the subjects. Isen and Levin’s results were as follows in 
table 1: 3 
Table 1 Number of subjects who helped in experimental versus control condition 
Condition 
Females Males 
Helped 
Did not 
help 
Helped 
Did not 
help 
Dime (experimental) 
No dime (control) 
8 
0 
0 
16 
6 
1 
2 
8 
Source: Data from Isen and Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and 
Kindness,” 387. 
 
 Isen and Levin found that for both males and female subjects, the rate of 
helping varied depending on whether the subject was in the experimental or the 
control group. Both male and female subjects in the experimental group who 
found the dime seemed more likely to stop and help the confederate than did the 
subjects in the control group who did not find a dime. Isen and Levin concluded 
that finding the dime in the phone booth elevated the mood of the subjects, 
                                                   
2 Confederates are actors or subjects who are collaborators of the experimenters and 
know the true purpose or goal of the experiments. This is in contrast to “naïve” subjects, 
who are not accomplices of the experimenter and have no knowledge of the true purposes 
of the experiment or of the affiliation of the confederate to the experimenters. To 
distinguish them, I will refer to confederates merely as “confederates” and naïve subjects 
as “subjects.” 
 
3 Isen and Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness,” 387. 
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making them more likely to stop and help. They did not speculate on why feeling 
good made one more likely to help, but merely that there seemed to be a 
relationship between the two. 
 
Significance 
 Situationists use these findings to show that even in very low cost helping 
behaviors like helping someone pick up their papers, a small situational cue or 
pressure like finding a dime in a telephone booth heavily influences whether to be 
helpful. This case is important to the situationist evidence because it shows how 
even a very small, seemingly irrelevant feature of a situation like finding a dime 
can affect human behavior. Moreover, the helpful behavior displayed in this 
situation seemed to be a result of the effect of the situational feature of finding a 
dime, not a spontaneous display of helpfulness from individuals with a consistent 
trait of helpfulness.  
 According to Doris’s substantive theory, situationists are concerned with 
robust traits, or traits displayed across a variety situations relevant to some trait 
x, including situations that are not conducive to trait x. The Isen and Levin 
experiment was a situation where the trait of helpfulness would have been 
applicable. The subjects who failed to help in the control condition were not 
robustly helpful because an individual with the robust character trait of 
helpfulness would have helped whether or not the situation was conducive to 
helpful behavior. As for those in the experimental condition who did stop to help, 
their behavior by itself is not evidence for a robust trait since it went along with 
the population norm for that condition. Moreover, once one looks at the numbers 
for the two conditions, it seems pretty clear that the dime in the phone booth 
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played a larger role in whether subjects were helpful than did some internal 
disposition. 
Although the dime experiment is the Isen and Levin study most cited by 
situationists, the title of their paper “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies 
and Kindness” actually refers to the first study reviewed in the paper. Isen and 
Levin were interested in a number of studies done in the late 60’s that postulated 
that the role of an individual’s mood affected their helpfulness. One important 
determinant of helpfulness was the potential helper’s positive affective state or 
“warm glow of success.”4 Isen and Levin’s first study spanned five sessions and 
was conducted in the libraries of a university and two colleges in Philadelphia. 
Fifty-two male students who were studying in individual carrels served as 
subjects. At the beginning of the session, a coordinator randomly assigned rows 
of carrels to either the “feel good” or the “neutral” condition. The “feel good” 
condition was induced by distributing cookies along the rows that had been 
assigned to that condition.  
 The subjects were then divided randomly into “help” or “hinder” groups. 
The subjects became aware that they were either in a “help” or “hinder” group but 
were unaware that some of the subjects had received cookies while others hadn’t. 
A few minutes after the confederates either distributed the cookies (or didn’t and 
simply walked by the subjects), the experimenter approached each subject 
individually and asked if and for how many twenty minute sessions they would 
serve in a psychology experiment. In the help condition, the subject was 
supposed to help subjects who would be attempting to discover novel uses for 
ordinary items. The experimenter told the subjects the purpose of this 
                                                   
4 Isen and Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness,” 384. 
 33
experiment was an investigation into creativity. In the hinder condition, the job 
of the subject was to distract a randomly chosen, unwitting student who was 
studying in the library. In this condition, the subject would drop books, make 
noise, rattle papers, etc., while the experimenter recorded the reactions of the 
student trying to study. The experimenter told the subjects the purpose of this 
experiment was an investigation about distractibility. 
 The experimenters found that for subjects who had been given a cookie, 
nine out of thirteen of them agreed to be part of the “help” investigation, while 
only four out of thirteen of them agreed to help with the “hinder” investigation. 
For the subjects who had not been given a cookie, however, only six out of twelve 
of them agreed to assist in the “help” investigation, while nine out of fourteen of 
them agreed to help in the “hinder” investigation. Isen and Levin concluded that 
feeling good, induced naturally by the cookies, lead to an increased desire to help.  
 
Significance 
As with the dime experiment, Isen and Levin wanted to show that 
depending on one’s mood one was more or less likely to be helpful. The 
researchers hypothesized that the subjects in the cookie condition were in a 
better mood after receiving the cookies than they had been when the researchers 
first walked in. Being in a better mood made them more open to the idea not only 
of helping with the experiment but also of being helpful to one of their fellow 
students with their studies. By contrast, the students who did not get cookies just 
went into the experiment in whatever mood they happened to be in, not having 
their mood enhanced by the addition of the cookies. This meant they were less 
likely to volunteer to be helpful to another person, as opposed to merely being 
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distracting (although still helping with the experiment). According to Isen and 
Levin, this shows that being in a better mood leads to increased helping. Even if 
what the results of the experiment actually show are not entirely clear, at the very 
least we can take away that students seemed more likely to chose to help or 
hinder depending on the condition they were in.5 
 
2. Princeton Seminary Experiment 
 Psychologists John Darley and Daniel Batson conducted the Princeton 
Seminary study, often dubbed “The Good Samaritan” experiment, at Princeton 
University. The subjects of the study were 47 students of the Princeton 
Theological Seminary. When subjects appeared for the experiment, an 
experimenter asked them to give a 3-5 minute talk on some passage handed to 
them. The first variable was that for some of the students the passage was the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, while for others it was a passage about the kinds 
of jobs seminarians could do. The second variable was the following: some of the 
students were told that they were already late to give their talk and so should 
                                                   
5 Situationists do not often cite the results of this experiment, even if it happens to be 
the first part of the famous dime in a booth experiment studied in countless social 
psychology classes and mentioned by every situationist. The reason for this seems to be 
that the results of this experiment do not clearly show the hypothesis that an elevated 
mood induces one to be more helpful than not. This could be blamed on the procedure 
used in the experiment or other factors, but it is clear that the results of this experiment 
do not show with any certainty that situational features influence a person one way versus 
another. Isen and Levin do not talk about the fact that slightly more of the subjects who 
did not receive a cookie still volunteered to help with the psychology experiment (fifteen 
out of twenty-six as opposed to thirteen out of twenty-six in the cookie condition), even 
though of those that did not receive a cookie who volunteered more of them volunteered 
to help in the hinder condition, not the help condition. Agreeing to help the experimenter 
at all is a form of helping as well and roughly the same number of students in the no 
cookie condition agreed to help (two more actually) than in the cookie condition. 
 
Isen and Levin do address the fact that they weren’t sure if helpfulness was a result of 
the good mood induced by the cookies or because the subjects had just been exposed to a 
helpful model in the confederate handing out the cookies. This was the reason for the 
second part of the experiment, i.e., the dime in a phone booth experiment that would 
hopefully yield clearer results. 
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hurry to the building where they would give their talk, while other students were 
told no such thing.  
When all of the students passed through an alley on the way to the next 
building there was a shabbily dressed man slumped in a doorway, head down, 
eyes closed, not moving. As the student went by, the man coughed twice and 
groaned, keeping his head down. If the student stopped and asked if something 
was wrong or offered to help, the man looked startled and somewhat groggy and 
would reply, "Oh, thank you [cough]. . . . No, it's all right.[Pause] I've got this 
respiratory condition [cough].. . . The doctor's given me these pills to take, and I 
just took one. . . . If I just sit and rest for a few minutes I'll be O.K. . . . Thanks 
very much for stopping though [smiles weakly]."6 If the student persisted in 
helping, insisting on taking the man inside the building, the man would accept 
the help and stand up.  
Darley and Batson found that subjects in a hurry were less likely to help 
than subjects who were not in a hurry. In the non-hurry condition, 63% of the 
subjects offered help compared to only 45% of those in an intermediate hurry and 
10% of those in the high-hurry condition. This correlation held steady even across 
those subjects who were going to give a talk about the passage of the Good 
Samaritan.7 The factor that seemed to have the largest effect on behavior was 
whether the subject was in a hurry. 
 
 
 
                                                   
6 John Darley and Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational 
and dispositional variables in helping behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 27, no. 1 (1973): 104. 
 
7 See Darley and Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho.”  
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Significance 
Situationists often cite this experiment because it was the rather trivial 
situational feature of “being in a hurry” that affected the helping behavior of the 
subjects. What is notable about this case is that the subjects were seminarians, 
individuals whose vocation includes helping others. Moreover, some of them 
were even reminded of this by being given the parable of the Good Samaritan to 
read before being sent off to the building where they would give a talk. Yet this 
apparently had no effect on how likely the subjects were to display helpful 
behavior. It was being or not being in a hurry that affected helpful behavior. 
Moreover, since a trivial situational factor affected the likelihood of 
helping behavior, the helping behavior did not appear to be the result of a robust 
character trait. Those subjects that helped in the non-hurrying condition, while 
acting compassionately, merely acted according to the population norm, and 
those that did not help acted inconsistently with a compassionate or helpful 
robust character trait (as well as also acting along with the population norm of 
not helping in that condition). Seminarians would be expected to have thought 
more about the robust character trait of helpfulness or compassion since it is 
often part of their work to help those in need, and yet even among the 
seminarians what determined a compassionate response (helping the fallen man) 
depended more on the features of the situation than on a robust character trait. 
 
3. The Milgram Experiment 
One of the most important pieces of social psychological evidence often 
cited by situationists is the infamous Milgram experiment. Between 1960 and 
1963 at Yale University, Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment with male and 
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female subjects from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds recruited via a 
newspaper ad or an automated phone call. The experiment was ostensibly a study 
of learning and memory where the subjects would be paid a small fee for their 
participation. There were a number of variations to this experiment, but the most 
famous variation of the experiment was set up in the following way: one 
confederate played the experimenter issuing commands to the naïve test subjects 
while the second confederate pretended to be a fellow naïve test subject.8  The 
second confederate and the naïve subject drew lots (rigged beforehand) with the 
naïve subject ending up as teacher while the confederate was to be the learner. 
The learner was then strapped into a chair with electrodes on his wrist in another 
room and out of view of the naïve subject during the test. The experimenter 
explained that the straps were to prevent excessive movement, although the effect 
was to make it appear that it was impossible for the learner to escape from the 
chair. The naïve subject was given a small shock from the electrodes to convince 
him he would be issuing real shocks to the learner.  
The experimenter then took the naïve subject into another room, where 
the subject sat in front of a shock generator with 30 lever switches while the 
experimenter sat nearby. The experimenter instructed the naïve subject to read a 
series of word pairs to the learner via a microphone. The learner would have to 
respond by pressing one of four switches in front of him that lit up one of four 
numbered quadrants in an answer box located on top of the shock generator. For 
every word that the learner got incorrectly the naïve subject would have to push a 
button on the shock generator that the subject believed would issue a shock to the 
                                                   
8 Some variations had no effect while others had very interesting effects. For more on 
the variations of the experiment and their results see: Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to 
Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 
 38
learner. After each mistake, the experimenter asked the naïve subject to give the 
learner a shock of a higher voltage, with some of the highest voltages (375-450 
volts) labeled “Danger: Severe Shock.” With each increase, the learner responded 
with increased distress that could be heard through the laboratory walls, 
screaming and asking to be set free, until at 300 volts he ceased responding at all, 
either in the form of protests or answers. If the naïve subject protested to the 
experimenter in the room with him, the experimenter responded with a series of 
predetermined responses and prods like, “please go on” or “you must continue.” 
Milgram found that 25 out of 40 subjects shocked the “learner” all the way to the 
end, even in this variation of the experiment where the subjects were told at the 
beginning of the experiment that the learner had a heart condition.  
 
Significance  
 Situationists focus on this study because of the surprising number of 
subjects that were willing to issue high voltage shocks to another person merely 
because they were told to do so. As Doris points out, it is unlikely that Milgram 
merely “tapped into a group of sadists that all happened to respond to the call for 
subjects” so it is unlikely that the behavior was a result of a number of the 
subjects being intentionally cruel or callous.9 The agitated state of many of the 
subjects and great reluctance to continue shocking the learner beyond 300 volts 
is evidence that they felt some compassion for the learner.10 A more plausible 
explanation is that human behavior is much more sensitive to situational cues 
than was previously believed and that the particular situation, not the character 
                                                   
9 For a full discussion by Doris of the results, see Doris, Lack of Character, 42-50. 
 
10 See Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 33; 53-4; 81-2. 
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traits of the native subjects, led to the results found in the Milgram experiment. 
In this case, the situational cues included the laboratory setting, the learner and 
the naïve subject being in different rooms (proximity of victim), the subject being 
the sole subject in the study, and the experimenter’s presence and calm 
demeanor (authority figure). Milgram noted that in variations where the 
experimenter was not in the room but gave instructions over the phone or via 
another subject (who was actually a confederate playing the role of a naïve 
subject), or variations where the naïve subject had to force the learner’s hand 
onto a touch plate in order to issue a shock, there was a sharp drop-off in 
compliance. This is still telling, however, since obedient behavior varied along 
with situational cues. 11  
 A failure to behave compassionately when doing so would have been 
appropriate and “not unduly costly” to the agent (who merely had to get up and 
leave without losing anything) is evidence against attributing a robust trait of 
compassion to the subjects. Since most of the subjects seemed to go along with 
the population norm in the variations of the experiment, their behavior seems to 
be due to situational factors, not individual character traits.  
 
4. Stanford Prison Experiment 
Situationists cite social psychologist Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison 
Experiment (SPE) as a piece of particularly troubling evidence of the disastrous 
effects of situational variables on behavior.12 This experiment from the 1970’s was 
supposed to be a demonstration of the effects of situational variables on the 
                                                   
11 For more, see Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 32-72. 
 
12 See Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil 
(New York: Random House, 2007).  
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behavior of individuals role-playing as prisoners or guards in a simulated prison 
environment. Zimbardo and his team chose the subjects carefully so that none of 
the subjects came into the simulated prison setting with any sort of pathology like 
the kind that would show up later. All subjects had filled out a series of 
psychological personality self-reports and the experimenters chose only those 
subjects that showed no history of crime, emotional or physical disability, or 
intellectual or social disadvantage that might differentiate them from the other 
subjects.13 The experimenters assigned the subjects at random to a role of either 
prisoner or guard.  
To make everything seem as real as possible, those students assigned to 
play prisoners were handcuffed, body-searched, and arrested by actual police 
officers at their homes the Sunday prior to the experiment; some of them in front 
of neighbors or family. They were then driven in a police car to the police station 
while the whole arrest was filmed. Upon arriving at the prison, the subjects 
assigned to play the guards stripped the “prisoners” naked, sprayed them with a 
powder they claimed to be delouser, and then gave them their uniforms. 
Uniforms consisted of smocks with numbers on them that would replace the 
prisoner’s name, a nylon cap to simulate the shaving of one’s head, and a chain 
                                                   
13 The measures that Zimbardo tested the participants on before the experiment were 
the F-Scale of authoritarianism, the Machiavellian Scale of interpersonal manipulation 
strategies and the Comrey Personality Scales.  
The F-scale tests the “rigid adherence to conventional values and a submissive, 
uncritical attitude toward authority” (Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 198).  
The Machiavellian scale assesses one’s “endorsement of strategies for gaining effective 
advantage in interpersonal encounters” (Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 198). Zimbardo 
found no real difference on these two scales for the scores of the guards versus the 
prisoners. 
The Comrey Personality scale was a self-report assessment used to predict dispositional 
variations in trustworthiness, orderliness, conformity, activity, stability, extroversion, 
masculinity and empathy (Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 199). On this scale, the average 
scores of the guards and the prisoners were virtually interchangeable although there were 
some slight variations within individuals. 
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strapped to one ankle that stayed on even while the prisoner slept. The prisoners 
were also given a number of rules by which they had to abide, including not 
talking to fellow prisoners in public, addressing each other by number only, and 
having many things they would come to expect in the outside world—like mail, 
smoking, and visitors—suddenly turned into privileges. Because the bathroom 
was outside of the area designated as a prison, when the prisoners used the 
bathroom (at pre-assigned hours), the guards placed paper bags over their heads 
and chained them together by their ankle chains, forcing them to walk one after 
another by touching the shoulder of the person in front of them. 
Some of the subjects assigned to guards began to take advantage of their 
positions of power almost immediately, humiliating the prisoners individually or 
by subjecting them to whims. Within a week, guards became excessively hostile 
and aggressive toward the prisoners and were recorded giving harsh commands, 
insulting prisoners, deindividuating prisoners, and showing verbal and physical 
aggression toward the prisoners, for example by threatening and using 
instruments against them.  
Meanwhile the students assigned as prisoners became passive and 
“mindlessly obedient,” yielding to the whims of the guards with little or no 
resistance. 14 When one of the prisoners actually tried to take some passive 
resistance by going on a hunger strike, the other prisoners harassed him for being 
a troublemaker rather than supporting him. The prisoners were nonsupportive 
and noncooperative amongst themselves, as if having internalized the negative 
image the guards had of them. This passive obedience and noncooperative 
                                                   
14 Zimbardo often uses this term to describe the behavior of the prisoners during the 
SPE in The Lucifer Effect. 
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behavior amongst victims would show up again in the real-life cases of the 
genocides in Rwanda and during the Holocaust, a testament to the sorts of effects 
that certain situations can have not only on the aggressors in those situations but 
on their victims as well. 
Zimbardo was amazed to find that when they brought in an actual 
chaplain to consult with the prisoners, the chaplain as well as many of the 
prisoners talked about their “parole” and “trials” as if actually believing that they 
were in a real prison awaiting a public defender to get their day in court. 
The experiment, which was supposed to last two weeks, was prematurely 
terminated one week after it began. By one week, the guards had started to inflict 
sexual humiliation on the prisoners akin to some of the practices that would later 
happen at Abu Ghraib.15 Many of the prisoners had already been released prior to 
the end of week by Zimbardo because they showed signs of extreme stress and 
depression. 
Zimbardo was impressed with the extent of the effects on the students 
involved as well as on himself. Not only was he astounded by the way the subjects 
internalized the prison settings and their roles and came to see them as quite real, 
he was also amazed with the speed with which the subjects playing the guards 
resorted to aggression and humiliation when dealing with the prisoners. He later 
remarked in his book The Lucifer Effect that he felt that even he, as the 
researcher, was caught up in the situational influences of the experiment. 
Although he daily saw reasons for stopping the experiment immediately, he let it 
continue even after he saw the sorts of effects it had on the students in the 
experiment. Zimbardo concluded that good people can be “induced, seduced and 
                                                   
15 I will discuss the Abu Ghraib case at length below. 
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initiated into behaving in evil ways” as well as being led to act in ways that are 
“irrational, self-destructive, antisocial and stupid.”16 
 
Significance 
As Zimbardo states, the SPE was not a study of trivial situational factors 
like finding a dime in a phone booth bur rather a situation where every aspect of 
the environment was controlled by the experimenter. One of the situational 
factors that affected the behavior of the subjects was the anonymity of the 
prisoners, achieved by giving each prisoner a number and referring to the 
prisoners only by their numbers. Moreover, both guards and prisoners were given 
uniforms that denoted their status in the experiment: guards were given clubs 
and glasses to hide their eyes behind while the prisoners had to wear merely 
smocks with their identification number on them as well as a chain around their 
ankle. The prisoners had all their belongings taken away and were not allowed to 
talk to each other in public. All of these factors contributed to making the 
experiment feel more real and creating a certain power dynamic between 
prisoners and guards, where guards had almost complete control of the prisoners 
(and many abused this power) while the prisoners had to submit to the whims of 
those in power.  
The Stanford Prison Experiment is a particularly important piece of 
evidence for situationism because of the surprising severity of the results. It is 
also astonishing the speed with which both prisoners and guards accepted the 
simulated prison and their roles in it as reality. Moreover, the extent of the 
cruelty of the subjects playing guards and the passive obedience of those playing 
                                                   
16Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 211. 
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the prisoners was completely unforeseen. Since Zimbardo had tried to choose 
psychologically healthy subjects, neither the cruelty nor the passive obedience 
seemed explicable by reference to the dispositions of the subjects. Furthermore, 
the subjects had been assigned their roles at random, yet most of them altered 
their behavior and dispositions to fill their roles within a few days. None of the 
subjects had ever been imprisoned before so the socialization into the prison 
environment happened over the week they spent there. 
Zimbardo agrees with situationists that these sorts of situations challenge 
the view of a relatively stable and consistent individual personality or character, 
especially when it comes to morality. Zimbardo writes that he was not surprised 
when he heard about Abu Ghraib, which he discusses at length in The Lucifer 
Effect. Zimbardo’s main contention in this book is that certain situations can 
make average or even seemingly good people commit brutal or humiliating acts 
against fellow human beings without feelings of remorse or guilt. His book, as 
well as the website he created for it, warn of “unwanted [situational] influences” 
and the various ways that they can influence our behavior.17 
One of the requirements of robust traits is that the trait-relevant behavior 
be displayed in a variety of situations, including situations that are not conducive 
to that trait, what Doris calls diagnostic situations. The Stanford Prison 
experiment is a good example of a diagnostic situation because the pressure to 
behave according to one’s prescribed roles was overwhelming. While one may 
argue that this is merely a failure in one situation, the extent of compliance with 
                                                   
17 Zimbardo also has some ideas on how we can counter these influences, but I will 
discuss those in the next chapter. 
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the situation seems to provide strong evidence against the attribution of robust 
traits to most of the subjects in the SPE.18 
 
 
The Historical Cases 
5. Kitty Genovese 
A historical case often cited as evidence for situationism is the infamous 
case of Catherine “Kitty” Genovese, a young woman murdered just outside her 
apartment complex within sight of her neighbors. On the night of March 13, 1964, 
Genovese was attacked three separate times outside of the apartment complex in 
which she lived in New York City. Over the course of half an hour, her assailant 
stabbed her several times, sexually assaulted her, and then left her to bleed to 
death. Although the attacks were in the courtyard of her apartment complex and 
Genovese screamed for help, no one offered to help or call the police until after 
she was mortally wounded. The story that ran in the New York Times later that 
day was titled “37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police. Apathy at Stabbing of 
Queens Woman Shocks Inspector.” The journalist who reported on the story 
wrote that 38 of Genovese’s neighbors had seen the attack, yet none of them 
interfered during the attack and only one called the police only after Genovese 
was already dying.  
According to a recent article about the Kitty Genovese murders by a group 
of psychologists from England, the events of that night paved the way for the 
development of the theory in social psychology, coined by psychologists Latane 
                                                   
18 That is, any of the subjects that complied. Zimbardo notes there was at least one 
“prisoner” who rebelled and several guards who were reluctant to mistreat the prisoners. 
(See Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil.) 
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and Darley, as the “bystander effect.”19 This refers to the theory that the more 
people there are standing around in an emergency situation, the less likely 
anyone is to help.  
According to Latane and Darley, the bystander effect inhibits bystander 
intervention in two ways. First, there is a diffusion of responsibility among the 
many bystanders. If there is only one person in the room when an emergency 
takes place, then they are the only person who can help and failure to do so would 
make that individual the sole person responsible for the outcome of the situation. 
If however, there are several people standing in the room, then each person bears 
some small brunt of the responsibility for the consequences. The second way the 
bystander effect works is that in ambiguous situation when we are unclear as to 
what is the proper reaction to a situation we naturally look to others. If we are 
unsure what the correct response is in a certain situation, the failure of others to 
help in a situation reinforces our belief that not helping is the correct action to 
take in that situation.20 
 
Significance 
The Kitty Genovese murder led to the most persistent account of the 
bystander effect, the idea that bystanders do not intervene when there is a 
number of bystanders in a situation because the presence of others negatively 
effects the likelihood of any one of them intervening. The Genovese case is 
mentioned in most social psychology textbooks as a powerful illustration of how 
factors in a situation can hinder the helping responses of a bystander when there 
                                                   
19 See Rachel Manning, Mark Levine, and Adam Collins, “The Kitty Genovese Murder 
and the Social Psychology of Helping: The Parable of the 38 Witnesses,” American 
Psychologist 62, no. 6 (2007): 555-562.  
 
20 See Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 41-42. 
 47
are other bystanders present. More broadly, the case shows how the presence of 
others can profoundly affect one’s behavior without one realizing it.  
 Out of the thirty-eight people who heard Genovese’s screams that night, 
some (if not most) of them had to be at least averagely moral people yet none of 
them responded from a robust character trait of compassion. One would expect a 
person of average morality would have some compassion, and compassion would 
require one to do at least the minimal act of calling the police or attempting to 
scare off Genovese’s attacker from the safety of one’s window. Even if this 
situation was a diagnostic one because perhaps it was unclear that help was 
required, that still leaves thirty-eight people failing to act compassionately and 
along with the population norm instead.  
 However, in a recent article, psychologists Rachel Manning, Mark Levine, 
and Adam Levine claim that the Genovese case is not as clear cut as most social 
psychology books would have it seem. Manning et al. conducted an analysis of the 
court transcripts from the trial of Winston Moseley (the man who attacked 
Genovese), plus an examination of other legal documents associated with the 
case, and a review of research carried out by a local historian and lawyer (Joseph 
De May Jr.). They found that a different picture of the events that night emerged.  
 According to the way the events are presented in most social psychology 
textbooks (and the way it was told in the original article), 38 of her neighbors saw 
the entire attack on Genovese and watched (or knew) that she was stabbed and 
then sexually assaulted over the period of half an hour and yet failed to do 
anything. According to the article by Manning et al., the layout of the apartment 
complex was such that most of Genovese’s neighbors would not have seen most 
of the attack at all (or even any of the attack) and even the three who testified as 
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eye witnesses had only partial glimpses of what could or could not have been a 
man attacking a woman. The second attack by Moseley happened inside a 
building, outside of the view of everyone. Moreover, a few of the residents of the 
apartment complex claimed to have called the police during the first attack 
despite “difficulties of contacting the police at that time,” not only because of the 
way the emergency response system was set up at that time in history but also 
because there was a bar on that street known for trouble.  
 Manning et al. conclude that the usual account of the murder of Kitty 
Genovese stands more as a parable of the sorts of ways that one’s behavior can be 
influenced by features of a situation (such as the presence of other bystanders) 
than a factual account of the way things really happened that night. Whether or 
not the Kitty Genovese story proves to be a good example for bystander effects on 
helping, there are a number of other studies done in this area that provide more 
clear cut examples of the phenomenon.21 
 
6. Abu Ghraib 
In the spring of 2004, the CBS program 60 Minutes II broadcast the first 
pictures of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, a prison used by both U.S. and Iraqi forces 
until 2006. The Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of 
Defense Detention Operations reported that “from October through December 
2003, on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib…acts of brutality and purposeless 
sadism” occurred. 22  
                                                   
21 See John Darley and Bibb Latane, “Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion 
of Responsibility,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 (1968):  377–383. 
 
22 Steven Strasser ed., (2004) The Abu Ghraib Investigations: the Official Reports of 
the Independent Panel and Pentagon on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004): 1. 
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The abuses that became known through the pictures that surfaced from 
Abu Ghraib were not part of authorized interrogations or directed at gathering 
intelligence from detainees.23 Many prisoners were stripped naked, apparently 
for the sole purpose of humiliation, and often left in their cell without clothes or 
blankets for days at a time in cold weather. Sometimes prisoners were handcuffed 
together with other prisoners or handcuffed to their cells wearing only hoods on 
their heads. Detainees were sometimes placed in simulated sexual positions with 
other detainees, forced to perform indecent acts on each other, or forced to 
participate in group-masturbation with other detainees while American soldiers 
took photographs. Other detainees were beaten, kicked, and forced to stand in 
pressure positions for hours on end; sometimes soldiers sat or stood on them. In 
a few cases, American soldiers used military dogs to frighten detainees.  
 When the allegations first surfaced, they were written off as the actions of 
a few rogue soldiers who had committed sexual and physical abuse under the 
chaotic conditions of Abu Ghraib.24 The prison had too many detainees for the 
number of military police guards to keep them under control. There was 
inadequate leadership and poor supervision that “worked to produce an attitude 
of fear and sullen resentment among the guards and interrogators at Abu 
Ghraib.”25 In September 2003, the Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the 
interrogation center at the prison was wounded along with ten other soldiers by a 
mortar attack on the prison. Two other soldiers were killed in this attack. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
23 There were also other abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib that were not 
photographed because they occurred during interrogation sessions. For example, there 
are pending allegations of rape and sodomy of the detainees by their American captors. 
 
24 For more see Strasser, The Abu Graib Investigations, 14-15. 
 
25 See introduction by Craig Whitney in Strasser, The Abu Ghraib Investigations, 15. 
 50
Frequent mortar attacks followed all winter, killing 22 prisoners and wounding 
80 others. Major General George R. Fay, who was conducting an investigation of 
the matter, wrote that the morale of soldiers and civilians suffered as the attacks 
continued. There was a general feeling among the soldiers at Abu Ghraib that the 
Army had forgotten them.  
 Furthermore, President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld decided in late 2001 that members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
captured in Afghanistan were not entitled to be considered prisoners of war as 
protected by the Geneva Conventions. Craig Whitney writes that “legal 
memoranda prepared by the Justice Department in the period leading up to the 
president’s decision seemed to show an administration seeking justification in 
law for torture.”26 This climate at Abu Ghraib provided the opportunity for such 
abuse to occur and to continue undiscovered for a long time. 
 
Significance 
 Situationists have cited the abuse at Abu Ghraib as a case where the 
baffling behavior of the soldiers is better explained by the pressures of the 
situation than by the character of the soldiers. One of the situational factors in 
play here was the ambiguous standards of treatment set for the prisoners. 
Although the White House never authorized torture, Whitney and others have 
claimed that the White House was trying to get around the legal issue of torture 
by denying the detainees prisoner of war status (which would have meant having 
to follow the Geneva conventions). Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez also 
authorized various exceptions to the normal handling rules for treatment of the 
                                                   
26 See introduction by Whitney in: Strasser, The Abu Ghraib Investigations, 16. 
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prisoners. These vague standards left it open to the interpretation of the soldiers 
at Abu Ghraib whether many of the abuses that committed were considered 
torture. They were definitely not techniques advocated by the U.S. government, 
but it was unclear whether the U.S. government frowned upon them. 
 Other situational factors included the power dynamic between prisoners 
and guards, the lack of leadership, and the relative inexperience of many of the 
soldiers stationed at Abu Ghraib. As in the Stanford Prison Experiment, prisoners 
were stripped of their identities by the removal of their clothes and their names, 
and guards were given complete control of them. In this case, as opposed to the 
SPE, the guards had actual motivation to abuse the prisoners seeing as the 
prisoners were considered part of the enemy forces that daily attacked their 
prison and killed American soldiers. As in the SPE, the guards were left mostly to 
themselves to decide the treatment of the prisoners, and it was never completely 
clear that even the upper leadership did not want these prisoners tortured.27  
While this is another case that might qualify as a diagnostic situation 
because the pressures of the situation are stronger than the pressure to act 
compassionately, because the behavior in question is so objectionable it seems to 
automatically discount the possibility of a robust trait of compassion. If instead 
one tries to explain the behavior by a robust trait of cruelty or callousness, it is 
                                                   
27 This is also the conclusion Doris and Murphy comes to in their paper “From My Lai 
to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity.” Doris and Murphy conclude that the 
lack of adequate leadership, the general climate at the prison constantly under mortar 
attacks, and the ambiguity of the government’s position on the treatment of prisoners had 
potent effects on the soldiers’ “ability to determine the illegality of atrocities other than 
unnecessary homicides,” that is that the soldiers suffered from moral drift—roughly 
defined as losing one’s sense of right and wrong (Sabini and Silver, “Lack of Character? 
Situationism Critiqued,” 553, call it “losing one’s moral compass”).  
Doris and Murphy don’t conclude that the particular features of the situation these 
soldiers found themselves in completely excuses their behavior but merely that the 
specific situational features had a strong effect on their ability to make decisions and thus 
on their behavior.  
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hard to reconcile this picture with accounts by family and friends of the soldiers 
involved as having been at least averagely moral individuals before Abu Ghraib. 
 
7. Vietnam Massacres 
 In the morning of March 16, 1968, Charlie Company, 11th Light Infancy 
Brigade of the US Army brutally murdered 300 residents in a sub-hamlet of Xom 
Lang on the coast of Central Vietnam known to Americans as My Lai. The victims 
were mostly women, old men, and small children. Many of the women were 
raped and some victims were tortured and then mutilated before being killed. 
That same morning, a mile or so away, another Task Force Barker unit, Bravo 
company, killed close to a hundred civilians in the sub-hamlet of My Hoi, known 
to Americans as My Khe.28 
 
Significance  
 Situationists mention the massacres in Vietnam because there was more 
than one company of soldiers involved and the massacres were all equally 
pointless and brutal. Unless it was the case that a large number of cruel of callous 
individuals were recruited, the situational features of the war are a better 
explanation for the brutal behavior of the perpetrators of these massacres. The 
conditions American soldiers and their allies found in Vietnam were extremely 
hostile. Guerilla warfare was the primary mode of engagement in battle, which 
                                                   
28 See. Kendrick Oliver, The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory (New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 11.Although this was by far the most 
publicized case of the killing of civilians in Vietnam, there were a number of other known 
instances of large-scale face-to-face killings of Vietnamese noncombatants including: the 
shooting of sixteen unarmed women and children near Danang; the deaths of 20 civilians 
in Thanh Phong; between four and five hundred inhabitants of the village of Binh Hoa by 
Korean troops; and finally the killing of hundreds over a seven month period by a US 
platoon and others.  
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meant that soldiers never knew who would be the next enemy combatant; it could 
be a child or a woman. American soldiers were fighting against an enemy in the 
enemy’s own turf, which included densely thick jungles and thickets.  
 Situationists also point out that regular situational influences that would 
distract us in normal circumstances, like loud noises or unpleasant smells, also 
affect soldiers in combat conditions.29 To this, one must add exhaustion often felt 
by soldiers who have gone without sleep for hours or days in the heat of battle. 
There is also the fact that many soldiers have to see their closest comrades killed 
or maimed, sometimes in gruesome ways. This does not include the sorts of 
training military personnel have to go through to be able reflexively to obey 
orders and kill other human beings without hesitation. Perhaps considering the 
training the soldiers had undergone and the conditions they found themselves in, 
they were responding quite logically to their environment. If even insubstantial 
situational factors can cause moral failures, the quite substantial situational 
pressures of warfare can definitely impair the exercise of normative 
competence.30  
 
8. Holocaust 
The Holocaust is perhaps the most notorious example of the types of cruel 
and inhumane acts that human beings are capable of against their fellow man. 
During the Second World War, between the years of 1941-1945 in Germany, the 
Nazi regime deliberately and systematically murdered six million Jews, one 
                                                   
29 See Doris and Murphy, “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib.” 
 
30 See Doris and Murphy, “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib,” 30. Doris and Murphy define 
this as “a complex capacity enabling its possessor to appreciate ethical considerations, 
ascertain information relevant to particular ethical judgments, and identify behavior 
implementing those ethical judgments.”  
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million people from Yugoslavia, at least two hundred thousand Gypsies, two 
hundred and fifty thousand handicapped, ten thousand homosexuals, and five 
thousand Jehovah’s Witnesses.31  
The plan of the Nazi dictatorship, headed by the infamous Adolf Hitler, 
was to annihilate an entire race of people, people of Jewish descent, and others 
who did not fit Hitler’s version of the Aryan ideal. To give an idea of the scope, 
after WWII was over and the surviving victims of the Holocaust were rescued, 
one-third of all Jews in the world had perished; this was roughly one-half of all 
Jews in Europe and two-thirds of all Jews living in the Nazi sphere of influence. 
 Historians have argued that a troubled political and social climate was 
largely responsible for the citizens of Germany tolerating this government-
sanctioned genocide of the Jews. For the few decades before World War II broke 
out, Germany had been going through a number of social, economic, and political 
problems and it wasn’t long before certain small political factions started blaming 
the Jews for these problems. The Jews were accused of having shirked front-line 
duty during WWI, of engaging in black-marketeering, and generally being 
exploitative and unpatriotic. The Jewish were also equated with socialism, which 
was feared greatly by a middle class quickly losing their position and slipping into 
the lower class. Still, even with the anti-Semitism that began to become rampant 
in Germany at the time, the large majority of the German population did not see 
the Jews with hatred but merely apathy and indifference.  
 Merely creating anti-Semitic sentiments in the German populace did not 
yet create the right type of social environment that would end in Hitler’s terrible 
“Final Solution,” the next step was to depict them as the sole cause of all of 
                                                   
31 Saul S. Friedman, A History of the Holocaust (Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 2004), 
397.  
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Germany’s social and economic problems.32 When Hitler seized power, slowly 
climbing the ranks of government until he had himself appointed Fuhrer, or 
supreme leader of Germany, he slowly began to institute anti-Semitic laws. In 
order to make the idea of concentration camps (and later death camps) more 
palatable to the average German citizen, who was usually merely apathetic 
toward the Jews, the Nazi began a program of conditioning that included 
indoctrination in the schools. History books and school texts in other subjects 
were changed to fit with the Nazi ideal of an Aryan world.  
 The Nazis also began a program of depersonalization of the Jews. They 
began by taking away Jewish legal rights and personhood and then began 
spreading propaganda that spoke of them in non-human terms. The new laws 
first took away the rights of Jews to take part in German society and then marked 
them out according to race. Later the Nazis stripped people of Jewish descent of 
their citizenship, deported some of them, and abrogated their rights as a 
minority. The Nazis would also take away the religious liberties of the Jews and 
would sometimes desecrate their cemeteries and houses of worship. They taxed 
the Jews unfairly taxed and forced them to register their property and assets 
before having it confiscated, leaving many of them in dire poverty and near 
starvation. The Nazis did everything they could to take away the individual 
identities of the Jewish populace so that the non-Jewish German citizens who 
daily saw their neighbors have their possessions taken from them before being 
hauled off to concentration camps would not respond with outrage. 
                                                   
32 Hitler’s original plan was to make life so intolerable for the Jews that they simply left 
on their own. Unfortunately, other countries wouldn’t take refugees and some of the Nazi 
policies that took away some of the right and property of people of Jewish descent also 
left them without the resources to do so. Moreover, once Germany began invading its 
neighboring countries they realized they would end up with the same problem. Eventually 
the Nazi’s decided the only way to deal with the “Jewish problem” was annihilation. 
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 After all the sanctions and laws that passed against the Jews and the 
indoctrination against them beginning from early childhood, by the time the 
Nazis began carting off people to the concentration camps the average German 
citizen was completely apathetic to the plight of the Jews, if not set against 
them.33  
 The final stage of Hitler’s program to exterminate the Jews was to 
bureaucratize the process of routinely murdering millions of innocent people and 
dehumanize the victims at the camps so that doctors and soldiers who worked 
there could brutalize and murder them. 34 The prisoners were given little or no 
clothing and were not allowed to wash or keep up any sort of general hygiene.35 
They lived at subsistence level in stark surroundings, drinking dirty water, and 
getting little food. They were often given just enough scraps of food to barely keep 
them alive and just enough to breed conflict among them if anyone got more than 
their share.  
                                                   
33 Ronnie Landau, The Nazi Holocaust (New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1992), 141-
145. However, as Landau notes, after the night that the Nazi’s came to refer to as 
Kristallnacht (“The Night of Shattered Glass”), the Nazi’s learned just how much the 
average German citizen would tolerate. Kristallnacht took the form of the destruction and 
burning of synagogues, the ransacking of Jewish shops and warehouses, and the 
terrorizing, beating up, and murder of Jewish individuals. Ninety-one Jews were killed, 
more than seven thousand shops destroyed, and three-hundred synagogues razed to the 
ground. The German reaction was one of righteous indignation, not support towards the 
government’s measures.  Yet a mere short time later twenty-five thousand Jews were 
arrested and sent to concentration camps. Plans of mass extermination would be put into 
action a mere three years later. The lesson seemed to be that people could tolerate the 
anti-Jewish measures only if they were not done overtly but invisibly where the Germans 
couldn’t see the results of their elected government’s policies.  
 
34 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 55-87. Sabini and Silver discuss how 
some of the most central figures of the Holocaust, such as Adolf Eichmann, explain their 
part in the murder of millions of innocent people by dispassionately claiming they were 
simply doing their job. Each of these bureaucrats each played a small if indirect part in 
the Holocaust and together contributed to the attempted genocide of the Jews and other 
groups. More on this discussion in the third and fourth chapters. 
 
35 See Friedman, A History of the Holocaust. 
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 Dehumanizing the prisoners by taking their clothes and their names as 
well as putting them into environments where they had to cling to survival 
apparently made it easier for their captors to treat them with indifferent cruelty 
and malice. Though some Nazi doctors, like the man who is known only as Ernst 
B., were clearly conflicted by their duties, as shown through various physiological 
symptoms of stress as well as heavy drinking, the majority of them still went 
through with their duties as SS officers. These duties included selections of 
prisoners for the gas chambers and experimentation on prisoners. Some doctors, 
like Josef Mengele, experimented on captives in horrific ways with experiments 
that were as irrelevant and unscientific as they were cruel and unspeakable. 
Furthermore, after the war the men who had worked as Nazi doctors at the camps 
did not seem to regret the actions they had performed at the camps.36 Meanwhile, 
the SS guards that patrolled the camps would brutalize the prisoners, humiliate 
them, deny them food and medical care, and finally march them off to gas 
chambers or shoot them one at a time. Yet these guards could go laugh, drink, 
and play games at the end of the night once their shift was over.  
The situational features seemed to have an affect not merely on the guards 
and the non-Jewish German citizenry but on the victims of the Holocaust as well. 
Much like the observations that Zimbardo would come to make about the 
students playing the prisoners in his prison experiment, Ronnie Landau notes 
that a number of historians have wondered why the vast majority of Jews seemed 
to have cooperated with their own destruction or, at least, had gone, as the cliché 
put it, ‘like sheep to the slaughter.’ They had registered as Jews, they had worn 
                                                   
36 See Robert J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of 
Genocide (New York: Basic Books Inc, 1986), 417-430. 
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the yellow star, they had formed Jewish councils and police forces to help the 
work of the Nazis, had reported at railway stations for deportation, had literally 
dug their own graves, and walked into gas chambers.37 Landau reminds us that 
the physical and psychological condition under which the Jews subsisted in 
Europe was one of powerlessness, isolation, and choicelessness (and of course 
their failure to imagine that the Nazis, as much as they hated them, would resort 
to brutality and mass murder). As with the prisoners in the SPE experiment who 
were all too willing to cooperate with the cruel guards and not willing to work 
with each other against them, it was the pressures of the terrible situation in 
Germany at the time that led to many Jews cooperating with the Nazis in their 
own destruction. 
 
Significance 
 Situationists cite the Holocaust as evidence for their theory because it is 
singular not just in its scope (the immense numbers of people that were 
murdered) but in its inhumanity and barbarity. It is also notable for the fact that 
it wasn’t just the doctors and soldiers that worked in the concentration camps 
that were involved but the citizens of Germany who sat by while millions of 
people were taken away to be killed in horrific ways. Is it possible that all of the 
people that participated, from German citizens to the doctors and soldiers that 
murdered or brutalized the victims in the death camps, were simply cruel or 
malevolent; or is it more likely that the situational features of the political and 
                                                   
37 Landau, The Nazi Holocaust, 192-193. 
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social climate in Germany at the time facilitated the ease with which the citizenry 
and soldiers accepted the genocide?38 
 Situationists point to the same sort of factors that played a part at Abu 
Ghaib and even the SPE. In order to get the citizens of Germany to accept the 
genocide, the Nazis instituted a program of indoctrination, blaming the Jews for 
the economic and social problems that Germany had been suffering. Then the 
status of the Jewish populace as citizens and individuals was taken from them by 
a series of laws and sanctions taking their possessions, their liberties, and their 
rights, and singling them out as somehow “different” from other Germans. 
Meanwhile, once at the camps, the Jews were dehumanized through violence, 
forced labor, and the taking of their food, clothes, and often their family and 
loved ones. The situation into which they were forced left them clinging to 
survival, fearing death from any number of courses, including the unhealthy 
conditions in which they lived or death at the hands of the captors.39 As in the 
SPE and at Abu Ghraib, these factors resulted in feelings of resignation and 
powerless obedience for the victims, and facilitated the brutal and heartless 
actions of the captors.  
Presumably, many of the citizens of Germany who stood by and did 
nothing to help their fellow citizens (before or during the Holocaust) were 
                                                   
38 The concentration camps during the Holocaust are another example of a situation 
where every aspect of the situation was controlled (much like the experimenters 
controlled the situation in the SPE or even Milgram). Here it was not experimenters who 
controlled the environment but rather Hitler and the Nazi regime who created the type of 
social, political, and economic climate that would be just right for the evils of the 
Holocaust. 
 
39 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 75. Sabini and Silver point out that 
starvation destroys the body’s capacity to produce a wide range of expressions and that 
constant hunger fixates the attention of an individual on his own internal state, further 
dehumanizing the subject. Moreover, extreme hunger will force one to extreme behavior, 
including scavenging through garbage or fighting fellow inmates for scraps of food.  
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presumably averagely moral people and so their indifference to the plight of the 
victims of the Holocaust could not be explained by reference to a robust character 
trait of malice or cruelty. Moreover, the SS officers and doctors, as cruel and 
sadistic as some of them may have been to the prisoners, were often family men 
who did not seem incapable of kindness in other situations so a robust character 
trait doesn’t seem to explain their sadism and violence.40 
 
9. Rwanda Genocide 
 “In the spring and early summer of 1994, a program of massacres 
decimated the Republic of Rwanda. Of an original population of about seven and 
a half million, at least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a 
hundred days, including children and men and women of all ages. The dead of 
Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the 
Holocaust.”41 Roughly seventy-five percent of Tutsi had been killed by early May. 
These numbers do not include those who were raped and/or maimed but didn’t 
die of their wounds.  
Like the Holocaust, the Rwanda genocide happened in the midst of a 
tense social and economic climate that had been developing for years between the 
Tutsi and the Hutu. The Tutsi and the Hutu had a long-standing classist rivalry 
that spanned back at least since colonial times when the Tutsi were favored over 
the Hutus for political and administrative jobs. A political rivalry between the two 
groups continued over the years, resulting in one massacre of Tutsi in 1963 and 
1964 with fourteen thousand dead and a larger scale massacre of the Hutu in 
                                                   
40 Although situationists never mention the possibility of their having formed a robust 
trait of cruelty while at the death camps. 
 
41 See Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with 
Our Families (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998). 
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Burundi resulting in one hundred thousand dead. In the years preceding the 
Rwanda genocide, a group of rebel Tutsi that had retired to the mountains would 
come down and mount attacks on Rwandan towns. After every attack, the Hutu 
would retaliate by killing innocent Tutsi living nearby.  
Further escalating the animosity between Hutu and Tutsi, an anti-Tutsi 
newspaper called Kangura appeared, run by a man named Hasan Ngeze claiming, 
among other things, that there was a Tutsi conspiracy to murder the Hutu. Ngeze 
published the “Hutu Ten commandments,” a doctrine of militant Hutu purity.42 
In addition, RTLM, a radio station that was the Kangura of the airwaves, began 
appearing. RTLM would be the same radio station that would falsely report that 
the Tutsi were planning an attack on the Hutu so they should attack first. 
Eventually this led to the attempted genocide of all Tutsi living in Rwanda by the 
Hutu over the period of three months in 1994. 
In his book, We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will all be killed 
with our families, Philip Gourevitch describes his visit to one site where a 
number of Tutsi were killed by Hutu. Inside a school at Nyarubuye, there is a 
massacre memorial where a large number of unburied dead lie, victims of the 
genocide in Rwanda, most of them women and some of them children. 
Gourevitch describes how the killers killed all day, in shifts, and at the end of the 
day cut the Achilles tendons of survivors so they could not run and went to feast 
on cattle looted from their victims and then to sleep “beneath the cries of their 
prey” only to awaken the next day to kill again.  
                                                   
42 The Hutu Ten Commandments embraced the ideology that the Tutsi were the rival 
and enemy of the Hutu and Hutu’s should try to socialize with them as little as possible 
and try to remember that the Tutsi’s real interest was to subjugate the Hutu. 
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One of the most disturbing facts about the genocide is that most of the 
killing of the Tutsi was done with machetes, at close contact (although others 
were killed by barrages of gunfire) by people the victims worked with, lived 
beside, and trusted. Moreover, stories emerging from the Rwandan genocide are 
filled with tales of mutilation, barbarity, and horrific cruelty. The Hutu not only 
killed the Tutsi but often tortured, raped, and mutilated them before their deaths.  
As with the victims of the Holocaust and the subjects playing the 
prisoners in the SPE, it was not merely the perpetrators of the murders that 
seemed to respond in baffling ways to the situation. A month in, some of the 
Tutsi had apparently accepted their grim fate and just hoped to die quickly (as 
opposed to cruelly) by a bullet rather than a machete, at home rather than in the 
street. One Tutsi survivor describes how one group of Tutsi were so resigned they 
simply sat down when told to do so by a group of militant Hutu who had thrown 
grenades into their midst. Like the victims of the Holocaust and the SPE, feelings 
of powerlessness and resignation seemed to overwhelm the victims so that they 
merely accepted their fate rather than trying to fight back or escape. 
 
Significance 
Considering the large number of Hutu that participated in the massacre, 
what else but features of the situation could explain how many of the perpetrators 
of murder and rape during the genocide were normal citizens one day, working 
alongside the Tutsi, teaching them in class, preaching to them in church, and the 
next were killing these same people in cruel and terrible ways? The Rwandan 
genocide is an especially compelling case for situationism because it was 
perpetrated by people who were neighbors, teachers, or even priests of the 
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victims but also because of the way in which it was perpetrated: at close range 
with machetes and often with extreme brutality. Unlike in the Holocaust, where 
victims were forced into concentration camps where they could expect death at 
the hands of the guards or doctors in charge of the camps, in the Rwanda 
genocide, the neighbors and co-workers of the victims did the actual killing 
themselves. While one might wonder at the passivity of many of the people living 
in Nazi-occupied territories as the Nazis forced their neighbors out of their 
houses and into camps where they would surely go to die, most of these people 
did not shoot their neighbors or send them to the gas-chambers themselves. They 
stood by watching their neighbors get taken away but they did not bring down the 
actual object of destruction onto their neighbors head or neck. Nor did they have 
to listen to their neighbors cries of pain and pleas for pity as they lay dying 
nearby. 
Situationists not only cite the large number of perpetrators as evidence 
that the situation is a better explanation of behavior than individual character 
traits, they also point to the similarities between the social climate in Rwanda 
during the genocide and that in Germany during the Holocaust. The two groups 
had lived uneasily side by side for years, often in direct conflict with each other. 
The group behind the RTLM radio station and the Kangura newspaper fed into 
the decades-long paranoia and distrust between the groups. Perhaps the actions 
of the Hutu perpetrators are better explained by the pressures inherent in the 
situation in which they lived. The social climate between the Tutsi and the Hutu 
was extremely tense, they were often in conflict, and individuals like those behind 
RTLM and Kangura helped to fan the flames of suspicion and distrust between 
the two groups. 
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The fact that the two groups lived among each other and interacted fairly 
peacefully on a daily basis is what makes it difficult to understand the genocide as 
the result of a large number of people with the a robust character trait of malice 
deciding to murder their neighbors. Robust character traits are consistent and 
what was perhaps most shocking about the genocide was that it was perpetrated 
by people who had lived alongside the victims. The Hutu perpetrators of the 
genocide had evidently been averagely moral citizens coexisting with their Tutsi 
victims until the call to action came from the radio station RTLM to murder the 
Tutsi.  
 
Conclusion 
Situational influences range from situations where a minor trivial feature 
of a situation can lead to one being less likely to help to situations where every 
aspect of the environment is controlled and agents can be influenced to commit 
violent or brutal acts. However, situational features and their effects on human 
behavior play a part in both the experiments and the historical cases, and these 
effects are not confined just to laboratories; there are a number of historical cases 
with circumstances very similar to those in the experiments performed by social 
psychologists.  
 65 
Chapter 3 
IN DEFENSE OF CHARACTER: RESPONSES TO THE SITUATIONIST 
EVIDENCE 
 
Philosophers and psychologists have given a variety of responses to both 
the situationist thesis and its evidence. Some of them disagree with situationists 
and argue that character is a real structure that can help predict or explain 
human behavior, while others agree with situationists that findings in psychology 
and social psychology have shown that the traditional concept of character is 
flawed and should be updated to fit the data from these findings.  
In this chapter, I look at responses to specific pieces of situationist 
evidence from advocates of character. All of these respondents claim that though 
situationists may be raising genuine concerns about human behavior, these 
concerns are not so troubling as to provide incontrovertible evidence against the 
traditional conception of character or character-based virtue ethics. I also give my 
analysis of these responses, sometimes agreeing with and arguing in favor of one 
of the responses already given and other times arguing for what I believe to be a 
more optimal response to the case in question. 
I have broken down the responses into two groups: those that argue from 
a position I have termed “argument from misrepresentation” and those that 
argue from a position I am calling “argument from deficiency of character.” 
Finally, I talk briefly about the evidence from historical cases. Historical 
cases do not seem to provide evidence for the same type of situationism as the 
cases I analyze in the first part of this chapter and instead seem to show that 
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social networks and environments play a role in the development and 
maintenance of individual dispositions. 
 
Two Approaches 
According to situationists, one of the necessary conditions of global 
character (the situationist version of the traditional or Aristotelian conception of 
character) is consistency, exhibited as cross-situational behavioral consistency 
across a number of situations. If agents show cross-situational behavioral 
inconsistency, then they lack consistency; their character traits are not “robust.” 
Robust character traits are necessary for global character so if an agent lacks 
robust character traits, then he does not have global character. Since 
experimental and historical cases have shown a number of people displaying 
behavioral inconsistency, many people lack robust character traits and thus 
global character.  
Generally, advocates of character respond to this argument via one of two 
approaches. The main contention of argument from misrepresentation (AM) is 
that situationism actually does little or no damage to the traditional conception of 
character needed to ground virtue ethics because situationism is attacking a 
different conception of character than that required for virtue ethics. The idea of 
global character is not an accurate portrayal of the traditional conception of 
character.1 
The main argument of the argument from deficiency of character (DC) is 
that particular subjects failed to display behavioral consistency because they 
lacked some fundamental aspect of character and not because character is not a 
                                                   
1 From here on, I will refer to the traditional conception of character as TC character to 
contrast it to robust character and global character, and for the sake of brevity. 
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real structure. There is nothing wrong with the traditional conception of 
character; the problem lies with the subject.  
The basic structures of each of the two approaches are as follows: 1) give 
an explanation for how an individual with a character trait x can behave 
inconsistently to trait x in some situations and yet still possess trait x (and thus a 
particular occasion of behavioral inconsistency to trait x is not necessarily 
evidence against having trait x) or 2) give an explanation for why specific subjects 
failed to display behavioral consistency while still maintaining that character is a 
real structure.  
 
The Argument from Misrepresentation 
The main thesis of the argument from misrepresentation (AM) is that 
acting inconsistently with character trait x is not necessarily incompatible with 
having trait x and behavioral inconsistency should not necessarily count as 
evidence that the subject lacks trait x. Respondents arguing from AM reject the 
claim that cross-situational behavioral inconsistency is necessarily evidence 
against having TC character. Behavioral inconsistency seems troubling because 
situationists have defined consistency (the first condition of “global character”) as 
merely cross-situational consistency in behavior, excluding other important 
elements of consistency. However, a correct representation of TC character can 
accommodate some inconsistency in behavior.  
 
The Argument from Deficiency of Character 
While the main idea of the argument from misrepresentation is that the 
problem is with the definition of character used by situationists, the main idea of 
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the argument from deficiency of character is that the problem lies in the actual 
character of the agents themselves. It is not that situationists are using an 
erroneous definition of TC character; rather, the subjects exhibiting behavioral 
inconsistency in the experiments and cases cited as evidence by situationists were 
subjects with deficiencies in their character. These deficiencies in character 
explain the inconsistencies in their behavior.  
Respondents who argue from DC to do not deny that the actions of the 
subjects in many of the cases should count as inconsistency in moral behavior; 
they accept this claim and instead reject the assumption that the particular 
subjects in the experiments used as evidence for situationism actually have global 
character. The argument from deficiency of character does not have the 
implication that it is not possible to have global character but merely that some of 
the particular subjects in the experiments and historical cases lacked character. 
One of the differences between AM and DC is that respondents who argue 
from AM do not find some of the situationist evidence very troubling for the 
attribution of global character to the subjects in the studies. The behavior of the 
subjects in those studies is not evidence for their lacking character. However, 
those respondents arguing from DC find the behavior displayed by the subjects 
worrying and a likely indication that those subjects lacked global character.  
 
Experiment-Specific Responses 
 Below I explain the responses to each of the cases, examining both AM 
and DC responses and the weaknesses and strengths of each. For responses from 
AM, I point out how respondents have argued that behavioral inconsistency is 
not necessarily an indication of inconsistency in character. For responses from 
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DC, I indicate what aspects of character the subjects in the cases and experiments 
are lacking according to the respondents from DC. For each of the responses, I 
point out possible problems and counterarguments to the problems and then 
argue for what I believe to be most optimal response to each case. 
 
Isen and Levin’s Dime in a Phone Booth Experiment2 
Arguments from Mood effects 
 There is no single account of how mood effects work but rather several 
different explanations of how mood effects might affect behavior. Below, I look at 
several different versions of this argument and the relative merits of each. 
 
AM response (Argument from heightened attention) 
 The first version of this argument, the “argument from heightened 
attention,” comes from Sabini and Silver. While Isen and Levin merely stated that 
a heightened mood led to more helpful behavior without hypothesizing on why 
this was so, Sabini and Silver propose that a heightened mood leads to 
heightened attention of surroundings. An agent paying more attention to his 
surroundings has a likelier chance of noting the unfortunate confederate.3 In 
other words, their idea is that the reason the subjects who did not find the dime 
did not help is that they were simply less aware of the situation around them, 
either of the actual details of the situation or of the features of the situation that 
called for some kind of moral action. It was not that the subjects in this situation 
                                                   
2 In Chapter 2, I also mentioned the experiment “Cookies and Kindness,” which 
ostensibly studied the same sorts of behaviors as the dime experiment. I do not look at 
responses to this one, as the assumption is that the same responses to the results of the 
dime experiment generalizes to it as well. 
 
3 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 540. 
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chose not to help the confederate because they were in a bad mood (or at least 
not in a good one) or because they simply did not feel like it; they did not help 
because they failed to notice features of this situation that made it the type of 
situation where they should help. How does this show that behavioral 
inconsistency in some trait x is compatible with the subject having trait x? 
 First, we must remember that one of the main contentions of the 
situationist thesis is that the way to determine whether an agent has a robust 
character trait is through cross-situational consistency in behavior. The Isen and 
Levin case is supposed to be evidence against character and evidence for 
situationism because, according to the data, it was the finding or not finding of 
the dime that seemed to determine whether the subjects stopped to help the 
confederate pick up her papers. That means that it is likely that agents would 
help if they were in a good mood but may not help if they are in a bad mood, and 
that shows cross-situational behavioral inconsistency.  
 However, proponents of the argument from heightened attention assume 
that failing to be helpful because one did not realize help was needed is 
compatible with the consistency requirement of TC character (even if it is not 
compatible with the consistency requirement of global character). According to 
the situationist thesis, if some agent has a robust trait of helpfulness, he will act 
helpfully in every situation in which behavior relevant to that trait is appropriate; 
failure to display trait-relevant behavior in a situation in which it would have 
been appropriate is good reason to think the agent does not have the trait. 
Proponents of the argument from heightened attention disagree with both parts 
of that statement. One can fail to display the trait-relevant behavior in a situation 
in which it would have been appropriate, but still have that trait.  
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 Proponents of the argument from heightened attention disagree with the 
claim that judging whether someone has a certain trait is as simple as observing 
whether that person displays trait-relevant behavior in every situation that calls 
for it. This is an oversimplification of what it means to have consistency as well as 
being a misrepresentation of the traditional conception of character. Traditional 
or Aristotelian character traits do not require one to display trait-relevant 
behavior in every situation in which it is appropriate.4 If an agent fails to help 
because he is unaware that his help is needed, his behavior might be inconsistent 
with being helpful but that does not necessarily mean he lacks a trait of 
helpfulness.  
 According to proponents of the argument from heightened attention, if 
the effects of mood work by affecting the agent’s attention to his or her 
surroundings, and being in a better mood means having heightened attention to 
one’s environment (thus one noticing the person in need), then the agent whose 
mood has not been enhanced has a perfectly good reason not to have helped the 
victim. How can we count the lack of helping behavior (of those who did not help) 
as good reason to think they are not helpful when those agents probably did not 
even notice that this was a situation that called for helpfulness to begin with? 
Suppose I see Jones fail to stop and help an old woman who has fallen on the 
sidewalk behind him. When I reprimand Jones for his lack of compassion, he 
tells me he never even saw the woman to begin with. Can I still claim that Jones 
lacks compassion then? According to proponents of the argument from 
heightened attention, I definitely should not. Jones can still be a compassionate 
                                                   
4 This argument may be tied to the idea (which I look at in the next chapter) that 
consistency is not measured just according to overt behavioral consistency but also 
according to internal consistency. Consistent behavior is not assessed based on how some 
objective third person perceives a situation (for example, as requiring a certain type of 
behavior), but, to some extent, also how the agent perceives that situation. 
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person even if he failed to show the appropriate trait-relevant behavior in a 
situation that required it. He simply did not even see the victim in need of help! 
Similarly, if the individuals who did not help genuinely did not notice the woman 
(or notice that someone needed their help) then they made no conscious decision 
not to help. If asked later why they did not stop to help, perhaps they would be 
genuinely surprised by the question. While it is true that it is somewhat 
surprising how something as trivial as having an apparently very small stroke of 
luck in finding a dime or getting a cookie can affect our mood and thus whether 
we focus on our environment or not, this by itself is not inconsistent with having 
the trait of helpfulness.    
There are some problems with this argument from heightened attention. 
First, the confederate dropped the papers directly in the path of the subjects; 
some of the subjects literally walked on the fallen papers. How could they fail to 
notice that the confederate had dropped her papers in front of them and was 
scrambling to pick them up? Secondly, it would still be open to situationists to 
argue that situational features were the driving force behind the change in mood 
of the subjects, and thus their heightened attention. Therefore, it is still true that 
situational factors explain the behavior of the subjects better than reference to 
any character trait the subjects may or may not have had. If something as small 
as finding a dime in a phone booth or being given a cookie can make one more 
aware to of one’s surroundings, then situational factors are indeed playing a 
much larger role in our behavior than we anticipate.  
It is problematic to argue that lack of attention to the details of the 
situation is the reason subjects failed to help in this situation. Considering the 
woman dropped her papers directly in their way, we have to dismiss the idea that 
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the subjects did not notice the woman. What about the suggestion that the 
subjects failed to notice the details of the situation that made it the sort of 
situation that required their help? Does this mean that the subjects saw the 
woman but this incident did not enter their conscious deliberation? Did they see 
the confederate in need of help but quickly dismissed this incident and gave it no 
further thought? This would seem to leave it open to situationists to point out 
that failure to notice that someone is in need seems like a failure in helpfulness. If 
we are going to notice whether people are in need simply because we are in a 
good mood (or fail to notice them because we are in a bad one), then we are going 
to be highly inconsistent in our helpful behavior, whether we do it consciously or 
not. Situationists could argue that part of being helpful includes no (or minimal) 
failures “to notice the relevant moral factors of a situation” (i.e., part of being 
helpful means noticing when one’s help is required).  
 
DC response  
While proponents of the argument from heightened attention would 
probably respond to this objection by simply denying that part of being helpful 
includes always being aware of when one’s help is needed, respondents from DC 
have a different reply. If noticing relevant moral factors in a situation is part of 
the practical wisdom that Aristotelians believe should be a part of virtue, then 
subjects in the Isen and Levin experiment may have simply lacked the practical 
wisdom necessary to notice relevant moral factors; therefore, the results from 
this experiment are not evidence for situationism.5 Perhaps individuals lacking 
                                                   
5 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,1998; Annas, The Morality of Happiness; Julia 
Annas, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 71, no. 3 ( November 2005): 636-642; and Rachana 
Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character.” Ethics 114, 
 74
practical wisdom will not notice relevant moral factors and so behave 
inconsistently. This explains the behavior of the subjects without helping the 
situationists’ case. Just because these particular subjects lacked practical wisdom 
and the trait of helpfulness, that does not mean that all subjects lack practical 
wisdom or even that it is not possible to have practical wisdom or the robust trait 
of helpfulness.   
This response is problematic for its own reasons. One might ask whether 
people can develop practical wisdom or whether situational factors necessarily 
influence their behavior. I come back to these questions in the next chapter. 
 
Analysis 
Argument from Choice 
However, perhaps the best response to the evidence from situations of 
minor need is that subjects saw helping in situation where the “victim” was in 
minor need of help as a matter of personal choice rather than one of moral 
obligation.6 Subjects felt they could fail to help without either failing to fulfill a 
moral obligation or failing to fulfill their duties as moral agents. This was either 
because subjects did not perceive helping situations of minor need as moral 
situations at all or because subjects perceived these helping situations as 
situations requiring merely morally elective (as opposed to morally obligatory) 
actions. If instead the subjects had perceived helping as a moral obligation, then, 
                                                                                                                                           
no. 3 (April 2004): 458-491. The issue of practical wisdom will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
6 By “moral obligation,” I mean merely to distinguish between actions that agents take 
to have some objective basis independent of personal choice or societal rules, as opposed 
to either actions required by social conventions or actions strictly up to personal choice.  
Because of the particular experiment to which I appeal for evidence, the term “moral 
obligation” as I am using it, means morally required, not morally elective. 
 
 75 
if they considered themselves moral agents, they would have felt they had a duty 
to help in order to fulfill their duties as moral agents. Therefore, subjects chose 
not to help based on other non-moral considerations, such as whether they felt 
like stopping to help or not (a decision affected by mood). I call this version of the 
argument from mood effects “the argument from choice.”  
If the subjects perceived helping (on this occasion) to be a matter of 
personal choice rather than one of moral obligation, then they could be free to 
choose how to respond based on non-moral considerations without failing to 
fulfill a moral duty to help and thereby failing as moral agents. For example, 
suppose that while I am hiking in the mountains I come across a small child who 
is apparently lost and scared. I have a moral obligation to take the child with me 
and help find her guardians or someone who can help find her guardians. If I 
decide to just leave the child in the wilderness because I already have my route 
planned out and do not want to deviate from the plan or simply because I feel 
that children should learn to fend for themselves, I have failed to fulfill my duty 
as a moral agent.7 It is not a matter of personal choice whether or not I should 
leave the child alone in the wilderness considering the very real harm that can 
befall her. 
However, if the subjects perceived the situation to be one that required a 
morally elective action or even a non-moral action, they may have felt that they 
had many more options from which to choose that would not affect their status as 
moral agents. Agents might perceive helping situations of minor need as 
situations where one’s moral obligations are fulfilled as long as one performs 
                                                   
7 This particular situation is one where the cost of helping is not that high, while the 
consequences of not helping could be exceptionally high. The class of morally acceptable 
actions might shrink or widen depending on the cost of helping for the agent and the 
consequences of not helping for the victim. 
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enough of that duty over the long run. An agent does not have to help in every 
situation of minor need in order to fulfill his moral obligation; therefore, he can 
choose to help on some occasions but not others. For example, suppose you work 
in an area of town where panhandlers on the street often solicit you for money. 
You may give occasionally, or even consistently every day or every week, but you 
probably will not give money to every person who solicits you. 
 The agents may also have perceived helping situations of minor need as 
situations that did not require a moral action at all, and so they were free to 
choose based on non-moral considerations. For example, when deciding on what 
I should have for breakfast in the morning, I might have a whole array of options 
from which to choose: I could eat eggs and ham, cereal, or just oatmeal. Neither 
an objective basis independent of personal choice nor social conventions or rules 
limits the class of acceptable actions in this situation. I have relative freedom to 
choose what I want to eat based on whatever considerations I take to be 
important at the time. 
 
Moral imperatives versus personal choice 
There is evidence for the argument from choice in a psychological study of 
moral imperatives versus social responsibilities conducted by psychologists Joan 
Miller, David Bersoff, and Robin Harwood with American and Indian subjects. 
Miller, Bersoff, and Harwood defined “moral concerns” as “(a) based on objective 
obligations, independent of social consensus or personal preference and (b) as 
legitimately subject to social regulation, rather than as the agent's own 
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business.”8 Miller et al. distinguished moral rules both from social conventions, 
which are “legitimately regulated but not as based on objective obligations,” and 
from matters of personal choice, which are “neither based on objective 
obligations nor legitimately regulated.” 9 The distinguishing feature of moral 
rules is that they are obligatory regardless of personal choice or social 
conventions. Even if social conventions do not enforce or even agree with the 
moral rules, the moral rules are still binding. Social conventions, on the other 
hand, are established and regulated by a particular society and may change to 
meet the needs of that society. Social-conventional concepts are hypothesized to 
be contextually relative and consensually agreed upon, unlike concepts in the 
moral domain which are supposed to hold in most or all situations regardless of 
whether social rules or laws agree with it or not. 10 Matters of personal choice 
were not obligatory by either social-conventions or moral rules.11  
                                                   
8 Joan G. Miller, David M. Bersoff, and Robin L. Harwood, “Perceptions of Social 
Responsibilities in India and in the United States: Moral Imperatives or Personal 
Decisions?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 1, (January 1990): 33. 
 
9 Miller et al., “Perceptions of Social Responsibilities in India and in the United States: 
Moral Imperatives or Personal Decisions?” 33. See also Joan. G. Miller, “Insights into 
Moral Development from Cultural Psychology,” in Handbook of Moral Development, eds. 
Melanie Killen and Judith G. Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006), 375-392. 
Miller et al. do not make a distinction between morally obligatory and morally elective 
actions. However, all of the hypothetical scenarios were set up as situations in which the 
cost to the victim was relatively low in comparison to the consequences for the victim if 
the agent did not help, especially in situations of moderate or extreme need. The agent 
would not need to perform any supererogatory actions in order to fulfill his moral duty in 
any of the scenarios. Therefore, Miller et al. were testing intuitions about morally 
obligatory not morally elective actions. 
 
10 See Judith G. Smetana, “Social-cognitive domain theory: Consistencies and 
Variations in Children’s Moral and Social Judgments,” in Handbook of Moral 
Development, eds. Melanie Killen and Judith G. Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006), 
119-153 (especially p. 121). 
 
11 Miller et al. “Perceptions of Social Responsibilities in India and in the United States: 
Moral Imperatives or Personal Decisions?” 34, 44.  
Miller et al. talk about a fourth category that they labeled “personal-moral.” This 
category included behaviors that were seen as governed by objective obligations but not 
as legitimately regulated. The category “was used in relation to social responsibilities that 
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Magnitude of Need Hypothetical Scenario 
Minor Need 
not giving someone directions 
concerning how to get to an art supply 
shop, because you are busy reading an 
exciting book and do not want to be 
interrupted 
not providing a ride to the train station 
to someone going sightseeing, because 
you feel that giving the ride might be 
boring 
not loaning money to someone so that 
they can attend a movie, because you 
feel like keeping the extra money you 
have brought 
Moderate Need 
not providing comfort to someone who 
is about to undergo knee surgery, 
because you do not want to get up early 
in the morning when the surgery begins 
not giving aspirin to someone who is 
suffering from a painful migraine 
headache on a bus ride, because you do 
not want to bother looking for the 
bottle of aspirin you are carrying 
not providing a ride to someone who 
needs to get to a ceremony in which he 
or she is one of the main speakers, 
because you feel that providing the ride 
would be uninteresting 
Extreme need 
not donating blood to someone who 
requires it during emergency surgery, 
because you have plans to go to a movie 
and do not want to get tired 
not administering mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation to someone who has 
stopped breathing, because you might 
get dirty administering the procedure 
not driving someone to the hospital 
who is bleeding uncontrollably, because 
you are concerned that some blood 
might get on your car 
Figure 1. Outline of Incidents Used.  Source: Miller et al., “Perceptions of Social 
Responsibilities in India and the United States,” 47. 
                                                                                                                                           
fell in an intermediate range between those viewed in moral terms and those viewed as 
matters of personal choice.” For the sake of brevity, I have included the percentages for 
the personal-moral category under the moral rule category.  
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In Miller et al.’s study about how individuals from different cultures 
weigh and coordinate moral and non-moral considerations, the experimenters 
presented nine hypothetical scenarios regarding attitudes toward helping to a 
sample of American and Hindu Indian children and adults.12 Miller et al. 
interviewed individuals from three different age groups about incidents in which 
an agent refused to help a dependent other who was experiencing either extreme 
(life threatening), moderate, or minor need. The situations varied not only in 
magnitude of need but also in the relationship between the agent and the 
potential recipient. The relationship between the agent and the potential 
recipient was presented as either that of a) a parent to a young son or daughter, 
b) a best friend, or c) a stranger. There were also questions included to “assess 
whether subjects felt that each behavior was (a) governed by objective obligations 
above [social-conventional] rule or law, (b) legitimately regulated, or both.”13 This 
was to differentiate whether the subjects considered the behavior to fall under 
either moral, social conventional or personal choice obligations. The person in 
need was portrayed as “dependent on the agent for having his or her needs met in 
a satisfactory manner” and described as “explicitly requesting aid from the 
agent.” 14 Moreover, the cost to the agent of fulfilling the other's request was 
portrayed as minimal, the agent's motive for refusing the other's request was 
                                                   
12 See Figure 1.  
 
13 Miller et al., “Perceptions of Social Responsibilities in India and the United States,” 
35, add that they made sure to mention that the “stranger” in the hypothetical scenarios 
was nonthreatening and posed no danger to the agent, in order to prevent suspicion or 
fear of strangers from influencing subjects’ judgments. 
 
14 Miller et al., “Perceptions of Social Responsibilities in India and the United States,” 
35. 
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presented as “uncompelling and selfish,” and the consequences to the other of the 
agent's refusal to help were described (see fig. 1).15  
Miller et al. found that in occasions of minor or moderate need, both for 
strangers and friends, American subjects were much less likely than Indian 
subjects to see helping behavior as morally obligatory (based on objective 
obligations). For situations of moderate need involving a stranger, 100% of 
Indian subjects saw helping as a moral obligation, compared to only 47% of 
American subjects. For situations of minor need involving a stranger, only 23% of 
American subjects saw helping as morally obligatory versus 73% of Indian 
subjects. Similar numbers held true even for occasions when the relationship 
between the hypothetical agent and person in need was that of best friends. In 
situations of moderate need involving a friend, only 65% of American subjects 
saw helping as morally required, as compared to 100% of Indian subjects. The 
numbers dipped even lower for situations of minor need involving a friend, only 
33% of American subjects saw helping as morally obligatory, as opposed to 93% 
of Indian subjects. 
American subjects were also less likely to see situations of minor or 
moderate need as legitimately regulated, that is, falling within the social-
conventional realm. In situations of minor need, only 22% of American subjects 
saw helping behavior as required by social conventions, versus 73% of Indian 
subjects. Even in situations of moderate need, only 40% of American subjects saw 
helping behavior as a required by social conventions versus 100% of Indian 
subjects. 
                                                   
15 Ibid. 
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Finally, Miller et al. found that in situations of moderate or minor need 
involving strangers, American subjects saw helping behavior largely as a matter 
of personal choice: in situations of minor 72% of subjects saw helping as a matter 
of personal choice, and in situations of moderate need 50% of subjects saw 
helping as a matter of personal choice. 
Miller, Bersoff, and Harwood theorized that since American culture tends 
to stress individual freedom and autonomy, while Hindu Indian culture places 
greater emphasis on interpersonal dependence and social obligations, the 
underlying cultural beliefs of the two groups would affect their attitudes toward 
helping situations. Results showed that Indians more frequently viewed 
responsiveness to the needs of others as an objective moral obligation while 
Americans saw strangers in need of help as morally obligatory only if they judged 
that the negative consequences ensuing from not helping were serious enough to 
warrant curtailing the agent’s autonomy or freedom of choice.16  
Taking Miller et al.’s study into consideration, the best response to the 
evidence from behavior in helping situations of minor need would be to say that 
most of the subjects simply did not consider helping in a situation of minor need 
as morally obligatory at all, but rather as either morally elective or a matter left 
up to personal choice. If the subjects considered helping in situations of minor 
need as morally elective, they may have considered helping as a morally optional 
way of discharging an imperfect duty of beneficence; they could choose to help or 
not help on this particular occasion based on other considerations. On the other 
hand, subjects may have considered helping someone in a situation of minor 
                                                   
16 Miller et al., “Perceptions of Social Responsibilities in India and the United States,” 
44. 
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need as a matter of personal preference. According to Miller et al.’s study, 72% of 
Americans perceived helping situations of minor need involving strangers as 
matters of personal choice. The numbers were similar for helping situations of 
minor need involving friends (67%) and a son or a daughter (55%). Subjects in a 
good mood were more helpful because they simply chose to be more helpful 
because of their good mood. Perhaps when an agent is in a good mood, he is less 
worried about whether his helpfulness will come off as true helpfulness or merely 
officiousness; or his helpfulness may be merely an outward expression of his 
good mood.17 
 It is entirely possible that for most of the subjects in the Isen and Levin 
experiment, helping the confederate was not a moral decision at all but rather a 
personal one. The subjects in the Isen and Levin study may have had an 
underlying assumption or belief that responding to the confederate’s minor need 
was not a moral duty because the need was not serious enough to warrant 
curtailing the personal freedom of choosing whether to help or not. The subjects 
that did stop and help did not do so because they now considered the decision to 
help as a moral action (morally elective or morally obligatory) but rather because 
they were in a good mood and made a personal choice to stop and help. Like 
someone who is in a good mood one day and decides to smile at strangers they 
                                                   
17 It would be interesting to conduct a similar experiment to Isen and Levin’s in a 
country with a more “collectivistic” culture where social obligations and interpersonal 
dependence play a greater role and helping others in need might be seen as being a moral 
duty, not a matter of personal choice. Although Miller et al. noted in their study that even 
the Hindu subjects tended to characterize minor-need stranger obligations in moral 
terms less frequently than other obligations. 
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meet on the sidewalk or to wear more colorful clothing to match their mood, the 
decision to help was a matter of personal choice, not a moral action at all.18 
On the other hand, if agents perceived helping in a situation of minor 
need as morally elective, then they could choose whether to stop and help on this 
particular occasion. Why would agents perceive helping as merely morally 
elective in situations of minor need? For an answer, I turn to the argument by 
Robert Adams that perhaps consistency requirements for trait-relevant behavior 
depend on the trait on which one is focusing. Adams argues that behavioral 
consistency requirements for different traits can be divided into two main 
categories reflecting the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect 
obligations.19 A perfect obligation is defined as “one that is violated if one fails in 
any single case to behave in a particular way,” while imperfect obligations are 
“satisfied if one ‘does enough’ of the relevant sort of thing.”20 Adams argues that 
people may be less likely to break a perfect obligation than they are to break an 
imperfect one. Perhaps agents perceived helping in a situation of minor need as a 
merely imperfect obligation, and therefore, a morally elective action.  
The consistency requirement for imperfect duties is lower than that of 
perfect duties. If being helpful in a situation of minor need is an imperfect duty it 
is not a duty that must be satisfied on every occasion; one could fail to be helpful 
on a few occasions and still have the trait of helpfulness if one helps in enough 
                                                   
18 It would be interesting to conduct a similar experiment to Isen and Levin’s in a 
country with a more “collectivistic” culture where social obligations and interpersonal 
dependence play a greater role and helping others in need might be seen as being a moral 
duty, not a matter of personal choice. Although Miller et al. noted in their study that even 
the Hindu subjects tended to characterize minor-need stranger obligations in moral 
terms less frequently than other obligations. 
 
19 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 145-147. 
 
20 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 145. 
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other cases. The behavior of those subjects who did not stop and help might be 
perfectly consistent with having the trait of helpfulness. Helpfulness is not a trait 
that needs to be displayed on every occasion. Perhaps the helpful subjects in the 
experiment decided to help on this particular occasion because of a change in 
their mood that changed their perception of the situation or increased their 
motivation to help. 
Adams points out that it is important to note that finding the dime was 
not the only factor that played a part in the behavior of the subjects. After all, the 
subjects that found the dime and stopped to help probably had some 
predisposition to helpfulness that was activated by their change in mood. It is 
possible that someone without this predisposition to be helpful would not have 
stopped at all, as the change in mood would not have activated anything. I come 
back to this interaction between predispositions and environmental factors in 
chapters five and six. 
 
Some considerations. One problem with the argument from choice is that it 
only works as a response for helping situations of minor need or, at most, in 
situations where helping (or displaying some other moral behavior) is seen as 
elective. If the argument from choice works as a response only to situations where 
moral behavior is seen as elective, then the results in these sorts of cases do not 
necessarily generalize to cases where moral behavior is perceived (or should be 
perceived as) morally obligatory. Hence, the argument from choice does not work 
as a response to other sorts of cases where consequences are far more serious 
such as the Milgram experiment. Responding to evidence from situations of 
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extreme need, for example, will require additional arguments. I come to those 
later on in this chapter and in the next chapter. 
 
Localizing trait terms. In helping situations of minor need, the trait in 
question (as stated in the psychological literature) is “helping behavior” or 
something like “helpfulness,” a very vaguely defined trait at best. We could try to 
define helping behavior along the same lines as “prosocial behavior” from the 
psychological literature, which is roughly defined as “voluntary behavior intended 
to benefit another,” but this term seems far too broad to cover only helping 
situations of minor need.21 Prosocial behavior covers helping behavior in 
situations of minor, moderate, or extreme need. Defining helpful behavior as the 
behavior of going out of one’s way to help or aid others in some way also seems 
like too broad a definition. After all, it would cover the case of someone helping a 
stranger pick up papers he had just dropped on the street, with little cost for 
helping and trivial consequences for not helping, as well as cases of people 
helping refugees escape from the Nazi’s during the days of the Holocaust.  
The problem is that while in conversation we might use “helpful” to cover 
all kinds of cases, we do not necessarily believe that because Alan is the type of 
person who would help a stranger pick up papers she has dropped in public, he is 
also the type of person that would hide refugees at the risk of his life and those of 
his loved ones. In the study on attitudes toward helping others in trivial 
situations, American subjects did not feel that in a helping situation of minor 
need helping behavior was a moral behavior at all. However, the subjects’ 
attitudes were different toward helping situations of extreme need. Fully 92% of 
                                                   
21 See Eisenberg, Spinrad and Sadovsky, “Empathy-Related Responding in Children.” 
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subjects considered it to be a moral obligation to help a stranger in extreme need 
of help while only 18% felt they had a moral obligation to help a stranger in minor 
need of help. Some of the same subjects that felt that helping behavior in a 
situation of minor need was not a moral behavior at all, felt that helping behavior 
in a situation of extreme need was not only a moral behavior but also a morally 
obligatory one. If “helpful” refers to behavior that would be morally obligatory in 
a situation of extreme need but merely morally elective in a situation of minor 
need then “helpful” refers to both a moral and a (potentially) non-moral trait or, 
at the very least, “helpful” refers to both behaviors that are morally obligatory and 
behaviors that are morally elective. In this context, “helpful” then is merely a 
blanket term that refers to a wide array of behaviors in different types of 
situations. However, since I make a distinction between morally obligatory and 
morally elective behaviors, this definition of helpful is not useful for this 
discussion. Instead, I propose to limit the definition of this term in the context of 
my discussion of the situationist evidence.  
I borrow from the situationist idea of contextualizing traits and narrowing 
the scope of trait terms by restricting the types of situations covered by a single 
character term; for example, by limiting situations (and corresponding trait 
relevant behavior) according to the degree of need of the victim in that situation. 
Perhaps the behavior of rescuers or refugees during the Holocaust should not be 
called “helpful” behavior, but rather “altruistic” behavior, where altruism refers 
to behaviors associated with high costs to the subject and/or serious 
consequences for the person in need. It seems intuitive to say this as we would 
probably not call the helping behavior exhibited in the dime experiment 
“altruistic” but merely helpful. So for example, one way we could parcel out the 
 87
different traits would be to say that performing a beneficent action in cases where 
the cost of helping and the consequences of not helping are fairly high is an 
altruistic action, performing a beneficent action in cases where the cost and 
consequences are moderate is a compassionate action, and performing a 
beneficent action in cases where costs and consequences are low is merely a 
helpful action. 22 This is merely an example of one way we could define traits 
according to cost and consequences for the purposes of explaining my argument. 
Obviously, this classification fails to capture some of the nuances of moral 
behavior, such as morally elective versus morally obligatory actions, etc. I come 
back to this problem in later chapters. 
If altruism, compassion, and helpfulness are three separate traits, then 
one’s failing to act in the dime experiment would have no bearing on how one 
would act in a situation that required “altruistic” behavior like risking one’s own 
life or limb for the sake of someone else. If the trait (and trait-relevant behavior) 
required in helping situations of minor need is not the same as the trait required 
in helping situations of extreme need, then if an agent fails to help in a situation 
of minor need but helps in a situation of extreme need, his behavior is not cross-
situationally inconsistent. He may just have the trait corresponding to situations 
of extreme need, without also having the trait corresponding to situations of 
minor need. I come back to this discussion in chapter five. 
For the purposes of my discussion so far, however, we need only to give a 
definition of “helpfulness” and the sorts of situations that require helpful 
                                                   
22 This is the case with some definitions of altruism at least. Altruistic behavior is 
sometimes defines less specifically, for example as a case where one acts to benefit 
another at a high cost to oneself (with no mention of consequences), and sometimes more 
specifically with the added caveat that the consequences of one’s actions cannot benefit 
one in any way.  
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behavior. For a definition, I turn to Doris’s definition of compassion in Lack of 
Character. Doris defines compassion as “a stable and consistent disposition to 
perform beneficent actions” with “failures to behave compassionately when doing 
so is appropriate and not unduly costly” counting as evidence against the 
attribution of that trait.23 According to Doris’s definition of compassion, to be 
consistently compassionate one must not fail to do beneficent actions in 
situations where it is appropriate to do so and doing so does not carry too high a 
high cost to the agent. Being consistently compassionate only requires one not to 
fail to act compassionately in situations where doing so is not “unduly costly” to 
the agent. Doris has limited compassion in scope by its costs to the agent. 
According to this definition, the subjects who did not stop and help in the Isen 
and Levin failed to act compassionately because it would have been of very low 
cost to them to stop and help. I disagree that compassion is the term that Doris is 
picking out with his definition. However, I believe he has the right idea in 
limiting the scope of traits terms by factors like costs to the agent or the person in 
need. 
 Defining “helpfulness” along similar lines to Doris’s definition of 
compassion, we might define helpful as “a stable and consistent disposition to 
perform beneficent actions when doing so is appropriate and of low cost to the 
subject and its omission of low cost to the victim.” With this new definition of 
“helpful” in mind, let us move on to the next major experiment cited as evidence 
by situationists. 
 
 
                                                   
23 Doris, Lack of Character, 28- 30.  
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Darley and Batson’s “Good Samaritan” Experiment 
 
Being in a Hurry Versus not Being in a Hurry 
AM response 
Similar to Sabini and Silver’s suggestion that some of the subjects in Isen 
and Levin simply did not see the victim because of their nonelevated mood, Owen 
Flanagan theorized that the seminary students who did not stop to help were not 
paying attention to their surroundings because they were hurrying and did not 
even notice the victim. Either the subjects did not actually see him, or they did 
not stop to think about the implications of what they had seen. That is, they saw 
him but did not think about whether the man was in serious need of help. Thus, 
perhaps they did not even realize that this was a situation that warranted helping 
behavior.24  
Like the argument from heightened attention, the main thrust behind the 
argument from misrepresentation seems to be a fundamental disagreement with 
the situationist claim that having the trait of helpfulness requires strict 
behavioral consistency. In order to have the trait of helpfulness, one need not 
help in every situation where helping behavior is required. An agent can fail to 
help and not have his failure to help in one situation count as definitive evidence 
against the agent having that trait.  
This response also runs into the same problems as the argument from 
heightened attention. If I consistently fail to notice people in need, am I really 
still “helpful”? Should something like “notices when someone needs help in at 
                                                   
24 Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality, 302. Nancy Snow points out that Darley 
and Batson themselves suggested that perhaps the seminarians did not consciously 
register the victim’s plight because of their hurry, a sort of “narrowing of the cognitive 
map.” The seminarians who were told to hurry were so focused on their assigned task 
they had little attention to pay to anything else. 
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least most situations” be part of the definition of helpful? Perhaps in order to be 
truly helpful one needs also to pay attention to one’s surroundings and notice 
when someone is in need of help. This last consideration again brings us back to 
the argument from deficiency of character.  
 
DC response 
As with the Isen and Levin case, we could argue from DC that the agents 
in the Darley and Batson situation who failed to help were lacking in practical 
wisdom or some other trait that one needs in order to be the kind of person who 
pays close attention to their surroundings. Perhaps the subjects from the 
Seminarian and dime experiments lacked a skill or trait that would have helped 
them act consistently with their desire to be helpful. 
Nancy Snow claims that lack of attention or awareness could be a vice that 
affects all of the virtues, not any specific one of them.25 Becoming overly focused 
on a task often causes us to miss our surroundings. Perhaps the seminarians who 
noticed the man but failed to register the situation as one that required their 
attention might be suffering from a “general obtuseness” that affects their display 
of certain virtues but does not necessarily point to a lack of caring about the 
welfare of others.26 There might be inconsistency in one’s behavior but this 
inconsistency is unintentional. That is, agents acted inconsistently in regards to 
helpful behavior because they lacked whatever trait one needs in order to keep 
one’s other trait-relevant behavior consistent.  
                                                   
25 As we shall see when we discuss practical wisdom, this may be the case as practical 
wisdom is supposed to ensure against our failing to notice relevant moral factors in our 
surroundings. 
 
26 Nancy E. Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 105. 
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Snow proposes some kind of general skill that one needs in order to 
ensure that one acts consistently with one’s traits. This general skill would help 
the agent act consistently with his motivation to be helpful, compassionate or 
brave, etc.; this skill that Snow proposes would in effect help one to act 
consistently with one’s values (like caring about the welfare of others). I will come 
back to this argument in later chapters. 
 
Ambiguity and Conflicting Duties 
AM response 
Snow argues that perhaps another factor playing a role in this case was a 
conflict between moral duties.27 She cites a not often discussed follow-up 
experiment conducted by Batson and colleagues in 1978 to test the hypothesis 
that hurrying versus not hurrying was by itself what reduced helping behavior in 
the Good Samaritan experiment.28 
In the follow-up experiment, male undergraduates were told that their 
date was either important (or not) to the completion of a research project. Then 
half of them were told they were late and must hurry, while the other half were 
told they had plenty of time. The results were as follows in table 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 103-107. 
 
28 See Daniel C. Batson, Pamela J. Cochran, Marshall F. Biederman, James L. Blosser, 
Maurice J. Ryan, and Bruce Vogt, “Failure to Help When in a Hurry: Callousness or 
Conflict?” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 4, no. 1(January 1978): 97-101. 
The curious thing about this study that may be somewhat problematic is that Batson et 
al. never describe what the “victim” in this scenario looks like. The assumption is that the 
victim is just as ambiguous as the one in the original study by Darley and Batson but this 
is left unclear in this paper. 
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Table 2 Number of subjects that helped in situations of hurrying versus not hurrying 
 Others not 
counting on 
them—not 
hurrying  
Others not 
counting on 
them—hurry 
Others counting 
on them—not 
hurrying 
Others counting 
on them—hurry  
Helped 8 out of 10 7 out of 10 5 out of 10 1 out of 10 
Source: Daniel C. Batson et al., “Failure to Help When in a Hurry: Callousness or 
Conflict?” 97-101. 
 
According to these figures, it is not merely being in a hurry that affected 
whether the subjects were likely to stop and help. Behavior was also affected by 
whether the subject had other conflicting obligations. While delivering some 
information to help with a research project may not seem as pressing as helping 
someone who is in possible distress, we should remember that the motive of 
fulfilling one’s social roles is a very strong one because we want to seem in tune 
with our social surroundings.29  
Sabini and Silver argue along the same lines as Snow, except they do not 
maintain that the two conflicting duties the subjects were torn between were both 
necessarily moral duties. For the seminary students, there was a possible conflict 
between stopping to provide possibly unwanted or unneeded help and probably 
failing to arrive on time or fulfilling the clear obligation of delivering the talk. 
Whereas the situation of the person slumped in the doorway may or may not 
have been a case that required their help (and thus may or may not been a moral 
duty), they had a clear duty to deliver a lecture to the people who had asked them 
there.30 
Sreenivasan argues along similar lines, maintaining that just because 
there might be a reason to act compassionately or honestly, for example, does not 
                                                   
29 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 147.  
 
30 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 557-59. This is another instance of the 
effects of the perceptions of others affecting behavior. For more on this see section on 
group effects in next chapter. 
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mean there might not be a reason that can defeat this reason as the one to dictate 
one’s behavior.31 For example, whenever the reason not to lie or to act 
compassionately is defeated, it can be perfectly consistent (in that particular case) 
to act dishonestly or fail to act compassionately.32 Perhaps in the Good Samaritan 
case it is justifiable to fail to help someone who might be in distress because one 
is hurrying and one’s obligation of getting some specific place (that one has 
previously agreed to) defeats one’s obligation to help.  
One other consideration is that in the original case hurrying versus not 
hurrying and the possibility of conflicting duties are not the only factor operating 
in this situation; there is also the troubling ambiguity of the victim’s situation. 
The seminary students could not be sure if the person slumped over in the 
doorway was somebody in need or simply a homeless person who was sleeping on 
the sidewalk and would not want to be disturbed. How does this explain the 
students who were not hurrying seeming more likely to stop and help? We could 
point back to the original idea that students who were in a hurry simply did not 
notice the man, or we could respond that like the subjects in the dime 
experiment, the subject who did not stop and help actively chose not to help the 
man because they saw this situation as one where being helpful was a matter of 
personal choice, not moral obligation, and not helping was not a breach in one’s 
moral duty.  
The response from conflicting duties is in line with the argument from 
misrepresentation—the idea that the consistency condition for character does not 
                                                   
31 See Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” 59-60. 
 
32 We should note here that the idea of “perfectly consistent with compassion” may 
refer here only to the subject’s view of what is perfectly consistent with compassion, not 
necessarily some objective view of what actually is consistent with compassion. This is an 
important distinction that seems to be blurred here. We will come back to this in the next 
chapter. 
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necessarily translate to an agent having to display trait-relevant behavior in every 
situation that calls for it. For cases where helpful behavior is required, an agent 
can fail to act helpfully in one situation and yet still be considered helpful if s/he 
is helpful in enough other situations.  
 
DC response 
However, we might think that in the case of the Good Samaritan 
experiment, where it was ambiguous whether the victim was ill or merely 
intoxicated or asleep, failing to at least stop and ask the victim if he needed help 
is a failure in helpfulness. Being in a hurry does not justify one merely passing by 
without helping. Actively choosing to not find out whether the person needs help 
is way of choosing not to help. The agent would rather not find out pertinent 
information about the victim’s situation that might help him make a truly 
informed decision (such as which obligation is overriding). If the agent is not 
helpful, or at the very least, that he lacks some aspect of being helpful because he 
actively chooses.  
This might strike us as a surprising conclusion about the behavior of the 
seminarians considering that it seems like seminary students should have 
developed a trait like helpfulness and should always pick moral duties over other 
personal goals. However, Nomy Arpaly remarks that the assumption that 
seminary students would be any more helpful than other people is strange, or at 
least misguided, and adds that this is simply an example of how terrible we are at 
judging one another, which doesn’t by itself prove the situationist point. 33 All it 
would prove, presumably, is that perhaps we are mistaken about which types of 
                                                   
33 Arpaly, “Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris,”  644. 
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people are more helpful than others. If we merely overestimate how helpful 
people really are, this may be an error in our general beliefs about what character 
traits are more common in a population (or certain populations), but it would say 
nothing about the broader idea character.34   
 
Analysis 
Conflicting Duties and the Powerful Effects of Ambiguity 
Although being in a hurry may have contributed to some of the subjects in 
the Good Samaritan experiment deciding against helping the victim, the 
underlying factors at work were conflicting duties and ambiguity. An agent that is 
in a hurry has less time to weight costs and consequences and so may weigh 
conflicting duties incorrectly. Moreover, the facts of the situation were 
ambiguous and agents could have assumed that the victim was only in need of 
minor help. For situations of minor need most people consider helping a stranger 
as either a non-moral or a morally elective choice so one does not need to help on 
every occasion; rather, it is a matter of choice when one helps. If it is unclear to 
an agent whether a victim is in minor or extreme need (or even, not in need at all 
but possibly dangerous), the agent may assume the former is true and choose not 
to help on that particular occasion because of a conflicting duty that takes 
precedence.  
Alternately, even if one sees helping a stranger in need as a merely 
morally elective action, sometimes greater obligations might demand our 
attention, especially when it is unclear that our help is needed (as it is arguable 
                                                   
34 This would bring up questions of the fundamental attribution error however, 
discussed in Chapter 1. The fundamental attribution error is as follows:  
(FAE) People’s inflated belief in the importance of personality traits and dispositions, 
together with their failure to recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting 
behavior. For more information see Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation. 
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that it was in the Seminary experiment). Does the victim really need help? Are 
they simply intoxicated or potentially dangerous?  
Ambiguity may seem like a poor reason not to help someone who is 
potentially in need, but there are numerous experiments conducted by 
psychologists to prove just how strong an influence it can have.  
  
 
Experiments on ambiguity 
Clark and Word. In the early 1970’s, psychologists Russell Clark and Larry 
Word conducted a study attempting to establish just what sorts of situational 
cues would have an effect on the helpfulness of bystanders during a simulated 
emergency (i.e., what kind of situational effects could lead to the bystander 
effect). Clark and Word ran two experiments “investigating the effects of 
ambiguity of an emergency situation on helping behavior.”35 They also studied 
what kind of effects group size would have on helpful behavior.  
The subjects were told that the purpose of the experiment was to 
determine how, why, and under what conditions sexual attitudes change. The 
subject would fill out a standard survey and afterwards would attempt to change 
the sexual attitudes of one or two females. The subject was escorted to an empty 
room where he was asked to take a seat and fill out a questionnaire. A few 
minutes later, a confederate posing as a maintenance man entered the room 
carrying a ladder and a venetian blind, then exited into an adjacent room where 
he could be heard working through a closed door. A few minutes later, the 
confederate pushed the ladder against the wall and fell to the floor, pulling the 
                                                   
35 See Russell D. Clark III and Larry E. Word, “Why Don’t Bystanders Help? Because of 
Ambiguity?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 24, no. 3 (1972): 392-400. 
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blinds down from a thirteen-foot window with him. He then groaned sharply and 
moaned, “Oh my back, I can’t move,” and then knocked the fallen ladder into a 
wall in a struggle to stand. He continued giving out cries, each less audible and 
less frequent, until he stopped altogether.  
In some variations, one or two female confederates (whose mind the 
subject was supposed to change regarding sexual attitudes) would be in the room 
with the subject. The confederates were instructed to react with surprise but to 
make no movement to stand unless the subject did so. The confederates should 
take any remark by the subject and return it in the form of a question. There were 
five conditions: in one the subject was alone, in a second he was accompanied 
with a naïve stranger (i.e., a stranger unaware of the real purpose of the 
experiment), in a third he was with an informed confederate (informed of the real 
purpose of the experiment), in a fourth he was with a naïve friend, and in a fifth 
he was with a friend who had been informed of the true purpose of the 
experiment.  
Clark and Word found that all of the subjects in this study helped with a 
variation of merely seconds between the times it took them to help. In other 
words, neither the number of people in the room (from one in the condition 
where the subject was alone, up to three when informed strangers joined him) 
nor the relation of the people in the group (either strangers or friends) affected 
whether subjects helped or not. Naïve subjects helped even in variations where 
the naïve subject was placed in a group with informed strangers (or an informed 
friend) who were told not to react to the sounds of the maintenance man falling. 
This is particularly important to note because the causes of the bystander effect 
are supposed to be diffusion of responsibility caused by the presence of multiple 
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people and dependence on the reactions of other people for cues about what the 
right action is in a situation.  
At least in this variation of the experiment, diffusion of responsibility did 
not seem to take place, nor did looking to others for cues about how to act. Even 
though the confederates (whether strangers or friends of the naïve subject) did 
not react in any real way to the sound of the maintenance man falling, all of the 
naïve subjects still offered to help. 
In the second study, Clark and Word tried a different variation of the 
experiment that they termed the “high ambiguity” variation. In this variation, 
they split up the subjects (all of them naïve subjects) to sit by themselves or into 
groups of two or five, and when the maintenance man fell he made no verbal 
signs of being injured or needing help. Helping dropped by approximately 70%. 
Only 30% of subjects in the alone condition helped, 20% in the two-person 
group, and 40% in the five-person group. In this case, the size of the group did 
make a difference to how much subjects helped. However, the influence of the 
size of the group was unclear as it dropped dramatically for a two-person group 
then increased again for a five-person group.36  
 Clark and Word proposed that the reason that the group made a 
difference at all in this variation was because of the ambiguity of the situation. In 
the first study, it was clear that the maintenance man had fallen and needed help, 
while in the second study it was not completely clear whether he had fallen or 
merely dropped something. Since the situation was ambiguous, the subjects 
looked to the other people in the group for an appropriate interpretation of the 
                                                   
36 There was also not much difference whether the group was made up of strangers or 
informed friends although they found that in most of the groups with informed friends, 
they acted slightly slower than in the group of strangers, (see Clark and Word, “Why 
Don’t Bystanders Help? Because of Ambiguity?” 395). 
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event in hopes of discovering a proper course of action by observing the behavior 
of their peers. 
Clark and Word concluded that ambiguity, rather than just group size 
alone, made a big difference to how a subject would respond to a certain 
situation. If a situation is ambiguous to the subject, the subject will begin to look 
around his environment for information that will help him figure out the proper 
course of action; this produces the “bystander effect.”37 For now, what is 
important to note is that ambiguity of the situation seemed to play a large role in 
whether people helped as well as how quickly they offered help.  
 
Piliavin, Piliavin and Rodin. Piliavin, Piliavin and Rodin also conducted a 
study on ambiguity in the form of a field experiment in the New York City 
subway.38 This study is relevant not only because it offers a response to anyone 
who might claim that the effects of ambiguity only work in the lab, but also 
because it parallels the ambiguous description of the victim from the Princeton 
Seminary experiment.  
The researchers set up this study in a New York City subway train using 
commuters who happened to be on the subway as the subjects of the study. The 
researchers were interested in discovering what effect the type of victim 
(intoxicated versus ill) would have on speed and frequency of responding. Four 
different confederates played the victim, all males between the ages of 26 to 35. 
                                                   
37 See Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 41-46. This is basically the idea 
that the more people there are in some emergency situation, the less likely that any one 
individual will offer help. 
 
38 See Irving M. Piliavin, Judith Rodin, and Jane Allyn Piliavin, “Good Samaritanism: 
An Underground Phenomenon?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 13, no. 4 
(1969): 280-299. The researchers were also interested in seeing which race would 
respond in each case, but my focus is not on that aspect of the study. 
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All of them wore Eisenhower jackets, old slacks, and no tie. The intoxicated 
victim smelled of liquor and carried a liquor bottle wrapped tightly in a brown 
bag, while the ill victim appeared sober and carried a black cane. The researchers 
hypothesized that people regarded as partly responsible for their plight (i.e., the 
intoxicated victims) would receive less sympathy than would people not seen as 
responsible for their plight. Moreover, they assumed whatever sympathy people 
did feel when they saw an intoxicated victim collapse would be dampened by fear 
of the victim becoming embarrassing or violent.  
Since the researchers were also interested in the effects of modeling 
behavior on the subjects in the study, they placed a confederate on the subway 
train that would intervene and help the victim if no one else offered to help after a 
predetermined amount of time. Depending on the different variations of the test, 
the model would wait a predetermined amount of time before stooping to help 
the fallen victim into a sitting position and staying with them for the remainder of 
the trial. The researchers noted that other social psychology tests had shown that 
an individual’s actions in a situation could lead others in that situation to engage 
in similar actions, including actions dealing with good samaritanism.39 The 
researchers wanted to test for this and to see what sorts of effects they could 
induce in the subjects via the confederate exhibiting the modeling behavior.  
Piliavin et al. found that the major differences among the variations of the 
test were in response times and how often the model would have to intervene 
before help was offered. Response times for the victim with the cane were much 
shorter than they were for the intoxicated victim; the model also had to intervene 
on a smaller proportion of the trials with the cane than the ones with the 
                                                   
39 See James H. Bryan, and Mary A. Test, “Models and helping: naturalistic studies in 
aiding behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 6, no. 1 (1967): 400-407. 
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intoxicated man. The victim with the cane received spontaneous help (before the 
model acted) in sixty-two out of sixty-five trials; the intoxicated victim received 
spontaneous help in nineteen out of thirty-eight trials. The differences could not 
be explained by reference to the numbers of potential helpers in the car since the 
mean numbers for both conditions were roughly the same.   
Just as in the study by Clark and Word, Piliavin et al. noted that they did 
not find that it mattered how many people were in the area when the incident 
occurred; what mattered was the type of incident that occurred. The authors 
concluded that the type of victim (intoxicated versus presumably just ill) was the 
most important factor in how often and how quickly help was offered. 
Although the researchers only considered one possible explanation for the 
response times associated with the different victims, there is another possible 
explanation. Perhaps the people who saw the intoxicated man fall did not see this 
as an occasion to help, not because they blamed him for his plight, but because it 
was not clear that he would want the help. While subjects could automatically 
interpret the fall of the man with the cane as inadvertent and his failure to get up 
as a need for help, they would not necessarily interpret the fall of the presumably 
intoxicated victim as a need for help. The subjects might have weighed this 
consideration and the consideration that the intoxicated victim might not want 
the help offered and might get violent, “embarrassing,” or aggressive in some 
way. The subjects who failed to help might have weighed costs versus 
consequences and decided that the consequences were not so serious as to incur 
the possible costs to themselves. 
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Darley and Batson Revisited 
The best explanation for the behavior of the subjects in the Princeton 
Seminary experiment is that there was some ambiguity playing a part in how the 
subjects interpreted the situation because it was unclear whether the victim was 
in need of help or merely asleep or intoxicated. The ambiguity surrounding the 
actual situation of the victim and the conflicting duties that the subjects seemed 
torn between together probably produced the results of the study. If researchers 
had tried another variation of the original experiment with the same hurry versus 
non-hurry conditions with a victim who was in obvious need of help, results may 
have been quite different. 
 
Possible problems 
Situationists could still point out that failing to act was a failure in 
helpfulness because the seminary students should have reasoned that helping 
someone in possible need was still more important than giving a lecture. If 
situationists believe that weighing duties correctly is part of being helpful, then 
failing to do so is a failure in helping behavior. Perhaps the inability to weigh 
duties correctly stems from a failure to understand what being helpful demands. 
This could once again be a failure in practical wisdom or some other kind of skill 
or practical knowledge that one needs in order to act consistently with one’s 
values. 
If we have a strict consistency requirement for helpfulness, we can agree 
with situationists that not helping in trivial helping situations is evidence against 
attributing helpfulness because it shows the subjects lack some aspect of 
helpfulness. On the other hand, if we agree that one can fail to act helpfully in a 
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few situations (of minor need) and still be considered consistently helpful, then 
conflicting duties and ambiguity are just two of the many reasons that an agent 
can have for choosing not to help in some situations without this thereby being 
evidence against the agent having a trait of helpfulness. 
Whichever side we come down on in regards to this problem, there is a 
bigger problem highlighted by the effects of ambiguity. If an agent chooses not to 
help a victim in an ambiguous situation because he believes the victim probably 
does not need help (or is not in extreme need of help) and it turns out the victim 
is in great need of help, the agent may end up making a decision he would not 
have endorsed had he known the victim was in need of help. If the agent cares 
about helping people in moderate or extreme need, and wants to help 
consistently in these types of situations, then he has failed to act as he would have 
wanted in the ambiguous situation. This is especially problematic if the agent 
consistently finds himself in ambiguous situations. 
Ambiguous situations might be another problematic area for many 
agents. Just like lack of attention due to being in a bad mood or in a hurry, 
ambiguous situational features might also increase the probability of an agent 
missing important details of a situation and consequently misinterpreting the 
situation. Failure to read ambiguous situations properly might be, as Nancy Snow 
put it, another “vice” that affects all of the virtues, not any specific one of them. 
Ambiguous situations may be situations in which we need to pay particular 
attention to situational features in order to have an accurate interpretation of the 
situation. We may need a particular skill in order to counter the effects of 
ambiguous situations. I will come back to this. 
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Milgram Experiment 
 All the experiments we have looked at so far tested for the trait of 
“helpfulness,” or coming to someone’s aid when costs and consequences are low 
for the agent and the victim. In the Milgram experiment, however, especially 
particular variations of it, the supposed consequences of not helping the victim 
were much more severe. The experiment was set up to make it look as if the 
victim could have suffered serious injury or even death because of the shocks. 
Possibly because of the severity of the supposed consequences, or because this 
experiment is testing for compassionate behavior, there are no responses arguing 
that the inconsistency in overt behavior in this case is consistent with having the 
character trait of compassion. Instead, all of the advocates of character seem to 
agree that some deficiency of character was responsible for the way agents 
behaved in this situation. That is, they agree with situationists that failing to act 
compassionately in this situation was evidence against attributing the trait of 
compassion.  
 However, they disagree among each other on what deficiency of character 
causes these inconsistencies and continue to disagree with situationists that this 
is evidence that situational contexts are always better predictors of behavior than 
character, even if this happened to be the case in this situation.  
 
DC Response  
 Some philosophers like Nomy Arpaly reject the situationist claim that the 
subjects all reacted similarly to the experiment: some subjects stayed all the way 
through, some left at different points, and some exhibited more overtly anxious 
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behaviors than others.40 Owen Flanagan also points out that “it’s important to 
keep in mind that a significant minority—fully one-third of the participants—did 
refuse to obey,” although he maintains that it is unclear to him what caused some 
people to comply and not others.41 Perhaps, many (though clearly not all) of the 
subjects simply lacked some aspect of compassion. Perhaps they lacked practical 
wisdom or some other skill that would help ensure that they acted consistently 
compassionately; or perhaps another trait they had overrode their compassion. 
 Philosophers and psychologists (Milgram included) have theorized that 
the reason most people complied with the experimenters request was the 
subjects’ deference toward authority. 42 Since the subjects had more practice 
obeying authority than performing compassionate acts, the trait of obedience 
overrode the trait of compassion. Robert Solomon points out that most often 
“people display compassion ‘by feeling sorry for’ those much worse off than they, 
a very small expenditure of effort even when it is sincere.”43 In other words, 
feeling sorry for others in bad situations is the most effort that most people 
usually put into trying to be compassionate. In circumstances like the Milgram 
experiment, where “unpracticed efforts” are required, people are capable of 
“beastly behaviors.”44 
                                                   
40 Arpaly, “Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris,” 644. 
 
41 Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality, 295 
 
42 See Sabini and Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” 547; Jonathan 
Webber, “Virtue, Character and Situation,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 3, no. 2, (2006): 
199; Robert C. Solomon, “What’s Character Got to Do with It?” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 71, no. 3 (November 2005): 648-655. p. 653; and Jonathan 
Webber, “Character, Common-sense and Expertise,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
10, no. 1 (January 2007): 89-104. 
 
43 Solomon, “What’s Character Got to Do with It?” 653. 
 
44 Solomon, “What’s Character God to Do with It?” 653. 
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Webber makes the further claim that we have a tendency to cite 
uncommon traits like cruelty to explain the behavior of subjects in the Milgram 
experiment, instead of common traits like obedience to authority.45 The behavior 
of the subjects was not showing inconsistency in compassion, it was showing 
consistency in obedience. However, the question remains, how could obedience 
so easily override compassion? 
 To answer this question let us turn back to Sabini and Silver and their 
paper on the sociopsychology of the Holocaust.46 According to Sabini and Silver, 
the Milgram subjects (like some of the people who aided in the Holocaust before 
them) did not intend the evil of shocking the learner all the way up to max 
voltage. The evil was unintended; they only intended the good of being deferent 
to authority. Since the experimenter was the authority figure, subjects didn’t feel 
as if they were fully responsible for what happened to the learner.47 Like people 
who aided the Nazi regime, Milgram’s subjects assumed the institution would 
bear the responsibility.  
 This is an obvious confusion between technical and moral responsibility. 
Like people who aided the Nazi’s, Milgram’s subjects seemed to ignore the fact 
that once the institution they were helping was no longer legitimate (because the 
institution was committing immoral actions), they could and should stop 
                                                   
45 Webber, “Character, Common-sense and Expertise,” 100. While this may be a 
problem of wrongly attributing traits to people, by itself this wouldn’t count as evidence 
for the situationist claim that there are no robust character traits. 
 
46 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 66-68. Sabini and Silver argue that 
evil actions aren’t always tied to desire, as in the Milgram case. 
 
47 See Milgram’s full discussion of this in Obedience to Authority: An Experimental 
View (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 
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obeying.48 The subjects failed to see that virtue required them to stop obeying the 
rules of a corrupt institution; failing to realize this was a failure in reasoning and 
practical wisdom, a deficiency of character that led to inconsistency in 
compassionate behavior.49   
 Sabini and Silver and others have also pointed out the stepwise character 
of the situation in the Milgram case.50 The subject’s evil behavior is not the 
consequence of a decision to do evil; it is the result of prior commitment to 
relatively unobjectionable behavior with escalating minor commitments that 
eventually result in complicity in a “pointless, cruel, and dangerous ordeal.”51 
Because subjects felt that they had only made a commitment to doing something 
relatively unobjectionable, they did not feel fully responsible for the objectionable 
actions they ended up doing. They were simply following through on their initial 
commitment. Once again, this is a failure in reasoning of not being able to see the 
relevant moral factors in the situation or, perhaps, a failure to weigh duties 
properly (with the duty not to harm weighing more than the duty to obey).  
Sabini and Silver also argue that people (especially Americans) don’t like 
confrontation, and walking away from the experiment would have required 
                                                   
48 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 66-68. Sabini and Silver argue that 
evil actions aren’t always tied to desire, as in the Milgram case. 
 
49 More on this in the section on practical wisdom in the next chapter. 
 
50 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 69. (See also Sabini and Silver, “Lack 
of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” 553; Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality, 
297; Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 50-58). 
 
51 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 56. See also Sabini and Silver, “Lack 
of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” 553. 
Flanagan also points out that people also feel a justification problem. Flanagan, 
Varieties of Moral Personality, 297. 
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confronting the experimenter and telling him that the experiment was immoral.52 
This is another failure in reasoning or failure to weigh duties properly. Duties of 
compassion clearly outweigh any squeamishness subjects’ might have felt at 
failing their duty to the experimenter. What are a few moments of discomfort to 
the possibility of hurting or possibly even killing someone (viz. the learner)?  
 
Analysis 
Obedience and Social Influence 
 In another paper, Sabini and Silver argue that it wasn’t just obedience to 
an authority that drove many of Milgram subjects to continue with the 
experiments; it was obedience to a specific kind of authority figure.53 The 
experimenter served as the guide and rational person in a situation that the 
subjects found morally baffling and unfamiliar. While this situation was not 
ambiguous in the same way as the Seminary experiment (in the most famous 
version of the Milgram experiment, the victim was, after all, yelling for help), the 
situation was wholly new to many of the subjects. 
 In unfamiliar situations, just as in ambiguous situations, subjects look to 
others in the situation to determine the correct course of action and in the 
Milgram experiment an authority figure had told the subjects that the experiment 
was perfectly safe. Not only was the situation unfamiliar to the subjects, an 
authority figure had told them the experiment was safe. Not only did the subjects 
feel a duty to obey the authority figure to go through with the experiment 
                                                   
52 Sabini and Silver, Moralities of Everyday Life, 552-53. In response to an experiment 
also dealing with the perceptions of others, Sabini and Silver claim that (557) “people do 
not want to embarrass themselves by looking like a fool, by losing their cool.” This seems 
to play an important role in this experiment as well. More on this in the section of group 
effects. 
 
53 See Sabini and Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” 547-53. 
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(because they had agreed to participate in it), they were in a situation that was 
unknown to them but well known to the authority figure. On the other hand, the 
victim was calling out for help and so there was a duty to him to help if he was in 
pain, or at the very least, not to harm him. However, the victim was also outside 
of his own environment and was not an authority figure. This experiment was the 
domain of the experimenter and if anyone knew what was supposed to happen 
within that environment it was he, not another subject.54 As Sabini and Silver 
pointed out, the subjects saw the experimenter as the “rational man” in the 
experiment. As if the strong compulsion to obey authority was not enough, the 
subjects also found themselves within the domain of that authority figure, 
making the impulse to obey even stronger. 
 Moreover, as mentioned above, subjects seemed to confuse technical (or 
legal) and moral responsibility. They assumed the authority figure had full 
responsibility for his commands (and the consequences of his commands), 
especially since the authority figure was issuing commands within his domain to 
an outsider.  
 Whereas for helping behavior in situations of minor need there may be 
some leeway regarding consistency requirements for each trait, for behavior in 
situations requiring compassion, especially those with possibly severe 
                                                   
54 There is some evidence for this. Among the many variations of the experiment that 
Milgram conducted were the following ones: in one variation the learner demands to be 
shocked after the experimenter (as authority figure) has told the naïve subject to stop, in 
another the experimenter is strapped in as the victim while an ordinary man takes on the 
role of experimenter in giving commands, and in another, two experimenters give 
conflicting commands to the naïve subject about whether to stop the experiment or not. 
In all of these variations, the naïve subject stopped when the experimenter told him to (or 
when the two experimenters began arguing). In the last variation with the two 
experimenter giving conflicting demands, the naïve subject seems to see this as evidence 
that even though the two experimenters are within their own domain, since both have 
equal authority and cannot decide on one command, neither command is valid. See 
Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 105-10. 
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consequences to the victim, there seems to be a much more stringent consistency 
requirement. If the choice not to help was the result of poor reasoning or some 
inability to act according to one’s values (like concern for victim), this points to 
potentially dangerous deficiencies in character. 
 We have already noted that ambiguous or unfamiliar situations confuse 
subjects, leading them to commit errors in reasoning. In the Milgram 
experiment, an unfamiliar situation was coupled with other problematic factors 
(such as conflicting duties and the subject’s impulse to obey authority) to create a 
situation that would baffle most subjects. Unfortunately, these types of situations 
are all too common and familiar in the annals of history and that makes the 
results of this case particularly troubling. It matters very little whether the 
subjects in the Milgram experiment felt compassion for the confederate if they 
did not act on that compassion. If certain types of situations pose problems for 
the expression of certain values for many agents, these are the types of situations 
we must evaluate closely in order to find a way to counteract situational 
influences in these situations.  
 However, not all of the subjects complied: fully one third of them quit the 
experiment early on. While these numbers may be disheartening, it is clear that 
correcting this deficiency is not impossible. Perhaps what we should take away 
from the experiment is that people are not as compassionate as they believe 
themselves to be but this may be due to an error or deficiency in moral education 
or a lack of attention to developing this particular trait. I come back to this issue 
in the following chapters.  
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 From the fact that at least a third of the agents refused to continue with 
the experiment until the end, we can surmise that it is not impossible to 
counteract these influences.  
 
Response to Historical Cases  
Finally, I would like to address the Stanford Prison Experiment, Abu 
Ghraib, the Rwandan genocide, and the Holocaust as evidence for the situationist 
critique. There have been few responses to these cases as evidence for 
situationism and these types of cases seem to fall into neither the argument from 
misrepresentation nor the argument from deficiency of character approach. The 
problem is that while these cases do have some features in common with the rest 
of the evidence for situationism, none of them presents clear-cut examples of 
evidence of the power of the situation over personal dispositions.  
 First, situational factors have a different meaning in these cases, referring 
not to the features of a single instance of a situation but rather to a complete 
environment, often for long periods. “Environment” here is defined as including 
the social and political climates of a particular place as well as the goals, values, 
and beliefs of the people in that place. Furthermore, there is little to no attention 
paid to the role of enduring beliefs, goals, or values on people’s behavior. The 
influence of values, beliefs, or goals developed because of a particular 
environment seems to be equated with the influence of purely situational 
influences like finding someone else’s discarded change in a phone booth. 
 The situational factors in these cases are long-term situational features. 
Often they refer to the environments that people grew up in and/or lived in. This 
type of “situational feature” is very different from experiments where a single 
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situational feature in a situation influences an individual to behave differently 
than they otherwise would have. The idea that people are affected by the 
environments in which they live and grew up is not one disputed by defenders of 
the traditional conception of character. Aristotle argued that in order for an agent 
to develop virtue, he must first be taught the moral virtues from his youth. 
Presumably, a parent, teacher, or guardian would help habituate him with the 
right moral beliefs, desires, values, affects, etc. Developing practical wisdom 
required time and the right sorts of experiences. According to Aristotle, the 
development of virtue was dependent on an agent’s environment. 
 According to the situationist critique, situationism is correct if behavioral 
variation owes more to situational rather than dispositional differences. 
However, if dispositional differences developed because of living in or growing up 
in a particular environment are also considered situational influences, it is 
unclear that there is a difference between dispositional and situational 
differences, if any. Moreover, the idea that an environment in which an individual 
grows up or resides has an effect on the development or maintenance of virtue is 
consistent with Aristotle’s idea of virtue. 
 For example, from historical analysis, we know that there were tensions 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi long before the genocide. The Hutu felt great 
animosity toward the Tutsi long before. There had been recurring violence 
between the two groups for decades. In 1963 and 1964, there was a massacre of 
Tutsi with fourteen thousand dead and a larger scale massacre of the Hutu in 
Burundi resulting in one hundred thousand dead. The two groups did not live 
happily side by side. They may have coexisted peacefully enough, but it is highly 
probable that ingrained in the mind of every Hutu and Tutsi child was the idea 
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that they should be deeply suspicious of members of the other group. The peace 
between the two groups was likely a highly fragile peace, easily disrupted. Once 
the RTLM radio station and Kangura newspaper began disseminating aggressive 
discrimination against the Hutu (see the militant doctrine of Hutu purity 
described in Chapter 2), and the false rumor that the Tutsi were about to attack 
the Hutu, it was only too easy to convince the ever suspicious Hutu that the Tutsi 
were planning yet another large scale massacre. 
 The Hutu had a certain mindset towards the Tutsi. They may have been 
genuinely compassionate, loyal, kind, etc., to their families and those of their 
group, but this mindset likely did not extend to members of the other group. They 
lived in a tense political and social climate that had shaped the way they viewed 
themselves and others. While their dispositions may have been a result of the 
environment in which they lived, this is vastly dissimilar from a situational 
feature in a single situation influencing them to behave differently than they 
would have if they had behaved according to their disposition. While the mindset 
of the Hutu may have been a result of the situation in which they lived (and had 
lived in for decades), this is less of a clear-cut example of “situationism” as 
someone deciding to help or not based on finding a dime in a phone booth. In a 
situation like this, it seems that behavior is not solely the result of situational 
features, rather, it is the result of a situational stimulus (like propaganda) 
interacting with a certain disposition (that included being suspicious of a certain 
group). 
 Conditions on the ground in Vietnam were even worse. Although soldiers 
had not grown up in the wartime environment in Vietnam, they lived in that 
environment for several months or even years. Kendrick Oliver writes that there 
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was a deep cultural divide between American soldiers and Vietnamese civilians; 
American soldiers simply did not understand Vietnamese culture or language. As 
a result, Vietnamese culture was subject to stereotypes, many of them negative. 
The view of Vietnamese culture was that it was inferior to American culture, that 
Vietnamese people did not feel anything regarding their own fates, that of their 
families, or that of their fellow citizens. As Oliver puts it, “The Vietnamese has 
been placed almost entirely beyond the reach of empathetic consideration.” As 
American casualties started adding up, more and more soldiers began to view the 
already misunderstood Vietnamese people as enemy combatants; soldiers 
presumed that every civilian was working with the enemy. Soldiers often 
destroyed whole villages for the sake of one sniper and sometimes merely 
because they simply didn’t know whether there could be an enemy amongst the 
people living there.  
This type of environment would have produced a certain mindset in many 
American soldiers. Whether or not a particular soldier was kind or 
compassionate to people of his own family or in-group, he may have had an 
increasingly negative view of Vietnamese civilians, seeming them as not worthy of 
kindness or compassion. Instead, the mysterious Vietnamese civilians of whom 
they knew so little may have been responsible for members of his in-group being 
killed or wounded.  
 We can make similar arguments about many of the non-rescuers in Nazi 
Germany. According to historians, the social and political climate in Germany 
around the time of Hitler’s rise to power was one already anti-Semitic. The Jews 
were blamed for social, political, and economic problems and were equated with 
socialism, feared greatly at the time by Germany’s middle class. Hitler’s rising to 
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power would have increased anti-Semitic sentiment in much of the German 
populace. German youth were inculcated with anti-Semitic beliefs, encouraged to 
believe that Jewish people were responsible for all the country’s problems and 
were even somehow less than human. School texts in German schools were 
changed in order to indoctrinate German children to a Nazi ideal of the Aryan 
world while at the same time Jewish rights and personhood were slowly taken 
away via new anti-Semitic laws and propaganda. Like the Hutu, many non-
rescuers may have genuinely compassionate, kind, or loyal towards their family 
or in-group (the group to which they belonged) while still holding aggressively 
discriminatory attitudes toward those in the out-group. 
 The inaction on the part of much of the native German populace would be 
largely a result of the social-political climate driven by Nazi ideologies in the form 
of heavy use of propaganda, inculcating of anti-Semitism from early youth, and a 
series of laws aimed at stripping a whole group of people of their rights and 
personhood combined with anti-Semitic attitudes heightened by this self-same 
environment. 
 The situation at Abu Ghraib during the time prisoner abuses happened 
had similar features. At Abu Ghraib there was inadequate leadership and poor 
supervision of relatively inexperienced guards. There were frequently mortar 
attacks on the prison, one of which had wounded many of the guards and even 
killed a few of them. The orders coming from above regarding the proper 
treatment of prisoners were purposely vague and so many abuses that would 
normally be considered torture were left to the interpretation of the guards. Abu 
Ghraib was already a prison to begin with, which meant that the guards would 
have seen the prisoners as the out-group versus fellow guards as the in-group. 
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Moreover, the prisoners were part of the group against which the in-group was 
fighting. Members of the out-group had wounded or even killed members of their 
in-group. The soldiers would have likely resented the prisoners, if only because 
they belonged to the enemy.  
 Family and friends of the guards involved in the abuses showed surprise 
at the behavior of the guards, arguing that their family member or friend had 
always been the most compassionate, kind, just, etc., person that they knew. How 
could this same person be capable of such abuses of another human being? 
However, as with the Hutu or many non-rescuers during the Holocaust, if the 
prisoners were seen as part of the aggressive out-group, the enemy, the guards 
may not have felt that compassion, kindness, or justice extended to them. The 
guards may have had the right sort of beliefs, desires, and feelings consistent with 
the virtues towards their friends, while having none of these towards the 
prisoners.  
  The historical cases cited as evidence for situationism do not provide 
clear-cut examples of situational features influencing behavior over dispositional 
differences. Instead, the historical cases provide evidence that environments can 
influence the development or maintenance of individual’s actual dispositions, 
which in turn influence his behavior. An individual’s dispositions will depend in 
large part on the social and political environment in which he lives as well as the 
people with which he lives on a daily basis. In some cases, some part of an 
individual’s dispositions will reflect the social-political environment into which 
he was born or in which he grew up, as in Rwanda and the youth in Nazi 
Germany.  
 117
In other cases, long-term environments like Vietnam, Abu Ghraib, or Nazi 
Germany can affect an individual’s dispositions. In many cases of this sort, the 
environment seems merely to expand on, rather than radically change, goals, 
beliefs, values, etc. that an individual already had. In Nazi Germany, for example, 
there was already a tendency toward anti-Semitism among many in the German 
populace that resulted in feelings of apathy toward the plight of the Jewish at the 
hands of the Nazis, at Abu Ghraib, there was already a justifiable fear and 
suspicion of enemy combatant that quickly grew into disdain and contempt. 
While these are types of “situationism,” they seem markedly different 
from someone deciding to help or not because of an annoying noise or a pleasant 
scent in the area. Instead, the historical cases are evidence that an individual’s 
environment can shape or change that individual’s personal dispositions. 
Behavior in those situations seems to be the result of the interaction between 
situational and dispositional features. This idea ties in with the theory that I look 
at in the next chapter, that behavior is the result of the interaction of 
dispositional and situational features, not one or the other. 
However, more generally, the lesson we can take away from these 
historical cases seems to be that social contexts play a large role in the 
development and maintenance of virtue for many people. I come back to this 
issue in later chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
 For helping situations of minor need, it seems quite likely that (at least in 
many Western countries) agents perceive these types of situations as requiring 
either morally elective or non-moral behavior. Helping in any particular situation 
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is merely a matter of choice and so helping behavior is inconsistent, dependent 
on many factors like whether one is hurrying, in a bad mood, or simply confused 
by some ambiguity in the situation. Virtue ethics theorists might be able to 
accommodate for inconsistent helping behavior in some situations of minor need 
by stipulating that there are virtues that require perfect obligations while others 
require merely imperfect obligations, as Robert Adams has argued. Helpfulness 
might be a virtue that does not require perfect obligation as it does not need to be 
satisfied on every occasion and whose consistency requirements merely require 
one to do enough of a certain behavior in order to be consistent in that virtue.  
 However, this does not include agents who are confused by ambiguous 
situations or are unable to weigh duties properly. It is debatable whether we 
should consider them to have the traits of helpfulness or compassion considering 
their failures in reasoning could lead to severe consequences for people in need. 
Whether agents can fail to act helpfully or compassionately and still have the trait 
in question will in part also depend on the definition of the particular trait and 
the stringency of its behavioral consistency requirement. If the particular virtue 
in question requires strict behavioral consistency, or that agents are always aware 
when a situation calls for compassionate or helpful behavior and are rarely or 
never confused about their duties in that situation, then failing to act helpfully or 
compassionately is evidence against attributing the trait. Perhaps the agent lacks 
some necessary skill or knowledge to have that virtue.  
 Moreover, we still have the difficulty of problematic situational features 
that can influence the behavior of agents in subtle, troubling ways. These include 
situations that facilitate assigning personal responsibility to someone else, and 
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situations that include conflicting duties, unfamiliar or ambiguous elements, or 
authority figures issuing commands.  
 This brings us back to the explanation from deficiency of character. 
Perhaps certain skills are a necessary requirement for virtue and the agents in 
these situations simply did not possess them and so did not possess those virtues. 
For example, one possible skill these agents may have been lacking is practical 
wisdom. The argument from practical wisdom says that virtue requires a specific 
type of knowledge that helps one know what the right thing to do is in every 
situation and why it is the right thing to do. An agent who does not have practical 
wisdom simply does not have the virtues and will often act inconsistently with 
those virtues. In the next few chapters, I discuss practical wisdom and other 
suggestions for possible skills necessary for improving behavioral consistency 
and combating the effects of problematic situational features.  
 I also argued that the historical cases, rather than being evidence for 
situationism, seem to be evidence that the environment in which a person grows 
up in or lives in for some amount of time has a strong influence on the 
development and maintenance of his virtue. The type of environment in which an 
individual grows up or resides may shape or change that individual’s character. I 
come back to this in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 120
Chapter 4 
IN DEFENSE OF CHARACTER: THE ARGUMENT FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL 
FACTORS 
 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the two approaches employed by 
advocates of character, namely, the argument from misrepresentation (AM) and 
the argument from deficiency of character (DC). According to respondents 
arguing from AM, situationism has misrepresented the Aristotelian conception of 
virtue. “Global character,” or the situationist description of the Aristotelian 
conception of character, is not an accurate portrayal of an Aristotelian or 
traditional conception of character (TCC); an accurate portrayal of TCC can 
explain away apparent behavioral inconsistencies as well as explain the role of 
dispositional features in the production of behavior.  
In this chapter, I look at the principal contention behind AM—the 
argument from psychological factors (PF). The general idea of the argument from 
psychological factors is that the biggest flaw of the situationist thesis is its heavy 
emphasis on overt behavior as the primary (or even sole) indicator of consistency 
in character.  
 Ultimately, I conclude that PF serves not only as a response to some of the 
situationist evidence from psychology but also as a response to one of the 
premises of the situationist critique. Psychological factors (neglected by 
situationists who focus exclusively on overt behavior) can explain some of the 
behavior in cases cited as evidence for situationists. Attention to psychological 
factors can also give us greater insight into human behavior and can help us 
understand, explain, and predict behavior with greater accuracy. For this reason, 
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the argument from psychological factors can point us toward a more realistic 
conception of character. I come back to this in later chapters. 
I also analyze whether arguments from PF are consistent with the three 
main contentions of AM: 1) human behavior is not largely driven by situational 
determinants, 2) experiments cited by situationists do not in fact show behavioral 
inconsistency, and finally 3) an accurate portrayal of TCC can account for both 1 
and 2 above. 
I conclude that in order to respond to the first two claims, advocates of 
AM must give up the third claim and alter the traditional conception of character. 
The conception of character described by PF is one that diverges in some ways 
from TCC. 
 
The Argument from Psychological Factors 
Philosophers have argued that one of the weaknesses of the situationist 
thesis is the emphasis placed on direct behavioral dispositions alone as indicators 
of virtue and character. 1  The consistency requirement of traditional virtue and 
character does not refer merely to behavior; it also includes some of the 
psychological factors of agents.  
The argument is not that overt behavior is not an important component of 
character, but rather that the complex and multifarious causes of human 
                                                   
1 See Adams, A Theory of Virtue; Annas, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of 
Character” ; Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Character on the Content of Our 
Character”; Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality; Snow, Virtue as Social 
Intelligence; Solomon, “What’s Character Got to Do with It?”; Sabini and Silver, “Lack of 
Character? Situationism Critiqued”; Sreenivasan “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory 
and Trait Attribution”; and Candace Upton, Situational Traits of Character: 
Dispositional Foundations and Implications for Moral Psychology and Friendship 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009). 
 
 122
behavior are just as important as indicators of character or virtue as the actions 
they cause.  
For example, philosopher Robert Adams writes that:  
human behavior, except most routinely habitual, is a 
product of multiple psychological factors which differ in 
different situations. A theory of virtue will have more 
explanatory power to the extent that the excellent qualities 
it identifies as virtues are found among those factors that 
lie behind behavior, rather than in direct behavioral 
dispositions.2 
 
In order to judge an agent’s virtue or character, we need to look not only at that 
agent’s overt behavior but also at some of the possible causes of that behavior.  
Some of the psychological factors that should be included in the concept 
of character or virtue are goals, beliefs, values, and an agent’s subjective 
construal. There is some disagreement over whether the traditional conception of 
character already includes these features or whether it should include them, but 
there is agreement that character (and by extension virtue) is more than just the 
sum of overt behavior.  
 
Construal 
 In the previous chapter, I briefly mentioned the argument that one of the 
possible explanations for the variability of a single agent’s behavior across 
different situations is that we measure behavioral consistency from a third person 
“objective” perspective, instead of measuring it from a first person “subjective” 
perspective. For example, if I want to judge whether Alan behaves consistently 
compassionately, I may observe Alan’s behavior in a number of situations where 
compassionate behavior is appropriate. When Alan does not behave 
                                                   
2 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 131. 
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compassionately, I take note that he has been inconsistently compassionate. 
However, I used my own criteria for determining which situations require 
compassionate behavior. Perhaps I base my criteria on which situations seem 
appropriate from my own perspective, or perhaps I poll a random sample of 
individuals on what types of situations they believe require compassionate 
behavior. I then observe Alan in a number of situations that I believe fit the 
criteria that I (or a random sampling of people) have judged to be situations that 
require compassion. However, I do not perceive the situations based on Alan’s 
own perspective of the situation, I perceive them from my own perspective and 
make my judgment based on my own perspective.  
According to the argument from construal, two agents might perceive the 
same situation differently from one another (or in the case of experiments, from 
the experimenters that set up the situation) and so might disagree on what they 
perceive the correct behavior to be in that situation. This may result in one agent 
judging the behavior of the other agent inconsistent with a certain virtue or trait. 
Yet from the point of view of the agent himself, his behavior may seem perfectly 
consistent with that same trait or virtue. So for example, if Matt and Alan are 
both in situation x and Alan feels that this is a situation requiring helpful 
behavior but Matt does not, Alan may feel that Matt’s failure to help is 
inconsistent with the trait of helpfulness. On the other hand, Matt did not 
perceive situation x as a situation that required helpful behavior so his failure to 
be helpful in situation x indicates nothing at all about his character.   
 The general thesis of the argument from construal is that in order to 
understand a particular individual’s behavior we first need to understand how 
that individual perceives and understands the situation. In other words, we need 
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to understand the agent’s “construal” of the situation. Merely observing an 
agent’s overt behavior will actually tell us very little about why the agent behaves 
the way he does. We may learn to recognize some patterns in behavior but unless 
we understand the underlying causes, including construal, we will not really be 
able to explain the agent’s behavior with any real insight or accuracy. Moreover, 
because different individuals have their own distinctive construal of a single 
situation, most experiments set up with an “objective” stimulus that all subjects 
should perceive in exactly the same way are actually disregarding the way human 
beings actually perceive the world. 
 According to social psychologists Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, construal 
is the “personal and subjective meaning” that an actor attaches to a situation; 
that is to say, it is an actor’s subjective perception of a situation.3 Ross and 
Nisbett wrote in 1991 that because of issues of construal (how an agent perceives 
and interprets a situation), no two situations, no matter how similar, will 
necessarily be judged the same even by the same person, let alone by two 
different people. Any approach that wants to make behavior explicable and 
predicable “must take into account the subjective perspective of the actor, not 
that of the observer or researcher.”4 
 One of the “tools of construal” is the use of knowledge structures or 
“schemas.” 5 A knowledge structure “summarizes generic knowledge and previous 
experience with respect to a given class of stimuli and events and, at the same 
time, gives meaning and guides anticipation with respect to similar stimuli and 
                                                   
3 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 11.  
 
4 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 163. 
 
5 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 12. 
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events in the future.”6 Different individuals can view the same situation distinctly 
depending on a number of factors, including the schemas and scripts that each of 
them has constructed. Schemas are a product of the individual’s personal history, 
temperament, and his individual goals and beliefs. So for example, I might have a 
schema revolving around my previous experience in a grocery store that leads me 
to anticipate having the same kind of experiences whenever I am in a grocery 
store environment. Every time I have been in a grocery store, there have been 
carts and hand baskets near the entrance somewhere. I do not have to pay for the 
items I intend to purchase until I reach the register, and I have to pay for my 
items using cash, credit, or some other form of currency before being allowed to 
take them from the store. Therefore, I expect that next time I enter another 
grocery store, whatever type it may be, I will find carts and hand baskets near the 
entrance and will have to pay for my purchases before leaving the store. I may 
also have some particular idea of how one is supposed to act in a grocery store, 
how the other shoppers will act towards me and each other, what expectations I 
can have of the employees that work there, etc. I expect that my experience will 
vary little from one grocery store to the next. Moreover, I will categorize different 
types of situations into different classes based on the different experiences I have 
in each. For every class of situation that I am in (work, school, banks, shops, at 
home, on the street, in a restaurant, with friends, etc.), I will have a different set 
of expectations as well assumptions about how I should behave that are partly 
based on previous experiences.  
                                                   
6 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 12.  
See also Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley Eds., Personality, Identity, and 
Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2009) 
Narvaez and Lapsley define schemas as organized knowledge structures that channel and 
filter social perceptions and memory, p. 195.  
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 There is little cognitive processing required for the enactment of schemas, 
which we use to guide our behavior in familiar situations; it is when we are in 
unfamiliar situations that we have to stop and think about how to interpret the 
situation since there is no knowledge structure to provide us with expectations 
for that situation. For situations with which we have much experience, our 
knowledge structures guide our expectations and behavior, so we rarely stop and 
interpret situations we have encountered before. However, when we are in 
unfamiliar or ambiguous situations, we are more likely to turn to other people to 
help us interpret the situation.  
 Different judgmental strategies or “heuristics” that the mind employs 
when making inferences lead to the formation of schemas.7 While there are a 
variety of different heuristics, most of them seem to operate without conscious or 
deliberate effort. Nisbett and Ross mention two common and simple heuristics as 
an example: the availability heuristic and the representativeness heuristic.  
 The availability heuristic operates when the relative availability of objects 
or events (i.e., the accessibility of objects or events in the processes of memory, 
perception, or construction from imagination) influences how an individual 
judges the relative frequency of some actual event or object. The accessibility of 
certain objects or events makes them more salient to the individual. However, the 
salience of certain objects or events in our minds often is not correlated to the 
actual frequency of those events. Instead, many different factors unrelated to 
actual frequency can affect the salience of certain objects or events in our mind. 
For example, if I am currently unemployed, then I may overestimate the rate of 
unemployment because I share the neighborhood, socioeconomic background, or 
                                                   
7 Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference, 18. 
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occupation of other unemployed individuals. Perhaps I run into other 
unemployed individuals during my attempts at job-hunting, at job fairs, at 
employment agencies, etc. Another example is that if I belong to a particular 
group or class of people (say, being a resident of New Mexico), I might 
overestimate the successes of that group of people because I pay more attention 
to the successes of members of my group as compared to other groups.8  
 The availability heuristic may also play a part in the way we judge 
relationships between events, particularly causal relationships. Nisbett and Ross 
cite the propensity of observers to cite dispositional rather than situational 
factors when observing the behaviors of others while attributing their own 
actions to situational factors. The observer sees the actors as the most available 
causal candidate, while the actor himself sees the environment as the most 
available causal candidate. For the actor, the active stimuli of the environment 
leads to his acting a particular way, whereas for an observer the environment is 
merely the “ground” and the actor himself is the figure or active causal agent. 
Ross and Nisbett claim that this phenomenon is what contributes to our 
propensity to commit the fundamental attribution error.9 
 
Goals, Beliefs, and Values 
 An agent’s goals, beliefs, and values also affect the creation of that agent’s 
schemas, as well as providing reasons and motives for the agent’s actions. 
Including goals, beliefs, and values in the concept of character seems to be 
something on which both virtue theorists and some situationists can agree. In the 
                                                   
8 See Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference, 18-21. 
 
9 See the first chapter for definition. I come back to the fundamental attribution error in 
the last chapter. 
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quintessential situationist textbook The Person and the Situation, Ross and 
Nisbett offer advice for finding a conception of personality that holds up to the 
problem of situational influences; part of that advice is to include goals, 
preferences, and construal into an account of personality. According to Ross and 
Nisbett, the real intentions of the agent can only be fully appreciated once one 
takes into account the agent’s “subjective representations of situations” (i.e., his 
construal) as well as the goals and preferences of the agent. Goals and 
preferences are important to intentions because according to Ross and Nisbett, 
human behavior is organized around short-term, long-term, and even lifetime 
goals.10 
 For example, let’s say Jones is a very introverted person who happens to 
work at a company that throws rowdy office parties a few times a year. From past 
experiences, he has formed a schema of office parties as situations in which no 
one comes over to talk to him and (due to his introverted nature) he stands off by 
himself because he feels uncomfortable approaching groups of his co-workers 
already engaged in conversation. Every time he knows there is an office party 
coming up, he feels exceedingly uncomfortable and sets a goal of merely staying 
as long as he needs to in order to be polite. His fear of approaching groups of his 
co-workers in order to join their conversation is due to his introverted nature and 
so his introversion is in part responsible for his past experiences in these sorts of 
situations. His past experiences in turn form schemas that inform future 
situations of this kind, resulting in Jones setting the goal of merely staying as 
                                                   
10 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 163-168. The other criteria on Ross 
and Nisbett’s list are: 1) the agent’s competencies and capacities, 2) the agent’s 
conception of himself, and 3) the agent’s attributional style (or how much control the 
agent feels he has over his own life). 
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long as necessary at future office parties. This goal in part informs his construal 
of the next office party, perpetuating the cycle.  
 Now let us suppose that because Jones feels exceedingly uncomfortable at 
office parties, he is often rude to his co-workers when approached in these types 
of situations even though Jones is usually friendly and approachable, even if a 
little shy. Due to his construal, his beliefs about parties, and his introverted 
nature, Jones is now inconsistently friendly. Even though Jones has the belief 
that it is right to be friendly or polite, values doing so, and has formed a long-
term goal to be friendly and polite, his introverted nature results in an immediate 
goal at the party of leaving as soon as possible.11 Since he is so eager to leave and 
fulfill his immediate goal, Jones does not even notice that he is being rude at the 
party. If we know enough about Jones and understand his construal and his 
goals, both long-term and immediate, we understand a little more about his 
actions at the party. 
 Moreover, beliefs or goals might also make an individual’s behavior 
merely apparently or outwardly inconsistent while still being internally 
consistent, that is, while still being consistent to one’s own subjective construal, 
goals, beliefs, or values. To illustrate what I mean I turn to a story from Robert 
Cialdini’s book Influence: Science and Practice. Cialdini observed the highest-
earning waiter at a restaurant to try to determine the best strategy for earning 
tips. He found that there was nothing consistent about the waiter’s 
behavior…except maximizing tips. Depending on the clients, the waiter behaved 
differently: with families the waiter was “effervescent, even slightly clownish,” 
                                                   
11 This is not a technical term. By long-term I merely mean a goal that one wants to 
satisfy across a wide span of time and/or a variety of situations. 
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with a young couple on a date he was “formal and a bit imperious in an attempt to 
intimate the young man…into ordering and tipping lavishly,” with older couples 
he was formal and respectful, and with lone diners he was “cordial, 
conversational, and warm.”12 However, his varying behavior was consistent with 
his goal of maximizing tips. The goal of maximizing tips stayed consistent, but the 
waiter employed different strategies in order to reach that goal and this resulted 
in apparently inconsistent behavior.13 
 
Analysis 
 Let’s stop and reflect on the aims of the situationist thesis. The driving 
force behind situationism is the idea of greater psychological realism in 
philosophical ethics, or the idea that ethical theories should be constrained by 
findings about human psychology. The main critique of the situationist thesis is 
that the traditional conception of character does not accurately reflect the reality 
of human psychology and so the concept must be altered or scrapped altogether 
for a concept that does. 
 One of the main conclusions of the situationist thesis is that people are 
not behaviorally consistent. Consistency is defined as “character and personality 
traits [being] reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior across a diversity of 
trait-relevant eliciting conditions.”14 However, according to situationists:  
 
 
                                                   
12 Robert Cialdini, Influence: The New Psychology of Modern Persuasion, (New York: 
Quill, 1984), 226. 
 
13. Cialdini, Influence, 190-191 
 
14 Doris, Lack of Character, 22. 
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behavioral variation across a population owes more 
to situational differences than dispositional 
differences among persons. Individual dispositional 
differences are not so behaviorally individuating as 
might have been supposed; to a surprising extent it 
is safest to predict, for a particular situation, that a 
person will behave in a fashion similar to the 
population norm.”15  
 
Situationists advocate a move to “local” traits, or traits contextualized by a 
particular time and situation. 
 The argument from psychological factors can respond to situationism in a 
number of ways. PF gives a partial explanation for apparent lack of behavioral 
consistency in at least some instances and provides a partial response to the 
situationist claim that situational rather than dispositional differences drive 
behavior. Moreover, the argument from PF calls into question the validity of 
some of the evidence used in favor of the situationist critique and has greater 
explanatory and predictive power than the move to local traits advocated by 
situationists.  
 
Validity of Experimental Results 
 Since two agents can (and often do) perceive the same situation 
differently from one another, setting up an objective stimulus in an experiment 
that all agents should perceive the same way is simply ignoring the way that 
agents perceive situations. For example, suppose I set up an experiment like the 
Princeton Seminary “Good Samaritan” experiment. From my point of view as the 
experimenter, the correct action in this case is obvious: to help the possibly ill 
man that is slumped over some steps in the alley. I have constructed my 
                                                   
15 Doris, Lack of Character, 24. 
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experiment with the assumption that this is the correct action, that is, that this is 
the helpful action, while no action shows a lack of helpfulness. Anyone that does 
not help the victim has failed to exhibit helpful behavior because this situation 
has been set up to appeal to all agents in the same way, namely, it is set up as a 
situation that calls for helping behavior 
 However, if there is no way to set up an “objective” stimulus in an 
experiment about helping behavior in situations of minor need, then it is unclear 
what the results of the experiment show. Situationists typically use the results of 
the Princeton Seminary Experiment as evidence for the inconsistency of 
helpfulness because it should have been obvious that the victim was in need of 
help (because it was obvious from the point of view of the experimenters who set 
up the experiment). If it was unclear to the subjects in a hurry that this was a 
situation requiring help, then one can argue that some of them chose not to help 
because they were unclear that the victim required help or because of the effects 
of ambiguity on weighing conflicting duties. We could also argue that the subjects 
simply failed to notice that there was someone in need of help because they were 
overly preoccupied with getting to their talk on time. The subjects may still have 
held a consistent goal of helping someone in moderate or serious need, even if 
their behavior on this occasion was inconsistent with that goal because of their 
failure to realize this was a helping situation of moderate or extreme need.16 
 
 
 
                                                   
16 I have mentioned elsewhere that the experiment does show that people are less likely 
to notice their environment when they are in a hurry and in an ambiguous situation, so 
hurrying and ambiguity are sources of bad reasoning leading to inadvertent failures to 
help. These sorts of situations may just be problematic for the majority of agents.  
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Response to Consistency Requirement 
 The argument from psychological factors also responds more generally to 
the claim in the situationist thesis that agents fail to meet the consistency 
requirement for global character because their behavior is inconsistent. The 
argument from PF provides a possible explanation for the variability of behavior 
in a single person across different situations or in different people in the same 
situation. If two people in the same situation perceive and construct the factors of 
the situation differently, they will act according to their own version of the 
situation. Moreover, if a person does not notice the relevant factors in two similar 
situations, they might take them to be two different situations requiring two 
different responses, resulting in seemingly inconsistent behavior. 17  
 An agent’s psychological factors might go a long way toward explaining 
apparent inconsistencies in behavior without rejecting TC character traits. 
Subjects fail to meet the consistency requirement for character only if we take 
character to be nothing but the sum of our overt behavior. However, if we 
understand how a person construes a certain situation, we might realize that his 
behavior is perfectly consistent from his point of view, just not from ours. 
 
Effects of Character Traits on Behavior 
 Another central claim of the situationist thesis is that behavioral 
variability has more to do with situational determinants than dispositional ones, 
and that individual dispositions are not so behaviorally individuating as one 
would think. Situationists single out overt behavior as the main indicator of 
character; the first two conditions of the situationist thesis are about behavioral 
                                                   
17 This could be due to a of lack practical wisdom, the knowledge to notice the relevant 
factors across situations. 
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consistency across situations and time. However, according to situationists, 
people generally display widespread behavioral inconsistency and any observed 
behavioral consistency owes more to situational determinants than it does to 
dispositional ones. People do not have robust character traits; if they have any 
traits at all, those traits are only slightly responsible for the person’s behavior. 
 However, according to the argument from psychological factors, 
differences in construal have great effects on behavior and construal is in part a 
result of knowledge structures and schemas that form due to personal history and 
the differing needs or goals of an individual. Furthermore, individuals create 
goals in part due to differences in temperament and personality, so differences in 
construal, knowledge structures, and schemas among agents show the effects of 
character traits on behavior.18  
  Let’s go back to my example of Jones, an introvert who does not enjoy 
office parties and so is often rude or standoffish to his co-workers at parties, even 
though he is friendly and approachable the rest of the time. I mentioned how 
Jones’s construal influences his behavior, and his construal is formed in part 
from knowledge structures formed through past experiences, his temperament, 
and his current beliefs and values. Jones’s construal of the party will likely be 
very different from that of his co-worker, Smith, who is more outgoing and 
extroverted and so enjoys office parties and looks forward to them every year. 
                                                   
18 Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics,” 472. Kamtekar argues, “if people’s 
differing goals lead them to behave differently, one might think, isn’t this very close to 
admitting that differences in character result in differing behavior?”  
Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics,” 481. Kamtekar adds that a virtuous action 
must have value for us (and practical wisdom is what will give it value).  
Arpaly, “Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris,” 645) says something similar 
in her statement that perhaps depth of concern for a certain virtue should also be 
included in the notion of character. 
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The two men may behave very differently at the party because of their particular 
construal. 
 Moreover, differing construal and goals can drive behavior even when 
they do not lead to differences in overt behavior. Let’s suppose that even though 
Jones does not look forward to these parties and seeks to leave as soon as 
possible, he also believes it is right to be polite and friendly, and so he goes to the 
parties and makes an extra effort to be friendly to all of his co-workers while he is 
there. On the other hand while Smith really enjoys rowdy parties, because he 
aspires to, a promotion to management, he tries to look professional at these 
parties and so is also merely friendly and polite while there. Depending on how 
restrained Smith is or how outgoing Jones is willing to be for the sake of 
friendliness, the two men may behave very similarly at the party and yet have a 
completely different reason for doing so. Their respective goals, beliefs, values, 
and construal of the situation drive their behavior. Jones is friendly and polite 
because he values friendliness; Smith is friendly because he is hoping to look 
good in front of his superiors. 
 
Better Explanatory and Predictive Power 
 According to situationists, people do not possess cross-situationally 
consistent (or robust) traits; instead, people possess merely local traits. Traits 
contextualized in various ways by specific situations. The move to local traits is 
supposed to be for the sake of achieving the goal of psychological realism: a better 
understanding of behavior and a greater ability to predict future behavior.  
 For example, Jones appears to have a merely a local trait of being rude at 
office parties, so even though he may be rude at office parties, he is not 
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necessarily consistently so across different types of situations, nor should we 
expect him to be. However, this merely gives us an idea of what kind of behavior 
we should predict of Jones. If we really wanted to understand Jones’s behavior, 
we might have to observe Jones in different situations, draw up a list of his local 
traits, notice patterns on that list, and then infer some of the reasons behind the 
patterns.  
 However, the argument from psychological factors can give an even fuller 
explanation of some inconsistencies in behavior. Let us go back to Jones for a 
second. Jones is introverted but he is also usually very friendly and thoughtful. 
However, at office parties, because he is so uncomfortable and eager to leave, 
Jones becomes uneasy and responds curtly to his co-workers. Situationists might 
claim that Jones has merely a local trait, something like “rude and unfriendly at 
office parties,” that does not extend past that situation. However, Jones may feel 
sorry for his behavior come Monday when he realizes he was rude to his co-
workers, or he may have been so focused on leaving the office party, he did not 
even realized he was rude to his co-workers. His introverted nature overrode his 
friendliness. It is unlikely that come Monday we would say of Jones that he is no 
longer friendly and thoughtful. We might be surprised by his behavior at the 
office party, but if we carefully observe Jones, we might begin to notice a 
pattern.19 If we know that Jones is shy, we might make a guess at why he is not 
very friendly at office parties. Jones’s behavior would be consistent with Jones’s 
personality (considering both his shyness and his friendliness) taken as a whole, 
even if his behavior was not consistently friendly. Not only does this provide us 
                                                   
19 In the next chapter, I examine Walter Mischel argument that in order to find 
behavioral consistency we need to view it as a series of patterns of behavior across similar 
types of situations. 
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with a better explanation of Jones’s behavior in both types of situations than 
merely assigning him local traits, if we understand the reasons for Jones’s 
unfriendly manner at office parties, we may be able to predict Jones’s behavior in 
situations similar to the office party. On the other hand, merely saying that Jones 
has a local trait of “unfriendly at office parties” does not help us predict his 
behavior beyond office parties and does not even attempt to explain why Jones is 
unfriendly at office parties. 
 Following the argument from psychological factors, if we know an agent’s 
construal of the situation, as well as his goals and beliefs (formed in part from 
past experience and temperament), we can begin to understand and perhaps 
even predict the agent’s behavior in future situations beyond the situation in 
which we observe him. Character is more than overt behavior, it is partly also the 
sum of an agent’s psychological factors.  
In Chapter 6, I look at an approach to personality from psychology called 
social cognitive theory, which incorporates the influence of psychological factors 
into one’s personality and behavior. In social-cognitive theory, traits are 
dispositions to interact with one’s environment in certain ways; the variability we 
notice in behavior is due to the interaction of an agent’s personal variables (like 
his knowledge structures, construal, goals etc.) with his environment. I argue that 
social-cognitive theory can provide us with a framework for personality that can 
ground a more realistic philosophical conception of character (including moral 
character). 
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Deficiency of Character 
Although the argument from psychological factors may provide us with a 
realistic conception of character, a problem remains. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the argument that agents chose not to help in a particular 
situation because of the way they construed that situation (the argument from 
choice) does not apply to agents who fail to behave consistently with a particular 
trait because ambiguous situations confuse them or because they are unable to 
weigh duties properly. In these cases, situational factors seem to be the strongest 
influence on the behavior of agents. According to PF, the interaction of 
psychological factors and situational features together produce behavior, so what 
can we say in defense of PF in regards to situational features whose influence 
seems to override rather than merely interact with an agent’s psychological 
features?  
 What is troubling about situational features like ambiguity is that these 
types of situational features can influence an agent to behave in ways opposed to 
that agent’s previous commitments to certain goals or values. If psychological 
factors have such large effects on behavior, then why did the subjects in the 
Milgram experiment and the SPE not show individuating behavior?  
 
 
Strong Situations 
Walter Mischel and other social psychologists believe there is a distinction 
between psychologically powerful or “strong” situations and psychologically 
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“weak” situations.20 Psychologically strong situations are powerful to the degree 
that they lead a large majority of people to construe the moral facts of the 
situation in the same way. This leads everyone to have uniform expectations 
regarding the most appropriate response pattern. Strong situations usually 
require skills that everyone has to the same extent and provide adequate 
incentives for the performance of a particular response pattern.21 Mischel gives 
the example of a red traffic light. A red traffic light exerts a powerful influence on 
the behavior of most motorists because they all know what it means, are at least 
somewhat motivated to obey it (failure to obey means getting ticketed or possibly 
causing a traffic accident), and have the ability to stop when they see it. On the 
other hand, weak situations do not generate uniform expectations about what the 
desired behavior should be and do not offer sufficient incentives for the 
performance of this behavior. They are also unstructured enough that an 
individual can feel that a variety of responses are equally appropriate.22  
 Situations are either strong or weak depending on how restricted the 
appropriate range of behaviors is in that situation. In the case of the red traffic 
light, the range of behaviors that are appropriate is extremely limited. For other 
situations like my grocery store example, there is probably a wider range of 
appropriate behaviors. 
                                                   
20Walter Mischel, “The Interaction of Person and Situation” in Personality at the 
Crossroads: Current Issues in Interactional Psychology, eds. David Magnusson and 
Norman Endler (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1977): 346-348, and Mark Snyder and William 
Ickes, “Personality and Social behavior” in Handbook of Social Psychology: Volume 2, 
eds. Gardner, Lindzey and Elliot Aronson no. 2 (New York: Random House, 1985): 904-
907. 
 
21 Mischel, The Interaction of Person and Situation, 347. 
 
22 For a full explanation of weak vs. strong situations, see Mischel, The Interaction of 
Person and Situation, 344-352, and Snyder and Ickes, “Personality and Social Behavior.” 
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 Milgran’s experiment is an example of a strong situation. The reason the 
Milgram experiment was not a weak situation was because of the unfamiliarity of 
the situation. The subjects should have felt like a variety of responses were 
equally appropriate considering they had no schema for the situation, however, 
this unfamiliarity with the situation resulted in most of the subjects looking to the 
experimenter to guide them and tell what behavior was appropriate for this 
situation. The experimenter served as a guide or “rational man” as Sabini and 
Silver put it. Moreover, the experimenter was an authority figure and most people 
have been conditioned to obey authority. The experimenter as authority and 
guide defined one appropriate response pattern—following directions and 
continuing to shock the victim until the experiment was over. Following this 
instruction required skills that all of the subjects had (reading out word pairs, 
pushing buttons, etc.). Whenever the naïve subject asked the experimenter about 
stopping the experiment, the experimenter insisted that they must go on, that the 
experiment had to continue etc., thus reaffirming following directions as the only 
appropriate response pattern.  
 While it may seem that the appropriate response pattern should have 
been clear to the subjects in the Milgram experiment (that is, refusing to continue 
with the experiment), we should remember what Robert Solomon pointed out 
about compassion: for most people, “compassion is usually displayed merely as 
feeling sorry for others.”23 Therefore, in a situation that requires more effort than 
merely feeling sorry for someone in order to act compassionately, people do not 
know how to act.  
                                                   
23 Solomon, “What’s Character Got to Do with it?” 653. 
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However, most people are accustomed to obeying authority, whether it is 
in the form of their parents, older siblings, teachers, police officers, or other law 
enforcement. Perhaps most people have not developed the knowledge structures 
necessary for disobeying authority in the face of competing demands because 
they are so rarely called to do so.  
 The Stanford Prison Experiment is another example of a strong situation. 
The experiment was set up so that depending on the role of guard or prisoner, the 
subjects came to see certain response patterns (which were limited severely by 
pre-assigned roles) as the appropriate ones. Students assigned as prisoners even 
shunned any prisoner who tried to protest their treatment at the hands of the 
guards because they perceived the scope of appropriate behavior to be severely 
limited (and appropriate behavior did not include acting in opposition to the 
demands of the guards). This may be due to a failure on the part of the agents to 
develop the necessary skills to disobey authority when commanded to behave in a 
way they would perhaps not endorse in different circumstances. 
 According to the argument from psychological factors, our values, goals, 
beliefs, construal, and other psychological factors are formed in part from our 
personal history and expectations. If the subjects in the Milgram and Stanford 
experiments had never come across similar situations in their personal history 
(as it seems likely), they may simply have lacked the experience necessary to deal 
with these types of situations. This would not necessarily imply that the subjects 
lacked any compassion, but merely that they had not developed the sort of 
schemas necessary to know what to do in these situations. Perhaps the reason the 
subjects who obeyed the experimenter all acted similarly is that they all lacked 
the schemas necessary for those types of situations.   
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On the other hand, perhaps obeying authority is a schema that all of them 
shared. Going back to Mischel’s red light example, most of us have had many 
experiences with traffic lights and have learned what to do at a red traffic light. 
We have come to expect that others will also obey the traffic light and that if we 
do not obey, we risk causing an accident or getting a ticket. The fact that the 
majority of people have this same schema is a result of our shared societal and 
governmental law, as well as a shared culture. Similarly, perhaps obeying 
authority may also be a schema that a majority of us shares. 
Being able to explain why people behaved the way they did is by no means 
the same as saying that the behavior is not problematic. While the psychological 
factors operating in strong situations may be able to explain why individuals act 
the way they do in response to these types of situations, it does not tell us how we 
can avoid letting subtle situational cues lead us to act in ways which we would not 
normally approve in these situations. Certain types of situational features may be 
problematic for behavioral consistency.  
What is most disturbing about inconsistent behavior due to situational 
influences in strong situations is the inability for the agents in those situations to 
remain consistent to their previous commitments to various values or beliefs. The 
fact that setting up a situation in a specific way can interfere with the 
performance of those goals or values is what is most disturbing about situational 
influences. 
The propensity to act according to the population norm is extremely 
disturbing in strong situations like the SPE, the Milgram experiment, and 
especially for historical cases where the consequences for the victims included 
injury or death. Although we may not encounter strong situations often, it is 
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important to address possible ways to avoid falling under their influence. In 
order to try to find a solution to the problematic influence of strong situations we 
need to look at some of the possible factors that make strong situations so 
influential. In the next chapter, I look at the argument from group effects or 
social influence, which also gives us some insight into countering the problem of 
strong situations. 
 
Strong Situations and the Situationist Critique 
 In their discussion of strong versus weak situations, psychologists Mark 
Snyder and William Ickes make the point that very strong situations are not ideal 
for exposing personality traits or dispositional attitudes because strong situations 
are by definition situations in which situational pressures lead a large majority of 
people to behave the same way. 
 However, according to the definition of a diagnostic situation in the 
situationist thesis, a diagnostic situation is one that is “unfavorable enough to 
trait-relevant behavior that the behavior would be better explained by reference 
to individual dispositions than by reference to the situation, because the behavior 
is outside the population norm for a situation.”24 This definition tracks the idea of 
a strong situation. Strong situations are situations where only one type of 
behavior seems appropriate, making all other types of behavior seem 
inappropriate.  
Going back to my example of a red traffic light, we could explain why 
people stop at a red traffic light by referencing situational features like the light 
itself, but we could also explain why people stop by referencing psychological 
                                                   
24
 Doris, Lack of Character, 18-19. 
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factors. Presumably, people who obey the red light do so because of similar 
beliefs, goals, and values. For example, an individual might value obeying the law 
or may have the goal of not being ticketed. Perhaps he may simply value public 
safety (as well as his own safety) and obeying the red light would be the 
appropriate response to behave according to those goals or values.  
However, situationists rarely cite these types of situations because one of 
the premises of situationism is that character traits should show up as 
individuating behavior. Apparently, we cannot learn anything about a person’s 
character in situations where they behave according to the population norm 
because we can explain those situations by referencing situational features. By 
this logic, since most people stop at red lights we could not learn anything about a 
person’s character by observing that he observes traffic lights. This seems to 
ignore one side of the equation. As I argued above, a majority of individuals may 
behave similarly to one another in a situation because they have similar goals, 
values, or beliefs that interact with similar ways with a situational feature. On the 
other hand, if we were to observe an agent running a red traffic light, then we 
could explain the agent’s behavior by referencing the agent’s personal 
dispositions (his goals, beliefs, values, etc.) instead of the red traffic light because 
he would be behaving outside of the population norm. 
Presumably, because of the idea that character should show up as 
individuating behavior, as evidence against character situationists predominantly 
cite social psychology experiments (and historical accounts) that pick out strong 
situations. When agents fail to show individuating behavior in these situations, 
situationists take that as evidence that most people do not in fact have “global” 
character because they are behaving according to the population norm. This 
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seems to bias the argument unfairly in favor of the situationist thesis. If 
situationists predominantly cite strong or “diagnostic” situations to assess 
individuating behavior and these are exactly the types of situations where 
individuating behavior is not displayed, then the results will always turn out in 
favor of situationism. 25 
 Situationists cannot support their claim that behavioral variation across a 
population owes more to situational rather than dispositional differences among 
persons mostly by citing strong situations. 26 At best, the behavior of subjects in 
strong situations can only support the narrower claim that different situations 
have varying degrees of situational pressures and that behavioral variation 
practically disappears in strong situations. The situationist claim that behavioral 
variation owes more to situational differences would remain true only if people 
generally found themselves in only (or at least, predominantly in) strong 
situations for most of their lives. If this were the case then it is true that 
behavioral variation would be due more to the situation than to the person. 
However, for the most part, people generally find themselves in a mix of weak 
and strong situations.27 
Moreover, the fact that some people did show individuating behavior by 
getting up and leaving or refusing to continue with the Milgram experiment 
might be taken as further evidence that psychological factors are playing a part in 
motivating behavior. It is evidence that the different values, goals, beliefs, or 
                                                   
25 See Mischel, The Interaction of Person and Situation. 
 
26 Doris, Lack of Character, 24. 
 
27 Doris does use the Isen and Levin experiment as an example of a weak situations 
where situational cues should have been vague enough that behavioral variance due to 
dispositional traits would have been displayed. However, there are other explanations for 
the findings in that study that have already been discussed in this paper. 
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schemas that people have influence their behavior. Milgram himself noted that 
some of the subjects who refused to comply also turned out to be people who had 
lived through the Nazi occupation of much of Europe and so had perhaps formed 
schemas in relation to blind obedience in the face of commands that go against 
one’s moral commitments.28 I look at this suggestion in greater depth in the next 
chapter. 
 
Analyzing the Argument from Misrepresentation 
As mentioned above, the three main contentions of AM are: 1) human 
behavior is not largely driven by situational determinants, 2) experiments cited 
by situationists do not in fact show behavioral inconsistency, and finally 3) an 
accurate portrayal of TCC can account for both 1 and 2 above. In order for AM to 
work as an argument against situationism, PF, the main contention behind the 
argument from misrepresentation, must be consistent with all three assertions. 
Below, I argue that the argument from psychological factors fails to meet 
the third claim of AM, the claim that an accurate portrayal of TCC can show why 
experiments cited by situationists do not in fact show behavioral inconsistency 
and how human behavior is not mostly driven by situational determinants. It is 
not completely clear that the description of character given in arguments from PF 
is consistent with TCC at all.  
As evidence for the first claim, advocates of character arguing from AM 
refer back to the agent’s construal. Particular situational features do not simply 
cause agents to behave in a particular way. How an agent responds to particular 
situational features will depend on his construal of a situation, which in turn 
                                                   
28 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 50-52. 
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depends on the interaction between the particular features of that situation and 
the agent’s psychological factors (his knowledge structures, beliefs, goals, etc.). 
Human behavior is caused by the interaction of situational and dispositional 
features, not just one or the other. The argument from psychological factors 
appeals to evidence from psychology to show that differences in construal, goals, 
beliefs, and values can lead to differences in behavior or motives for behavior.  
Furthermore, according to TCC, virtue requires that a virtuous action be 
correctly motivated in order for that action to count as truly virtuous. Virtuous 
actions are not determined merely by overt behavior; the agent must also have 
the correct motivation (a type of psychological factor). Motives are psychological 
factors that can be the result of an agent’s beliefs, values, and goals. Aristotelian 
virtue does include some psychological factors as a part of character. This is 
consistent with Aristotelian virtue as a disposition to do the right thing from a 
firm and unchanging character. If an agent has the goal of acting 
compassionately because he believes compassion is the right thing to do and so it 
has value for him, then that agent’s disposition to behave compassionately is a 
result of his goals, beliefs, and values. Moreover, if that agent consistently holds 
those same beliefs, goals, and values throughout his life then we may say that his 
disposition to act compassionately is firm and unchanging, determining his 
behavior across time and situations. The first claim of AM then is consistent with 
TCC. 
Advocates of character arguing from AM argue for the second claim by 
maintaining that agents themselves should measure behavioral consistency 
rather than a third person observer. When judging behavioral consistency, it is 
important to take into account the agent’s construal of the situation. In the 
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previous chapter, I argued that at least for situations of minor need, the argument 
from choice was the strongest response to situationism. According to the 
argument from choice, subjects sometimes will fail to help because they see a 
particular helping situation of minor need as a matter of personal choice (or a 
morally elective action) rather than one of moral obligation. That is, for helping 
situations of minor need, one need not display trait-relevant behavior in every 
situation and so an agent can choose when to display the trait-relevant behavior. 
However, since this argument only applies to helping situations of minor need, 
the implication is that different traits have different requirements for behavioral 
consistency.  
While the argument explains the apparent behavioral consistency in the 
experiments examined above, it does so by making a claim about behavioral 
consistency requirements that are not Aristotelian. Aristotelian virtue theory says 
little about the behavioral consistency requirements of different virtues, so the 
claim that virtuous agents need only have behavioral consistency for traits that 
require perfect obligations is a claim that Aristotelian virtue does not share with 
advocates of character arguing from AM. Consistency is expected from virtuous 
agents as a result of their having developed virtue so both the situationist and 
Aristotelian conceptions of character stress the importance of characteristics of 
an agent that dispose the agent behave in certain ways. In the Aristotelian 
conception of character, just as in the situationist conception of character, if you 
have the disposition to be brave then you are—as Annas put it—“habitually and 
reliably” a brave person.  
The argument from misrepresentation depicts a conception of character 
that diverges in some ways from the traditional conception of character. Since PF, 
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the underlying argument of AM, offers a strong response to the situationist 
thesis, the ways in which this new conception of character diverges from the 
traditional conception may point us in the direction of a more realistic conception 
of character. 
 
Conclusion 
 The argument from psychological factors provides the strongest response 
to the situationist claim that situational rather than dispositional influences are 
the major drive behind human behavior. With the argument from psychological 
factors, we have an account of the effects of character on behavior. Once we 
understand how psychological factors that are a part of character affect our 
behavior, we have a greater ability to explain and predict behavior. The argument 
from psychological factors also calls into question the usefulness of the move to 
local traits advocated by situationists, as well as the validity of some of the 
experimental evidence cited by situationists.  
 However, as I pointed out in my analysis of the argument from 
misrepresentation, the argument from psychological factors depicts a conception 
of virtue (and character) that diverges in some important ways from the 
traditional conception of virtue. Since the argument from psychological factors 
appears to be the strongest response to the situationist thesis, the ways in which 
this new conception of virtue diverges from the traditional conception may point 
us in the direction of a stronger conception of character.  
 Unfortunately, although the argument from psychological factors may 
point us toward a more realistic conception of character, it cannot provide us 
with an answer to the problem of psychologically strong situations. In strong 
 150
situations, individuals often behave inconsistently with their previous behavior, 
but more importantly, they behave inconsistently with their commitment to 
certain goals and values. Moreover, they behave in a way they would not have 
actively endorsed or identified with. In the next chapter, I look into possible 
underlying factors that make certain situations have such powerful psychological 
effects on agents and some possible ways of combating those effects. 
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Chapter 5 
IN DEFENSE OF CHARACTER: SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND PRACTICAL 
WISDOM 
 
According to the argument from deficiency of character, certain 
experiments showing inconsistencies in behavior show nothing more than that 
many of the agents in those situations lacked something in their character to keep 
their behavior consistent with their beliefs and values. This does not imply that 
character does not exist but merely that those particular agents did not have 
character. Two of the most common tacks for this argument are the argument 
from social influences (SI) and the argument from practical wisdom (PW).  
The argument from social influences is the claim that one of the most 
common deficiencies in character is the propensity to be influenced by other 
people, often leading to behavior of which an agent would not normally approve. 
This deficiency is responsible for the inconsistent behavior of agents across 
different situations. I review the argument as well as some possible theories that 
philosophers and psychologists have put forth as possible solutions to the 
problem of social influences.  
According to those making the argument from practical wisdom, much of 
the inconsistency that exists in behavior is due to a lack of practical wisdom. An 
agent who has practical wisdom can deliberate well and determine the right 
course of action in every situation. Agents who fail to act consistently with their 
values or beliefs because of subtle situational cues probably do so because they 
lack this kind of practical deliberation.  
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I conclude that social influences can be both disastrous and beneficial and 
so we must exercise great care in how our social environments influenced us. To 
counter some of the destructive effects of social influence, we need to develop 
some practical wisdom so that we can differentiate between beneficial and 
potentially harmful social situations and influences. 
 
Social Influence 
According to the argument from social influence, many agents have a 
weakness in their character that makes them likely to succumb to the subtle 
pressures of social influence thus failing to stay consistent with their 
commitment to various goals, beliefs, and values. People are greatly “influenced 
by the attitudes and behavior of other people, even of other people whom [we] 
don’t know and who have no control over [our] lives.”29 
The effects of social influence can work in at least three different ways. In 
unfamiliar situations, the agent might turn to those around him for guidance on 
how he should behave. In many cases, this can influence agents to behave 
inconsistently with their previous commitments to certain values, for example, by 
behaving with cruelty when the agent values compassion and usually behaves 
compassionately. The second way social influences influence an agent’s behavior 
is due to the agent coming to perceive others in his environment as a sort of 
audience to his actions. Since agents want to seem attuned with their 
environment (which includes other people in that environment), the opinion of 
the majority carries “normative or moral force.”30 In other words, the need to feel 
                                                   
29 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 44. For more on this see 44-46. 
 
30 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 45. 
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that one is in agreement with others in the same situation is a powerful drive. 
Finally, situational influences can work through what Ross and Nisbett refer to as 
“tension systems,” which help to keep the opinions of the individual in line with 
those of the group. According to Ross and Nisbett, when an agent discovers there 
is a discrepancy between the beliefs of the group and his own view, this creates a 
tension that must be resolved by influencing the group toward his own view, 
opening himself to the influence of the group’s view, or rejecting the group’s 
opinion for his own. Social influence is an especially insidious deficiency because, 
as Ross and Nisbett put it, “other people are among our best sources of 
information about the world.”31 
One of the ways the opinions of others (even strangers) can influence our 
behavior is due to the informational aspects of social influence; we use other 
people as sources of information about our environment and the world. We are 
not in the habit of ignoring the opinions of others because in the past listening to 
others has proven to be a good way of leaning about the world.32 Others serve as 
guides to our behavior in certain ways. For example, in an unfamiliar situation 
where you do not know what the correct action is, you might turn to your peers to 
see their reactions in order to decide how you should act in that situation.  
                                                   
31 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 44.  
See also Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 141-143. Adams argues that virtue is socially 
dependent so if one is in the wrong situation, or has the wrong sort of peers, one is less 
likely to be virtuous. Since we are social creatures we take our cues from the environment, 
particularly in situations that are unfamiliar to us.  
See also, Sabini and Silver “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” and 
Moralities of Everyday Life; Solomon, “What’s Character Got to Do with It?” 
 
31 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 44. See also Cialdini, Influence: 
Science and Practice. Cialdini also mentions how we are influenced to buy things we do 
not like, or behave in ways of which we would not normally approve because of our desire 
for internal consistency and being manipulated by our commitment to the rule of 
reciprocity. 
 
32 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 44. 
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The subjects in Milgram’s experiment were in an unfamiliar situation and 
did not know how to act, so they took their cues from the experimenter. They 
accepted an interpretation of the situation given to them by the experimenter 
when they were unable to come up with one of their own. The experimenter told 
them (or led them to understand) that the experiment needed to continue, that 
there was no problem with the learner yelling for help, and that they were not 
morally responsible for anything that happened to the learner; the subjects 
accepted this interpretation. It is not necessarily true that all the subjects that 
continued to shock the victim to the end were lacking some virtue of compassion, 
more likely still they could have all shared a character defect that resulted in 
blocking an appropriate show of compassion. Similarly, in the Stanford Prison 
experiment, the students playing the guards seemed to respond to the way the 
environment was set up, and the students playing the prisoners took their cues 
from the guards. 
 Another way that the perceptions of others can influence our behavior is 
by our viewing others as audience to our actions, which inhibits us from doing 
actions that we think will make us look foolish.33 Subjects in the Milgram 
experiment might have been afraid of looking foolish by confronting the 
experimenter who seemed calm and collected and not at all nonplussed by how 
things were unfolding. Similarly, the subjects of the Seminary experiment may 
have been afraid of the embarrassment they might suffer at having failed to 
deliver the lecture they were supposed to give. This could have affected them via 
diversion of attention (so they did not notice the fallen figure or did not give a 
second thought to him) or because the subjects felt that the obligation of giving 
                                                   
33 Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality, 304. 
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the lecture (or finishing the experiment in the Milgram case) overrode any 
possible obligation they may have felt toward the victim. 
Moreover, in both the Milgram and Stanford Prison Experiment, there 
was great pressure to conform to the “group” norm and not deviate in judgment. 
In the case of Milgram, the group was merely the experimenter, while in the 
Stanford Prison Experiment the group was all of the subjects together playing 
their assigned roles. The need to feel attuned to the environment (which includes 
the group) played a large part in both experiments, as many of the subjects in the 
Milgram experiment seemed unwilling to tell the experimenter they did not like 
the direction the experiment was taking, and in the Stanford experiment both 
guards and prisoners followed their roles dutifully, even resenting the one or two 
prisoners who actually tried to rebel against the harsh oppression of the guards. 
 
Analysis 
 The argument from social influence can explain the behavior of agents in 
many strong situations. However, this still leaves us with the problematic nature 
of social influence. Social influences are especially problematic because in many 
situations we take our cues on how to act from features of the situation or other 
people in that situation. Since we are always living within a social context and 
trying to get along within it, we cannot completely ignore our social 
environments. We could not get along in our social environments if we simply 
ignored features of our environment (including people in that environment) and 
trying to do so would probably be maladaptive.  
However, if the most common thread found in a lot of situational 
pressures that can influence our behavior is the pressure of social influence, then 
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at least we know that the situational cues that can influence our behavior are not 
as numerous and diverse as situationists would have us believe.34 Moreover, we 
also have some idea of the kinds of situations in which social influence is more 
likely to have an effect on us. 
 
Possible Solutions to the Effects of Social Influence 
 Rather than trying to counteract the powerful effects of social influence on 
our behavior, some philosophers instead have opted to embrace these effects and 
harness them toward the maintenance of virtue. These philosophers contend that 
social networks (and in some cases communities) are not only helpful in 
maintaining the virtues, they are absolutely necessary.35 
 Lawrence Blum writes about the “fundamentally social nature of virtue” 
and the ties between community and virtue. He argues that not only are the ties 
between community and virtue more significant than hitherto has been given 
credit to them by moral theory but that some forms of community are crucial to 
the maintenance of a “moral psychology of excellence,” not only in sustaining 
virtues but in learning them as well. Blum bases his account largely on the case of 
Le Chambon, a French enclave that sheltered thousands of refugees during the 
Nazi occupation of France. The Chambonnais risked their lives by aiding and 
sheltering refugees. Although André Trocmé, the town’s pastor and spiritual 
leader, is considered a central organizer of part of the rescue effort simply by 
calling people in his sermons to the true teachings of Christianity as he 
understood them, “to love one’s neighbor, to cherish human life, not to consort 
                                                   
34 Sabini and Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” 553-559. See also 
Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 153-155. 
35 See Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994).  
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with evil, to be nonviolent” the people of Le Chambon helped refugees 
individually, without the rescue effort being an explicit collective enterprise or 
one that was openly talked about amongst them.36 While Trocmé’s moral 
leadership may have helped the people of the community see for themselves that 
rescuing was the right thing to do, community values may have made particular 
moral motivations salient, familiar, and “owned” that would not otherwise have 
been salient to an individual making moral decisions independently. The 
community of Le Chambon had a history of religious persecution and resistance 
to religious persecution which may have made “salient, familiar and ‘owned’ the 
motive of resisting an evil perpetrated by the state and state authorities” which 
linked their resistance to their own persecution with the persecution of Jews by 
the French state.37 Furthermore, if the people of Le Chambon already had certain 
values or virtues like ‘love thy neighbor,’ ‘cherish life,’ etc., the community, 
through its actions, may have helped to fill in the practical content of what may 
have otherwise been merely abstract values or virtues.38  
 Maria Merritt also believes there is a “sustaining social contribution to 
character” and writes on the varying strengths of what she calls the “motivational 
                                                   
36 Blum, Moral Perception, 151. 
 
37 Blum, Moral Perception, 154. 
 
38 Blum, Moral Perception, 144-156. Blum also notes (157-160), that since the people of 
Le Chambon didn’t seem to feel as if they were doing anything extraordinary in harboring 
refugees at such a risk to their own lives, it seems like communities can shape members’ 
ability to sustain a level of virtuous conduct beyond what in some other contexts would be 
regarded as too much to be demanded.. So, communities can raise (and probably lower) 
the ordinary standards of what is expected of someone. 
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self-sufficiency of character” (or MSC for short) in different virtue theories.39  
According to Merritt:  
a conception of character advances a strong ideal of 
MSC to the degree that it calls for the possession of 
the motivational structure of virtue to be, in 
maturity and under normal circumstances, 
independent of factors outside oneself, such as 
particular social relationships and settings.40 
 
We use the concept of MSC to gauge the degree to which a particular conception 
of virtue theory calls for the “possession of the motivational structure of virtue to 
be independent of factors outside of oneself, such as particular social 
relationships and settings.”41Aristotelian virtue theory advances a very strong 
ideal of MSC, something Merritt finds problematic because it is unrealistic to 
what human beings are really like. While aspiration to realizing a strong ideal of 
MSC might make you more vigilant and less dependent on social networks, it 
might simply be an ideal that is out of reach for most humans.  
 Merritt proposes that since the Humean approach to virtue theory 
requires a much weaker ideal of MSC, and there appears to be no real need to 
resist dependence on social networks (so long as one exercises care in the choice 
of social settings and relationships), the Humean approach to virtue is better and 
more realistic.42 According to Merritt, what is important for the Humean 
approach is merely that one possesses the virtues (characterized as socially or 
personally beneficial qualities of mind) somewhat stably over time without any 
                                                   
39 Maria Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2000): 374. 
 
40 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” 365. 
 
41 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” 365. 
 
42 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” 375-381. 
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special significance on stability having to be self-sufficiently sustained. An agent 
can have a “structure of motivation” that is stable largely because it is socially 
sustained and still be considered to have genuine virtue. Merritt argues that 
instead of trying to make our character “as independent as possible of all 
particular social settings or relationships,” we should exercises care in our choice 
of our social settings and relationships and how far we allow them to affect us.43 
 Adams is another philosopher who agrees that virtue is dependent on 
social environments, not only in its acquisition but also in its persistence.44 That 
is not to say we do not contribute to the acquisition or persistence of virtue, but 
merely that its acquisition and persistence are also partly dependent on our social 
environment. For example, whether or not I acquire virtue depends partly on 
whether I am raised by people who inculcate me with virtuous ideals. This does 
not mean that I cannot acquire virtuous dispositions without having any virtuous 
people to teach me (or to imitate), but merely that having someone that can teach 
me how to be virtuous will make it likelier that I acquire virtue.45 Moreover, if I 
live and move within a social environment (which includes relationships with 
other people) that encourages virtuous actions, or at least does not discourage 
them or encourage vices instead, then I am likelier to maintain my virtue.  
 
                                                   
43 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” 378. 
Solomon, “What’s Character Got to Do with It?” 650-651. Solomon also argues that “there 
is good reason to be suspicious of a notion of character that is supposed to stand up to 
overwhelming pressures without peer or institutional support.” Like Merritt, Solomon 
does not feel that virtue ethics requires a strong sense of autonomy or ability to cut 
oneself off from the influences and pressures of other people.  
 
44 See Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 155-161.  
 
45 This argument is perfectly in line with Aristotle’s idea that the moral virtues were 
acquired by habitual training in one’s youth under the instruction of a teacher or mentor. 
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, 28-30, 1103a11-1103b26. 
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Problems with virtue as socially dependent  
However, there are problems for conceptions of virtue that require merely 
a weak MSC. Merritt herself alludes to the first problem when she states that we 
need to exercise care in the choice of our social settings and relationships. If 
virtue is partially socially sustained, then the wrong social settings or 
relationships can be damaging to our virtue. As both Blum and Merritt 
acknowledge, being dependent on social networks for virtue can be risky if one 
happens to be in the wrong situation or among the wrong people.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that what we could learn from the historical cases 
sometimes cited as evidence for situationism was that an individual’s 
environment played a large role in the development and maintenance of virtue. 
These cases seem to be further evidence for the arguments made above. However, 
the historical cases show the problem with virtue being socially dependent. If an 
individual’s virtue is socially dependent, and that individual happens to be in the 
wrong type of environment, then he is more likely not to develop virtue (or fail to 
maintain his virtue). Adams argues that if virtue is socially dependent then it is 
“frail,” or dependent on our luck of ending up in one type of situation versus 
another.46 This does not mean that everyone will fail to do the right thing in 
strong situations, as evidenced by test results and history itself, but that perhaps 
many of us, or even most of us, will fail to do so.  
Would accepting that virtue is subject to moral luck and dependent on 
social networks simply prove the situationist point? If for many people, acting 
virtuously in a situation depends on their social environment, are they really 
virtuous? Is virtue something properly theirs or merely a consequence of their 
                                                   
46 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 157. 
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environment? This would depend on what one takes the virtues to be. If being 
able to rely quite heavily on one’s own moral perceptions and motivations with no 
regard for the particular situation in which one finds themselves (what Merritt 
refers to as a strong MSC) is part of the conception of virtue, then socially 
dependent “virtues” are not really virtues of the agent. However, if one has a 
conception of version with a weak MSC, then one might still be considered to 
have virtue even if the environment played a part in one’s behavior.  
One way to respond to this question would be to argue that virtue comes 
in degrees and that there is a minimum requirement for having any type of virtue. 
In later chapters, I argue that, at minimum, an agent needs to value and care 
about his moral commitments in order to have any kind of virtue. He may lack 
the ability to deliberate on how to behave consistently with those moral 
commitments and so behave inconsistently with his moral commitments in his 
absence of his social networks but he genuinely wants to behave consistently with 
his moral commitments. Perhaps, an agent’s ability to maintain his virtue in 
absence of, perhaps even opposition to, his social networks is an indicator of the 
degree of his virtue. However, at minimum, the agent must at least care enough 
about his social commitments to want to behave consistently with them. 
We can imagine two agents: one that cares about his moral commitments 
and values but lacks the ability to behave consistently with those moral values 
and commitments in absence of his social networks and one whose values and 
commitments rely entirely on his social network, shifting and changing along 
with those of his social network. The second agent does not really seem to care 
about or identify with those values and commitments. The agent may not even be 
able to give a reason for endorsing those values and commitments other than that 
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his social network has those same values. In absence of his social network, the 
agent may have no values or commitments, or his values and commitments may 
shift in a radically different direction. Both types of agents may display similar 
behaviors, often failing to behave virtuously in the absence of guidance from their 
social network. However, only the first type of agent has virtue. An agent whose 
values and commitments shift along with those of his social network does not 
really seem to care about his virtue, merely about conforming to the group 
whereas the second type of agent genuinely cares about virtue but may lack 
certain abilities to help him behave consistently with his moral commitments. 
For example, suppose that Alan is usually a compassionate person, he is 
very strongly against inflicting harm of any kind on innocent people. However, 
Alan turns out to be one of the subjects in Milgram’s obedience experiment, and 
overwhelmed by strong situational influences in that experiment, Alan shocks the 
victim all the way to the end. Contrast this example with Nina. Nina usually acts 
very compassionately because she mimics the behavior of those around her. Nina 
is fortunate enough to be around people who act compassionately, but she does 
not really have particular reasons for acting compassionately other than to fit in 
with those around her. She has never really thought about why she should be 
compassionate. If people in her social network stopped behaving 
compassionately and instead began behaving callously, Nina would also stop 
behaving compassionately and begin to behave callously. Nina values fitting in, 
she does not value being compassionate. Even if Nina always behaved 
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compassionately within her social network, it seems counterintuitive to say that 
she has the virtue of compassion.47 
However, even if an agent cares about his moral values and commitments, 
relying too heavily on his social networks to behave consistently with those values 
and commitments can be risky. Because our environment can influence us 
positively or negatively and the sort of environment we are in often depends on 
moral luck, virtue that is too dependent on environment is also dependent on 
moral luck. Relying too much on our social environments for moral guidance and 
judgment can lead us to make bad judgments and/or have bad character if we are 
unlucky enough to end up in bad situations or around bad people.  
Perhaps a temptation to succumb to pressures to conform socially is a 
temptation that we have overlooked, but nevertheless a temptation that is as 
overwhelming and as commonly occurring as better-known temptations. Adams 
argues that perhaps we should see social conformity as akin to the temptations of 
passion or desire or those that work through fear. When see an individual 
overcome by fear or desire on a single occasion, we do not immediately conclude 
from that one failure that the individual lacks courage or strong will. Similarly, 
because an individual is overcome by the temptation to conform socially on a 
single occasion, we should not assume that individual lacks a particular virtue.  
Just as there are cardinal virtues to contend with temptations like fear 
and passion, perhaps the problem of the frailty of virtue in the face of social 
temptations necessitates a new cardinal virtue like moral autonomy, or the 
                                                   
47 However, in later chapters, I argue that if Alan really values compassion but has no 
idea how to act consistently with compassion, and so in absence of his social network is 
completely at a loss as to how to behave, he has merely a very low degree of compassion. 
He may have a desire to be compassionate, but if he really values compassion, he should 
make an effort to deliberate on how to behave compassionately and avoid behaving 
inconsistently with compassion. 
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“ability to interpret situations accordingly and confidently” and stand one’s 
ground even when one is in disagreement with others.48  
At minimum, an agent needs to exercise some care in his choice of 
situations and social networks so that he can avoid the temptation to conform to 
social pressures. However, sometimes doing even this requires some kind of 
practical wisdom. An agent with some practical wisdom might recognize when his 
social environment is not conducive to fulfilling his goals or to his staying 
consistent with his previous values or commitments.  
 
Practical Wisdom 
 Responding to the problem of the frailty of virtue in the face of unlucky 
circumstances brings us to the second general response using the argument from 
deficiency. Some virtue theorists argue that dependence on social networks to 
maintain virtue is due to our lack of ethical knowledge or practical wisdom; when 
we lack practical wisdom situations of people can influence our behavior, for 
better or worse.49 According to the argument from practical wisdom, the reason 
many of the subjects failed to act consistently compassionately or helpfully is that 
they lacked practical wisdom. Since practical wisdom is a necessary part of virtue 
that helps agents identify the correct action for each situation, those agents that 
                                                   
48 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 155.  
See also: Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 33-34. Adams’s idea of moral autonomy 
According to Adams, structural virtues are “structural features of the way one organizes 
and manages whatever motives one has.” Adams never actually refers to the virtue of 
moral autonomy as a structural virtue. Adams argues that the excellence of structural 
virtues is the ability and willingness to govern one’s behavior in accordance with values, 
commitments and ends one is for. He contrasts this with “motivational virtues,” which 
are defined by “motives which in turn are defined by goods that one is for in having them, 
as benevolence, for example, is defined by the motive of desiring or willing the good of 
others.”  
 
49 Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics,” 483. 
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did not perform the correct actions were deficient in practical wisdom and thus 
lacked a truly virtuous character.  
In order to give a clear account of the argument from practical wisdom, I 
first give a brief overview of the traditional Aristotelian conception of virtue and 
the role that practical wisdom plays in that conception of virtue. 
One of the fundamental suppositions of Aristotelian virtue theory is that 
virtue is a state or disposition of a person.50 If Smith has the character trait or 
virtue of generosity, then he has a character of a certain sort; he is “habitually and 
reliably” generous. 51  Julia Annas describes virtue as a disposition to act in 
certain ways and not others. Quite importantly, she makes the further claim that 
a virtue is a disposition to act for reasons and so must be exercised through the 
agent’s practical reasoning or practical wisdom.52  
 Virtue is not just a disposition to do the right thing; it is a disposition to 
do the right thing for the right reason in the appropriate way.53 That is, in order 
to count as having a particular virtue one must meet all three criteria: 1) one must 
perform the correct action, 2) one must perform it for the right reasons, and 3) 
one must do the action from some preexisting disposition (or if the disposition is 
not preexisting, at least lasting in some way). Together these criteria are both 
                                                   
50 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, 36, 1106a10. Interestingly enough in some 
translations of Aristotle (see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1962), “state” is translated as 
“characteristic.” In others, (see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1996) “moral virtue” is 
translated as “virtues of character.” 
 
51 Julia Annas, "Virtue Ethics," in The Oxford Companion to Ethical Theory, ed. David 
Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 1. 
 
52 Annas, “Virtue Ethics, 1. Practical reasoning is also called practical knowledge, 
practical wisdom and practical deliberation at other times by Annas (see Annas, 
Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character”; Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue 
Ethics.”) 
 
53 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, 38, 1106b20. 
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necessary and sufficient for virtue and are supposed to eliminate cases of people 
accidentally doing the correct action and/or people who perform one virtuous 
action but generally perform unvirtuous ones.  
 Importantly, it is not just about determining a “correct” action in a 
specified situation but also the “right reason” for performing that action. There 
are presumably objective facts about what action is correct and why it is correct; 
practical wisdom helps the agent learn these objective facts. 
Doing the right thing for the right reason requires that an agent not have 
internal opposition to the action he is doing but also that he understands and 
accepts the correct reasons for performing that action. He must know not only 
what the right thing to do in some particular situation is but also why it is the 
right thing to do in that situation.54 It is not enough that one merely know that a 
certain action is the right one in a certain situation, one must also know why that 
is the case.  
For example, if you know that you should help someone who has fallen in 
the subway but you do not know why you should help, then you are not really 
virtuous (in this case, you do not really have the virtue of compassion). Having 
acted compassionately is not enough to make you a compassionate person even if 
you always help people up who have tripped or fallen down in front of you. The 
mere fact that you do not know the reason why you should help them up is 
enough to keep you from having true compassion. This may seem 
counterintuitive at first, but Aristotle added practical wisdom into his theory of 
virtue because he hypothesized that an agent who did not know the reasons for 
acting compassionately or bravely (or in some other way virtuously) would be an 
                                                   
54 Annas, “Virtue Ethics, 2. 
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agent who would not be reliable in his virtue. If the reason you help someone 
who has fallen is because you were taught to do so as a child without knowing the 
reasoning behind it, perhaps with no understanding that it is what compassion 
requires (and the further understanding of why compassion requires it), then you 
have only learned a sort of unthinking habit. While you may be on your way to 
virtue, you are not fully there. 
There are two important parts to virtue: moral virtue and practical 
wisdom.55 Moral virtue is attained by habit, by training our emotions to want 
what is best. Moral virtue is the desire to do the right sorts of things but by itself 
cannot tell us what the right action is in new situations that we have not 
encountered before. Practical wisdom is necessary in order to help us put our 
moral desires into action.56 It is what helps us deliberate well and choose the best 
action in a certain situation; it also helps us understand why a correct choice is 
the correct choice in that situation. A virtuous agent must have both practical 
wisdom and moral virtue. An agent who has the correct desires will be able to 
perform the right moral action in a number of situations with which s/he is 
already familiar, but in unfamiliar situations, s/he will have to guess without any 
good process of deliberation to guide her and may choose incorrectly. As such, 
her behavior could be inconsistent even with her own desires (such as her desire 
to be compassionate). 
The main thrust of Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom is that an actor’s 
reasons for acting are just as important as the action itself. In the end, it is not 
just how frequently certain actions are performed, the actions must be in some 
                                                   
55 See Aristotle’s, discussion of moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, 28-47, 
1103a11-1109b26. 
 
56 See Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom in Nicomachean Ethics, 1998, pp. 142-
143, 1140a25-, pp. 1140b30; 154-158, 1143b18-1145a11. 
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way connected to the agent’s reasons for acting. Not only must the virtuous agent 
act out of a desire to be helpful or compassionate, he must understand the 
reasons behind his action. Assuming the agents in the Milgram experiment, for 
example, were “normally moral” people, “normally moral” may simply refer to 
people who have the right desire (the desire to be compassionate) without 
necessarily having the practical wisdom necessary to understand how to put that 
desire into action. 
Sometimes we may know that a compassionate response is the correct 
one, but we don’t know what acting compassionately requires in a specific 
situation. For example, if a friend with a drug habit asks you for money and you 
know he is going to spend it to support his habit, does compassion require you to 
give him money, withhold money, try to convince him to go to rehab, etc. To take 
an example from the psychological literature, if you see someone drop his papers 
on the street in front of you, what does real compassion require of you?57 Should 
you stop and help him, or would that just embarrass him?  
Developing the moral virtues through habit will ensure that one has the 
correct desires in place, and practical wisdom and experience ensure that the 
virtuous agent makes decisions about the morally correct thing in some specific 
situation.58 The virtuous agent will be able to notice the relevant factors of that 
situation and not be swayed by non-relevant factors 
Kamtekar and Annas both argue that the virtues properly understood 
require practical wisdom, and that one possible reason for the majority of the 
                                                   
57 See Isen and Levin, “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping,” 1972. 
 
58 Experience is something that Aristotle points out as an important part of virtue 
especially the practical wisdom part of virtue, making ethical theory and practice not a 
young man’s game. Aristotle (1998), p. 148, 1148a13-28. 
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subjects in experiments like Milgram or the Stanford Prison Experiment—or to 
an extent, in some of the historical situations—having acted the way they did was 
that they had not developed the kind of practical intelligence needed to deal with 
unforeseen circumstances and pressures.59 In order to have practical wisdom or 
intelligence one must understand which principles are important and the 
virtuous action must have value for us.60 We need to reflect on what makes our 
responses appropriate to situations we find them appropriate for and how 
similarities in new situations or circumstances will make that same response 
more or less appropriate in those new situations or circumstances.61 For example, 
true virtue requires having the practical wisdom to know what compassion is, 
what it demands, and when it is required. It is ultimately developed through 
intelligent decisions, resulting in more intelligent deliberation and decision. This 
includes a flexibility and complexity of reasoning that allows one to think more 
clearly about the appropriate actions in new or innovative situations.62  
                                                   
59 See Annas, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character,” 637-639 and Kamtekar, 
“Situationism and Virtue Character, 480-484.  
 
See also Annas, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character,” 639. 
 
60 See Annas, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character,”.637. 
See also Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Character,” 481. Kamtekar says that 
learning to do what is virtuous requires taking appropriate pleasure in doing that action. 
 
61 Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue character,” 481-482. Kamtekar adds that that  
sometimes people have strategies on when to express a certain trait, thus not expressing 
it every time but that even though this may result in their behavior being viewed as 
inconsistent, the other extreme “absolute behavioral consistency” (485) would be 
maladaptive. 
 
62 Annas, “Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character,” 637-38. Annas adds that the 
subjects in the experiments referred to by situationists (see Milgram, Obedience to 
Authority; Darley and Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”; Zimbardo, The Lucifer 
Effect)) had not developed the kind of practical wisdom that would have dealt 
appropriately with unforeseen kinds of circumstances and pressure. 
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Related to the issue of practical wisdom is Kamtekar’s suggestion that 
perhaps trait names like “honesty” capture a whole range of behaviors that we 
group together under one word. For example, we may group two seemingly 
different behaviors like “not cheating on a test” and “not lying to your friends” as 
both being consistent with the trait of “honesty” because both cheating and lying 
are types of deceptive behavior.63 However, it might require practical intelligence 
or wisdom to notice that both cheating and lying and even more contextualized 
behaviors like “not cheating at cards” or “not cheating on one’s significant other” 
are types of the same kind of behavior; thus, if one really values not deceiving 
people, one should not cheat or lie in any situation. Lack of practical intelligence 
might result in behavior inconsistent with a single trait term. 
 
Analysis 
Developing practical wisdom would be a possible solution to the problems 
of unwanted social influence and strong situations.64 The common thread among 
many of the situational features that have the most power to influence our 
behavior is social influence, which can influence people to act inconsistently with 
their goals or values. Practical wisdom would help to counteract the influence of 
potentially dangerous social influences. 
As I argued above, many of the underlying factors that make strong 
situations have such powerful psychological effects on agents are social factors. In 
unfamiliar situations, agents look to others in that situation to determine the 
                                                   
63 Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Character,” 468-469.  
 
64 Philosophers and social psychologists have suggested different skills and abilities to 
help us repel the power of situational influences on our behavior. These skills may be 
useful in the development of practical wisdom. We will look at these suggestions in 
greater detail in the next chapter. 
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correct action. In many situations, agents perceive others in that situation as an 
audience to their actions, and in an attempt not to look foolish, may modify their 
behavior according to what they think the audience believes they should do. 
Moreover, agents feel great pressure to conform their opinions to the opinions of 
those around them.  
Social influences are especially problematic because looking to others for 
information is completely natural and social networks are actually valuable in 
helping to produce and maintain virtue. However, dependence on social networks 
alone for the maintenance of virtue is potentially dangerous. If an agent’s virtue is 
dependent on his social environment for his virtue and he is unlucky enough to 
be in an environment that is not conducive to virtue, he may behave in ways that 
are contrary to virtue. 
Practical wisdom is knowing how to act on one’s moral virtues (or, 
speaking more generally, one’s commitment to certain values or goals) in specific 
situations, so having practical wisdom may help to identify when one’s social 
environment is not conducive to virtue. An agent with practical wisdom knows 
what the right thing to do is in a particular situation, as well as why it is the right 
thing to do. In strong situations, where unfamiliar settings, social pressures, or 
other situational influences might lead an agent to believe action x is consistent 
with having a certain virtue (say, compassion) when it is actually not, an agent 
with practical wisdom should be able recognize the action that is actually 
consistent with compassion. 
One consideration we must keep in mind is that the development of 
practical wisdom is subject to moral luck in various ways. Aristotle argued that 
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practical wisdom was developed through experience and good deliberation. 
Lacking either of these, an agent might also lack practical wisdom. 
Agents develop practical wisdom over time and with experience so the 
types of life experiences that an agent has had will partly determine the areas of 
his life in which he has practical wisdom. For example, in Milgram’s experiment, 
one of the subjects that stopped the experiment was Jan Rensaleen, a man who 
emigrated from Holland after World War II.65 Jan was one of the 25 subjects who 
stopped the experiment early despite assurances from the experimenter that he 
was responsible for anything that happened to the victim and the experimenter’s 
insistence that subjects “must continue with the experiment” because subjects 
“had no choice.” Jan refused to let the experimenter confuse him into believing 
that legal responsibility was the same as moral responsibility, insisting that he 
alone was responsible for what happened to the victim. Moreover, Jan showed 
surprise that psychologists had made such low estimates of the number of 
subjects that would comply with the experiments, citing his experience in Nazi-
occupied Europe as evidence for people’s obedience. Having lived through a 
“strong situation” that had overwhelmed millions of people into obedience and 
compliance, Jan appeared to have learned from his experience and refused to let 
the experimenter define the situation for him. Another example is a subject 
named Gretchen Brandt, a woman who had lived in Hitler’s Germany in her 
youth and had been exposed to Hitler’s propaganda.66 She also refused to let the 
experimenter define the situation for her, insisting instead that she did in fact 
have a choice and that the victim’s life was in possible peril, whatever the 
                                                   
65 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 50-52. 
 
66 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 84-85. 
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experimenter might say. Both subjects had learned from their own experiences of 
the disastrous consequences of obeying authority unquestioningly and had 
applied this lesson to this particular situation. 
Other subjects, on the other hand, apparently did not have the practical 
wisdom necessary to help them see that the authority figure was basically telling 
them to inflict harm, perhaps even death, on the victim. These subjects did not 
seem to realize they could question claims made by an authority figure. Perhaps 
these subjects had been fortunate enough to always have dealt with authority 
figures who did not steer them wrong. They had not had bad experiences with 
authority figures, or they had not learned from previous bad experiences.  
One important consideration that has not been widely discussed is that 
having practical wisdom alone does not ensure that an agent will have virtue; 
virtue requires both practical wisdom and the moral virtues and developing the 
moral virtues is also somewhat dependent on luck. Developing virtue isn’t just 
dependent on the sorts of experiences we have (in order to develop practical 
wisdom) but also on having already developed the moral virtues, or the right 
sorts of values and beliefs. We can only develop virtue if we have developed the 
right sorts of commitments and values, namely, a commitment to the virtues; this 
ensures we have the right sort of motivation in the first place. The development of 
virtue is dependent on luck because it is dependent on an agent having been 
inculcated with the right commitments, values, and goals in his youth.  
For example, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that our emotions are in a 
sense “trained” when we are very young. She gives the example of someone who 
has racist ideas taught to him at a very young age. This person might come to 
have certain negative emotions in response to people from different races, along 
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with certain negative judgments of those people. An agent might be capable of 
changing his judgments by engaging in rational deliberation and re-evaluating 
his beliefs, but it will be harder for that agent to re-educate his emotions. So for 
example, for someone raised with racist beliefs, it might be possible for him to 
change his beliefs about other races, but the original negative emotions might 
remain, making him less than fully virtuous. 67 An agent usually does not control 
what ideas he is raised with (as well as the emotions that attach to those ideas), so 
the degree of virtue that one can acquire may just be dependent on luck.  
Similarly, an agent raised by parents or guardians who taught him the 
wrong sorts of beliefs or values will not even have the right sort of motivation to 
begin with. Moreover, if an agent does not have the right kind of beliefs or values, 
unless that agent undergoes a life changing experience or sudden insight, he may 
never even want to change his beliefs or goals, or even realize that a change is 
necessary. We do not always have a choice about what social environments we 
end up in, what types of situations we find ourselves in (strong situations for 
example), what environment we were brought up in, or even what natural 
dispositions we are born with. 
 It may seem like an unsavory conclusion that both practical wisdom and 
the moral virtues are subject to moral luck in various ways, but it is not really an 
extraordinary conclusion. We are aware that people are not born equally 
advantaged in wealth, opportunity, or even family. Similarly, some people grow 
up in homes where they are fortunate to receive an inculcation of the moral 
virtues from their parents or guardians, while others are not so lucky. Some 
people are fortunate enough never to end up in strong situations where their 
                                                   
67 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 108-120.  
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actions lead to disastrous consequences, and thus perhaps they never learn about 
the influence of strong situations at all; if one day they found themselves in a 
strong situation, they might be unable to resist the powerful psychological forces 
of strong situations. 
 
Conclusion 
The argument from social influence can account for much of the powerful 
psychological influence of strong situations. Human beings are social creatures 
that often look to others to guide their own behavior. Unfortunately, social 
influences are often at the heart of strong situations that can influence people to 
behave in cruel or terrible ways. Although the argument from social influences 
can help us to know what types of situations can have powerful, unwanted 
influence over us, we still have the problematic effects of social influences on 
behavioral consistency. 
Social influence can have both positive and negative effects on our 
behavior. Social networks may help us sustain our virtue, but they can also 
influence us to act in harmful ways, so we must have a way to tell the difference. 
The problem with relying too heavily on social networks alone to sustain our 
virtue is that, depending on our luck, we might end up in the wrong kind of social 
network. An agent that wishes to act consistently with his virtues would have to 
have a way to counteract (or at least recognize) potentially harmful situations and 
situational features. 
Although a virtue theory need not advance a need for strong motivational 
self-sufficiency of character, a virtue theory that allows an agent to rely too 
heavily on social networks to help him maintain his virtue, depends too much on 
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moral luck. An agent who is too dependent on social networks to maintain his 
virtue is not truly virtuous. The virtuous agent must strike some sort of balance. 
He must at least attempt to develop some practical wisdom, enough so that he 
can deliberate about how act consistently with his values and commitments in 
some situations, an can learn from his experiences, and form some idea of what 
certain virtues require, even in the absence of his social networks. Developing 
practical wisdom may help agents counteract the powerful psychological effects 
of social influences when these induce the agent to act in ways inconsistent with 
his previous values or commitments.  
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Chapter 6 
CONSTRUCTING AN EMPIRICALLY ADEQUATE THEORY OF CHARACTER: A 
REVIEW OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE 
 
In Chapter 4, I maintained the strongest argument against the situationist 
critique was the argument from psychological factors (PF). Once we understand 
how the psychological factors that are part of character affect our behavior, we 
have a greater ability to explain and predict behavior. I also claimed that PF could 
point us toward a more empirically adequate theory of character, specifically, a 
theory of character that emphasized construal and other psychological factors. In 
this chapter, I look at the social cognitive approach to personality that can ground 
an empirically adequate theory of character. In the next, I set forth an actual 
theory of character based on the social cognitive approach. 
According to the social cognitive approach to personality, we can find 
personality consistency not in direct behavioral dispositions but rather in the 
interaction between individual psychological factors and situational features. 
Depending on an individual’s history, goals, beliefs, values, etc., that individual 
will come to form distinct but predictable ways of interpreting situations that will 
in turn lead to distinct but predictable patterns of behavior  
In this chapter, I posit the social cognitive approach as a possible 
framework of personality that both epitomizes the main contention of PF and 
grounds a more realistic conception of character. Specifically, I review 
psychologist Walter Mischel’s social-cognitive theory of personality as a possible 
framework for a philosophical theory of character. 
 178
 However, since Mischel’s theory only provides a framework for character 
in general without specifying the necessary components of moral character, I also 
review a theory of moral character by psychologist Augusto Blasi compatible with 
the social-cognitive view of personality. Blasi’s theory specifies the four 
components he believes are necessary for moral character, namely, moral desires, 
a moral will, willpower, and integrity. According to Blasi’s theory, an individual’s 
self-identity as a whole includes a number of different self-concepts (or ideas and 
beliefs about the self) including a self-concept about one’s role as a moral person, 
which Blasi termed a “moral identity.” Blasi proposed that moral identity is more 
important for some agents than it is for others. Agents for whom moral identity is 
central to their self-identity are more likely to be motivated to act based on moral 
considerations or commitments. Agents with low centrality of moral identity are 
less likely to be motivated by moral considerations or commitments in the face of 
other non-moral considerations. As evidence for Blasi’s theory, I also look at 
some studies on the role of moral identity in motivating moral behavior. 
According to Blasi’s theory, an agent with a moral identity will be 
motivated to behave morally, so supporting Blasi’s theory requires us to have 
some explanation for how his theory can be consistent with our experience of 
people behaving in immoral ways. Accepting Blasi’s theory of moral identity 
would seem to require one to either accept the claim that few agents actually have 
a moral identity or explain how agents with a moral identity can behave in ways 
opposed to their previous moral commitments. In the second part of the chapter, 
I argue in favor of the latter claim and review a study on a number of 
psychological mechanisms that agents with a moral identity might use in order to 
behave in ways opposed to their moral identity.  
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Social Cognitive Theory 
Social Cognitive versus Traditional Trait Approach to Personality 
Psychological situationists have criticized theories of personality 
grounded in what psychologists call the “trait approach” to personality (which 
some psychologists have compared to the “virtue” approach to moral character).1 
Psychologists Daniel Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez write that the distinction 
between the traditional trait approach and the social-cognitive approach to 
personality is that the trait approach is a “having” as opposed to a “doing” 
approach. 2 They explain that trait theory understands personality as a sum of 
traits that one has, with different individuals having different distributions of 
each trait. For example, the classic Five Factor Model of traits rates people on five 
different personality dimensions: neuroticism, agreeableness, open-mindedness, 
extraversion, and conscientiousness.3 The underlying assumption of the Five 
Factor model is that everyone has these traits to some degree and the degrees to 
which the individual has each of the traits collectively make up his personality.  
While traditional trait theory illustrates the “having” side of personality, 
social-cognitive theory illustrates the “doing” side of personality. The social-
cognitive approach “emphasizes what people do when they construe their social 
landscape and how they transform and interpret it.”4 Lapsley and Narvaez argue 
                                                   
1 Daniel Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez, Moral Development, Self, and Identity (Mahwah: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 193. 
 
2 For full discussion see: Lapsley and Narvaez, Moral Development, 189.  
 
3 See Rebecca Shiner and Avshalom Caspi, “Personality Development,” in Child and 
Adolescent Development, eds. William Damon and Richard Lerner (New York: Wiley, 
2008): 181-215.  
 
4 Shiner and Caspi, “Personality Development,” 195. 
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that one of the problems of traditional trait theory is that it overlooks the 
“complex pattern of coherence that individuals display in response to changing 
contextual circumstances.”5 According to social-cognitive theorists, “coherence is 
evident in the dynamic, reciprocal interaction among the dispositions, interests, 
capacities, and potentialities of the agent.”6 Behavioral consistency is not 
measured by merely observing whether an agent behaves similarly across 
different types of situations, but rather by taking into account the interaction of 
the psychological factors of an agent with features of his situation.  
The idea behind social cognitive theory is similar to the idea from PF that 
how an individual responds to a situation is dependent on his construal of that 
situation. The agent may be behaving consistently with his particular character 
traits from his own point of view, even if not from ours. We may still be able to 
observe a pattern in the interaction between particular situational features and 
the agent’s individual psychological factors that is stable over time, even if this 
pattern would not show up as strict behavioral consistency across different types 
of situations. Instead, behavioral consistency would be dependent on the pairing 
of certain situational factors with an agent’s particular psychological factors so 
that “changes on one side of the interaction invariably induce a cascade of 
consequences on the other side.”7  
According to psychologists Daniel Cervone and Ritu Tripathi, the reason 
that certain personality structures like the Five Factor Model seem to be based on 
unreasonable assumptions about the consistency of traits is that these kinds of 
                                                                                                                                           
 
5 Shiner and Caspi, “Personality Development,” 194. 
 
6 Ibid., 194 
 
7 Lapsley and Narvaez, Moral Development, 193. 
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personality frameworks are useful for finding personality differences between 
individuals, not for finding an enduring personal framework of a single 
individual.8 Cervone and Tripathi define two types of personality structures: one 
is “a mental entity possessed enduringly by an individual” that takes on form, 
content, or functioning and varies from individual to individual, while the other 
is a model of interindividual differences in a population.9 The latter structure is a 
conceptual system for organizing differences between people. The Five-Factor 
model is the latter kind of personality structure.10 
According to Cervone and Tripathi, for each of the personality structures 
there is a class of research: one class charts “interindividual differences in typical 
behavioral dispositions,” the other class is an “exploration of intrapsychic 
cognitive and affective systems that underlie the coherence of psychological 
experience and social behavior.”11 The first type of research seeks to find 
“dispositional variables that function to describe between person differences in 
typical behavioral tendencies,” while the second is after “intrapsychic variables 
that serve to model features of mental life or “personality architecture.”12 In other 
words, personality researchers are conducting two different types of personality 
research to meet two different purposes. One type of personality research seeks to 
chart the actual psychological factors of a particular individual, while the other is 
                                                   
8 Daniel Cervone and Ritu Tripathi, Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations 
in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009: 30-51. 
 
9 Cervone and Tripathi, Personality, Identity, and Character, 32. 
 
10 Cervone and Tripathi, Personality, Identity, and Character, 32. 
 
11 Cervone and Tripathi, Personality, Identity, and Character, 33. 
 
12 Cervone and Tripathi, Personality, Identity, and Character, 33. 
 182
concerned with finding differences in psychological factors among different 
individuals. 
Personality research that is merely charting the personality differences 
between individuals provides data for trait theory. Personality structures 
modeled after the trait model are not suited for the explanation or prediction of 
individual behavior as that is not the primary purpose of these sorts of 
frameworks. For example, in a sample of five people, it is likely that among the 
five of them there will be variance on the degree to which each of them is 
compassionate. Even if two or more of them have a similar degree of compassion, 
this only indicates one variable or trait in a larger personality structure. Merely 
knowing a person’s average rating on a trait like compassion does not give us any 
information on when that person is likely to act compassionately. A personality 
structure like the Five Factor model might merely tell us that compared with his 
peers Smith is compassionate. However, that tells us nothing about when Smith 
will act compassionately. If social-cognitive theory and the argument from 
psychological factors are correct, then we would have to map out Smith’s beliefs, 
values, and goals in order to be able to predict on what particular occasions Smith 
will act compassionately. A personality structure like the Five Factor model is 
simply not useful for predicting or explaining Smith’s behavior. In order to 
explain or attempt to predict when Smith will behave compassionately, one 
would have to look at the second kind of personality structure, the kind that 
studies the interaction of psychological variables responsible for human behavior.  
Social-cognitive theory is the latter sort of personality structure and is 
thus better suited for the explanation and prediction of behavior than traditional 
trait theory. Moreover, social-cognitive theory provides a framework for the type 
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of character traits described by proponents of the argument from psychological 
factors because social-cognitive theorists also maintain that “having” a certain 
trait, like compassion for example, does not necessarily result in uniform 
compassionate behavior across all situations. Rather, whether an agent displays 
certain behavior relevant to a particular trait depends on the interaction of an 
agent’s individual psychological structure with his environment.  
If the traditional conception of character in philosophical discourse has a 
framework akin to trait theories like the Five Factor Model, then it has a type of 
personality structure that is not useful for the explanation or prediction of 
behavior. If the traditional conception of character is similar to trait theory, then 
it is useful for picking out differences between individuals on a particular trait but 
not for being able to predict or explain a single instance of a behavior in a 
particular situation.  
 
Social Cognitive Theory 
A conception of character based in social-cognitive theory is better suited 
to help predict and explain individual behaviors because research using the social 
cognitive approach charts the interaction of situational features and the 
individual psychological factors of an agent. Neither personality frameworks like 
the Five-Factor Model nor merely looking at the situation alone can help us 
explain and predict human behavior.13 Instead, PF, the strongest argument 
against the situationist critique, points us toward the intersection of the person 
and the situation. That is, it points us toward taking into consideration how 
certain variables like the psychological dispositions mentioned in Chapter 4 
                                                   
13 See my argument for this in the previous chapter. 
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interact with a situation to produce certain behaviors. This is also the view of 
social-cognitive theorists in social psychology.14 
According to the social cognitive view of personality, if different situations 
acquire different meanings for the same individual, then the kinds of 
expectations, beliefs,  goals, and behavioral scripts that are likely to become 
activated in relation to particular situations will vary. Therefore, there is no 
theoretical reason to expect the individual to display similar behavior in different 
psychological situations unless the situations are functionally equivalent in 
meaning to that individual.15 Expecting an individual to display similar behavior 
in two different situations because they have trait x is not taking into account 
some variables internal to the individual that might affect what he interprets the 
correct response to be in that situation.   
For example, suppose that Smith is very friendly to the people in his 
office. He has worked at that office for many years and he knows and talks to 
everyone there. When he arrives there in the morning, he greets everyone and 
often converses with his co-workers throughout the day. He is easy to talk to and 
approachable and shows no signs of shyness or introversion. Should we expect 
him to behave in a friendly manner no matter what situation he encounters? 
According to social-cognitive theory, we should not. We should only predict that 
                                                   
14 See Walter Mischel, “The Interaction of Person and Situation,” in Personality at the 
Crossroads: Current Issues in Interactional Psychology, ed. David Magnusson and 
Norman Endler (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1977): 333-352; Walter Mischel, “Toward an 
Integrative Science of the Person,” Annual Reviews in Psychology 55 (2004): 1-22; 
Cervone and Tripathi, Personality, Identity, and Character, 30-51; Darcia Narvaez and 
Daniel K. Lapsley, eds., Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral 
Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009); and Albert Bandura, “Social Cognitive 
Theory of Moral Thought and Action,” in Handbook of Moral Behavior and 
Development, eds. William Kurtines, Jacob Gewirtz, and Jacob Lamb (Hillsdale: 
Erlbaum, 1991): 45-103. 
 
15 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 5. 
 185 
Smith will behave similarly in situations that have a “functionally equivalent” 
meaning for him (i.e., situations that Smith perceives as very similar). Outside of 
that, we can make no predictions and expect no behavioral consistency because 
Smith’s response to a situation depends largely on how he interprets that 
situation, and his interpretation of the situation will depend in part on the 
interaction of the features of that situation with his construal, goals, beliefs and 
other features of his psychology.  
As noted in Chapter 4, the observation that individuals adapt their 
behavior to the situation seems obviously true. If on his way home, Smith cuts 
through an alley and a mugger holds him up at gunpoint for his wallet, we would 
not expect Smith to act in a friendly manner toward his assailant. However, we 
might be a bit surprised if we saw Smith at a party and noticed that he failed to 
display his characteristic friendliness, instead being introverted and shy.  
Using the social-cognitive approach to personality, we might figure out 
why Smith behaves shyly at parties and friendly at the office. Perhaps Smith is 
naturally introverted as well as friendly. Since he already knows everyone at the 
office and feels comfortable there, he acts friendly toward his coworkers whereas 
at a party where he doesn’t know many people, he might feel too shy to speak to 
anyone. If we knew the cause of Smith’s shyness at the party versus his 
friendliness at the office, we could probably generalize some of Smith’s traits and 
make some predictions about Smith’s behavior in situations where he is 
acquainted with everyone versus situations in which he does not know people 
very well.  
As I argued in Chapter 4, if we were to use the situationist model of local 
traits to describe Smith all we would learn is that Smith has two apparently 
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unconnected traits “shy at parties” and “friendly at the office” without any 
explanation as to why Smith behaves this way. On the other hand, if we merely 
assigned a trait like “shy” or “friendly” to Smith, not only would neither of these 
traits fully capture Smith’s character we would also be at a loss to explain his shy 
or friendly behavior in one situation versus another. 
 
Walter Mischel and the CAPS model 
 Psychologist Walter Mischel was one of the first people to endorse a move 
to the social-cognitive model of traits after his survey of theoretical approaches in 
personality psychology revealed a startling lack of cross-situational behavioral 
consistency. Rather than concluding that individuals showed no behavioral 
consistency, Mischel argued that “behavioral consistency is found by 
incorporating the situation into the search of invariance rather than removing 
it.”16 Mischel also disagrees with the situationist move to local traits, arguing that 
we cannot look to the situation alone in order to find behavioral consistency 
anymore than we can look to the agent’s behavior alone without reference to the 
context in which the behavior is enacted.  
Instead of focusing on either overt behavior or situational features as 
behavioral determinants, Mischel proposes a model that focuses on “the 
underlying psychological processes that might lead people to interpret the 
meanings of situations in their characteristic ways, and that could link their 
resulting specific, distinctive patterns of behavior to particular types of 
conditions and situations in potentially predictable ways.”17 Mischel contends 
                                                   
16 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 13. 
 
17 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 4.  
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that “the route to finding the invariance in personality requires taking account of 
the situation and its meaning for the individual, and may be seen in the stable 
interactions and interplay between them.”18  
Once we understand the psychological processes underlying the agent’s 
behavior we are able to make a much more educated guess about that agent’s 
behavior in the future. Thus, a focus on the psychological factors of the agent 
could lead to greater understanding of that agent’s behavior as well as a 
heightened ability to predict that agent’s behavior in future circumstances. If, for 
example, we are to understand why Smith is shy at parties but friendly at the 
office we need not look merely at the situation and how it appears to us but need 
to try to understand the situation from Smith’s point of view. What is Smith’s 
construal of the situation? Just as importantly, why does Smith construe the 
situation this way? What are the factors of the situation that lead to Smith 
construing it one way versus another? Mischel calls factors of situations that lead 
agents to perceive a situation in a particular way the “psychologically active 
ingredients” of a situation. Psychologically active ingredients are “features of a 
situation that have significant meaning for a given individual or type, and that are 
related to the experienced psychological situation—the thoughts and affects and 
goals that become activated within the personality system.”19  
                                                                                                                                           
Mischel points out that other people, or our relationships with other people are also 
considered “situations.” For example, according to Mischel “in close relationships, one 
person’s behavioral output becomes the other person’s situational input, and vice versa, 
forming a dyadic system. To the degree that each partner’s personality is characterized by 
a stable if…then…behavioral signature, it becomes possible to model the interactions 
between them, and to predict the “personality” of the interpersonal system they form, 
characterized by its own distinctive relationship signature and dynamics.” 
 
18 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 5. 
 
19 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 15. 
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Mischel called his social cognitive framework of personality the 
“Cognitive-Affective Processing System” (or CAPS). CAPS is supposed to help 
with the explanation and prediction of individual behaviors of a single agent. 
According to Mischel’s CAPS theory, patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behavior 
are all part of personality, as well as “how the person construes (encodes, and 
appraises) situations (including people and the self) and the beliefs, expectancies, 
goals, and self-regulatory competencies that became activated within the 
individual in the continuous stream of interactions with situations.”20 Mischel 
refers to all of these psychological processes under the collective title of cognitive 
affective units (CAU’s).  
Mischel argues that there are essentially five types of CAU’s: encodings, 
expectancies and beliefs, affects, goals and values, and competencies and self-
regulatory competencies. Different individuals will have different CAU’s. 
According to Mischel, as an agent experiences situations that contain different 
psychological features, different “CAU’s and their characteristic 
interrelationships become activated in relation to these features,” so the 
activation of CAU’s changes from one situation to another.21   
Encodings refers to categories or schemas for the self, people, events, and 
psychological and external situations. As discussed in previous chapters, 
depending on the type of experiences that a particular agent has had, he will 
                                                   
20 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 4. Self-regulatory 
competencies refer to control mechanisms that operate in response to social sanctions or 
self-reactive influence. The major self-regulatory mechanism operates through self-
monitoring of conduct, judgment of conduct in relation to personal standards and 
environmental circumstances and affective self-reaction (the emotion an individual feels 
in response his own conduct). (See Albert Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory of Moral 
Thought and Action” in Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development, eds. William 
Kurtines and Jacob Gewirtz (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991), 68. 
 
21 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 11. 
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develop different types of schemas. An agent will often construe future situations 
according to the particular schemas he has formed in the past and this may lead 
to his having a different construal of a situation from other agents who have 
formed different schemas. 
Expectancies and beliefs refer to what an individual expects will be the 
consequences of a particular action. For example, a young child may decide on 
whether to lie to his mother or not depending on what he expects will be the 
outcome. If he expects that she will catch him lying and will make him go without 
dessert that night, he may decide against lying. If for some reason the child did 
not want dessert that night, he may decide to go ahead and lie. Two children with 
similar expectancies (if I lie to my mother, I will not get dessert tonight) may act 
differently if the outcomes they expect have different values for them.  
Affects refers to feelings, emotions, and affective responses (including 
physiological responses). Mischel argues that emotions influence social 
information processing and coping behavior as well as self-regulation and the 
pursuit of long-term goals. Beliefs about the self and one’s personal future are 
emotional as is anything that implies important consequences, harmful or 
beneficial, for the individual. Moreover, affective-evaluative reactions to 
situational features can occur immediately and automatically and these reactions 
may trigger cognitions and behaviors associated with those emotions. The 
particular emotions an agent feels in response to a situation may reflect 
individual differences related to temperamental or biological variables.22 
                                                   
22 Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, “A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of 
Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in 
Personality Structure,” Psychological Review 102, no. 2 (1995): 246-268. 
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Self-regulatory mechanisms help individuals to regulate their own 
behavior by self-imposed standards and self-produced consequences (e.g., guilt, 
remorse, etc.). Self-regulatory mechanisms can also help guide behavior in 
absence of (or opposition to) situational pressures through use of rules and 
plans.23 Rules specify “the kinds of behavior appropriate (or expected) under 
particular conditions” and plans specify the “sequence and organization of 
behavior patterns” that can best help the individual achieve his goals or expected 
outcomes.24 
Using Mischel’s approach, let’s look at my example of Smith who is 
sometimes friendly, sometimes introverted, and try to assess Smith’s character. 
In order to assess his character, we do not merely look at Smith’s behavior in 
different situations and simply make up a laundry list of different local traits that 
Smith possesses. In order to be able to successfully explain and predict Smith’s 
behavior, we have to understand the psychological factors responsible for those 
local traits, such as his construal, beliefs, and goals. We also have to identify the 
“psychological features of situations that play a functional role in the generation 
of behaviors, and that are contained in a wide range of nominal situations” for 
Smith in particular.25 What features of the situation of the office party is Smith 
reacting to when he responds with shyness rather than friendliness? What other 
situations hold these features, thus making it likely that Smith will display similar 
behavior in these situations? The features of situations that a particular agent 
                                                   
23 Walter Mischel, “The Interaction of Person and Situation” in Personality at the 
Crossroads: Current Issues in Interactional Psychology, eds. David Magnusson and 
Norman S. Endler (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977): 333-352. 
 
24 Mischel, “The Interaction of Person and Situation,” 345. 
 
25 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 15. 
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reacts to, as well as how the agent actually reacts to those features, will be 
different from person to person. Two agents in the same situation may experience 
that situation completely differently from one another because of different 
psychological factors. 
If we come to learn that Smith is introverted and that he is only friendly 
when he perceives himself to be in a “safe” situation, where he knows everyone 
and feels less likely to have his friendly overtures rebuffed by individuals in that 
situation, we can predict how Smith will act in other similar situations. Once we 
understand a little more about how Smith interprets situations (his 
interpretations being based on his beliefs, goals, abilities, and other psychological 
factors), then we can expect to be able to predict Smith’s behavior with greater 
accuracy as well as explain his actions in different types of situations of varying 
similarity. Smith’s behavior will show consistency across situations that he 
perceives as having similar situational features. 
Mischel believes that we should phrase character traits as conditionals or, 
as he calls them, “if…then…” situations.26 Trait conditionals are not limited to one 
or two particular situations, but can instead be expanded to refer to a wide array 
of situations. For example, we could state a trait conditional limited to only one 
type of situation (i.e. parties) as, “If Smith is at an office party, then he will be 
friendly” or “if Smith is at a friend’s party, then he will be introverted and shy.” 
However, Mischel is interested in generalizing conditional traits to cover a 
number of different situations in order to show behavioral consistency. For 
example, we might say, “if Smith is in a situation with a group of people he does 
not know, then he will be shy and not say very much,” however, “if Smith is in a 
                                                   
26 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 8. 
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situation with a group of people he knows very well, he will be friendly and 
talkative.” These trait conditionals cover a number of different situations, all of 
which include similar situational features from Smith’s point of view. Trait 
conditionals are limited by “psychological situations” or situations as they are 
construed and appraised by a particular person (which depends on his individual 
CAU’s). If we understand how an agent interprets and appraises situations, we 
may widen the scope of a conditional trait to all situations that the agent 
perceives to have similar features; then, we will see high levels of behavioral 
consistency.  
Mischel believes a collection of “if…then…” conditionals provide a sort of 
“behavioral signature of personality” that identifies an individual and “maps onto 
the impressions that other people have of that person” in the same way that a 
traditional character trait would. For example, two of Smith’s character traits 
would be something like “introverted around strangers” and “friendly and 
talkative with familiars.” Assessing character within a CAPS framework leads to 
the “construction of typologies based on distinctive processing dynamics and 
personality signatures that are linked to the types of situations in which they are 
likely to be expressed.”27 That is, assessing character using the CAPS framework, 
we may begin to notice a number of different individuals with similar trait 
conditionals sharing personality types. For example, individuals who are 
“introverted around strangers but talkative around people they know” or, more 
generally, people who are “anxious in response to social situations” would all 
belong to one personality type. All individuals sharing this personality type would 
have similar CAU’s, thus leading to similar interactions between their CAU’s and 
                                                   
27 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 12. 
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particular situational features, resulting in similar behavior. An agent can belong 
to more than one personality type depending on his CAU’s. So for example, Smith 
may belong to the personality type of people who are “anxious in response to 
social situations” but also the personality type of “kind to strangers” or “generous 
with his friends and loved ones,” etc. 
Conditional traits as postulated by Mischel’s social-cognitive framework 
for personality are similar to local traits in that they are contextualized by 
situation; however, unlike local traits, they are not based in the assumption that 
behavior is purely situationally driven. The reason that an agent’s personality is 
made up of these kinds of conditional traits is not situational factors alone drive 
behavior, but rather because situational factors interact with a person’s goals, 
beliefs, desires, values, and construal to elicit certain behaviors.28 The pattern of 
behavioral variability from one type of situation to another is not entirely 
random. According to Mischel, “if behaviors are stable within each type of 
situation but varied from one type to another” the pattern of the variation should 
be stable and characteristic for each individual.29 Other things being equal then, if 
Smith is friendly and talkative with people he is familiar with but shy and 
introverted with strangers, we should expect him to act accordingly in each type 
of situation in the future.30  
                                                   
28 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 8. 
 
29 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 6. 
 
30 See Nancy Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory 
(New York: Routledge, 2010). One philosopher that argues in favor of the social-
cognitivist tradition in psychology is Nancy Snow, who argues that perhaps the reason 
that cross-situational consistency in behavior is so hard to come by is that we are 
expecting the wrong sort of consistency. Snow argues in favor Walter Mischel and 
Michael Shoda’s conceptualization of personality as a cognitive-affective processing 
system (CAPS) which consists of social-cognitive units like beliefs, desires, feelings, goals, 
expectations, values, and self-regulatory plans.  
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Chronically Accessible Schemas  
Schemas (also known as knowledge structures) are another important 
part of personality structure. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a schema “summarizes 
generic knowledge and previous experience with respect to a given class of 
stimuli and events and, at the same time, gives meaning and guides anticipation 
with respect to similar stimuli and events in the future.”31 An agent can have 
schemas about himself (self-schemas), other people (person schemas), and 
events and situations (scripts). Schemas are a product of an individual’s personal 
history, temperament, and his individual goals and beliefs.  
Psychologists Daniel Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez maintain that since 
schemas are a product of an individual’s CAU’s, and different individuals have 
different schemas, schemas also “demarcate regions of social life and domains of 
personal experience to which the person is especially tuned, and about which he 
or she is likely to become a virtual ‘expert’.”32 Lapsley and Narvaez argue that 
                                                                                                                                           
Snow also believes that there is a possibility for “global” character,” what Doris terms 
“robust” character, or traits that are cross-situationally consistent. She believes that the 
way this is possible is essentially what Robert Adams had hypothesized, that a collection 
of local traits can be aggregated together to form more robust traits. Although Snow 
points out that some local traits may just stay local, if there is nothing to make the agent 
perceive that other situations are similar and call for the same sorts of behavioral 
responses.They will still probably not be so robust as to satisfy Doris’s definition of a 
robust trait, but they will show much more consistency in behavior than taken alone. 
What will bind these traits together will be an agent’s construal of the situations as 
similar, thus calling for similar behavioral responses. Snow argues that what the factors 
that will motivate an agent’s construal are things like the agent’s beliefs or desires, and 
more importantly, their goals.    
 
31 Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, 12.  
See also Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley Eds., Personality, Identity, and 
Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2009) 
Narvaez and Lapsley define schemas as organized schemas that channel and filter social 
perceptions and memory, p. 195.  
 
32 Lapsley and Narvaez, “Social Cognitive Approach” in Moral Development, Self, and 
Identity, 198-200. 
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chronic accessibility of schemas is another “source of individual differences in 
moral functioning.” Accessibility is basically the “activation potential of available 
knowledge;” the more a certain schema is activated or the more recently it is 
primed, the more accessible it should be for “processing social information.”33 
“Chronically accessible” schemas are those schemas that have been activated 
more often and, as a result, they are more easily accessible for activation in future 
cases to the point where activation sometimes even approaches automaticity. 
Lapsley and Narvaez cite a personality structure model by Nancy Cantor in 
support of their theory. 
 According to the model of personality by psychologist Nancy Cantor, two 
of the critical functions of schemas in behavior are to serve “as chronically 
accessible constructs [that] repeatedly direct individuals’ attention selectively to 
certain aspects of life” and to help “individuals develop highly practiced 
procedural routines for doing those tasks in schema-relevant contexts.”34 
Individuals can quickly retrieve “facts” in their domains of expertise and organize 
new information in terms of their schemas. Their familiar schemas provide a 
ready, even automatic plan of action in the life contexts with which they are 
familiar. 
For example, suppose that I have been a student at a university for a few 
years. I have probably formed a schema about classroom experiences at that 
university; I have an idea of what is expected of me, what I should expect from 
others, what my responsibilities are, how to act, how others act, etc. The longer I 
                                                                                                                                           
 
33 Lapsley and Narvaez, “Social-Cognitive Approach,” 200. 
 
34 Nancy Cantor, “From thought to behavior: “Having” and “doing” in the study of 
personality and cognition.” American Psychologist 45 (1990): 735-750. 
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am in school, the more experience I gain about this particular type of situation. 
Eventually I have a great amount of expertise in this type of situation and can 
know what to expect and how to behave immediately upon entering another 
classroom because my “classroom schema” is chronically accessible and thus 
easily activated. Since being a student is a big part of my life, I have developed 
schemas that revolve around that aspect of my life and those schemas in turn 
guide my behavior in future situations relevant to that schema. 
Lapsley and Narvaez argue that a moral person, or a person who has a 
moral character, would be “one for whom moral constructs are chronically 
accessible and easily activated for social information processing.”35 Moral 
categories (which include schemas) that are important for an individual’s self-
identity are more chronically accessible for interpreting situational factors. These 
categories would either be constantly on line or easily primed and easily 
activated. Once activated, these constructs would dispose the individual to 
interpret his situation according to his or her moral commitments. Thus, an 
individual for whom moral commitments are central to his self-identity would be 
more likely to construe his situation using moral schemas and scripts that reflect 
his moral commitments.  
This argument by Lapsley and Narvaez complements a model of moral 
character proposed by psychologist Augusto Blasi. Blasi theorizes that willpower, 
a moral will, responsibility, and integrity are the necessary requirements of moral 
character. 
 
                                                   
35 Lapsley and Narvaez, “Social-Cognitive Approach,” Moral Development, Self, and 
Identity, 200. 
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Moral Identity and Moral Behavior 
Augusto Blasi’s Model of Moral Identity 
According to psychologist Augusto Blasi, an individual’s global self-
identity (i.e. how an individual views his own identity as a whole) includes a 
number of different self-concepts (also referred to as identities by Blasi) or beliefs 
and ideas about the self.36 An individual can have a number of self-concepts 
corresponding to different domains or goals and values in his life. For example, I 
may have a self-concept about my role as a sister, another about my role as a 
friend, another about my role as a moral person, or as a compassionate or just 
person, etc.  
Blasi reiterates that one’s global self-identity is “not just a collection of 
traits, attitudes, or percepts, but refers to the way these characteristics are 
ordered and organized and to that narrow area of functioning that is 
apprehended as “deep, ” “central,” and essential.”37 Some self-concepts are more 
central or important in an individual’s view of his identity as a whole, and 
behaving opposed to a self-concept that is central to one’s global self-identity can 
result in feelings of betrayal of one’s self or feelings of loss of identity. So for 
example, if I feel that being a moral person is important to my global self-
identity, behaving in a way that is opposed to morality can result in feelings of 
betrayal or feelings loss of identity. If being moral is an important part of who I 
am but I do not behave like a moral person, then who am I? 
                                                   
36 To make things a bit clearer, I will use the term “self-concept” to refer to one facet of 
a global self-identity, “moral identity” or “moral self-concept” to refer to a moral facet of a 
global self-identity, and “global self-identity” to refer to the more global construct. 
 
37 Augusto Blasi, “Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Theoretical Perspective.” 
Developmental Review 3, no. 2 (1983): 200. 
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Blasi called a self-concept about one’s view of oneself as a moral person a 
“moral identity.” There are different types of moral identities and different 
individuals may value their moral identity as either more or less important than 
other self-concepts. Blasi argues that agents that exhibit cross-situational 
behavioral consistency usually value their moral identity as an important part of 
their global self-identity and have developed a moral will, willpower, 
responsibility, and integrity. In order to distinguish the general self-concept of a 
moral identity from a moral identity that is central to the agent’s self-identity, I 
will refer to the general self-concept of one’s morality as a “moral identity” and 
will refer to agents whose moral identity has become central his global self-
identity as having “high centrality of moral identity.” According to Blasi’s theory 
of moral identity, an agent that has an undivided moral will, responsibility, and 
integrity will have a higher centrality of moral identity and if the agent has also 
developed willpower, he will be more likely to display greater behavioral 
consistency across situations requiring moral behavior. 
 Moral will refers to a “deep, central, affective and motivational orientation 
toward morality.”38 According to Blasi, the will brings an agent’s desires under 
the domain of his agency, including both first and second-order desires. 
Following philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt, Blasi defined second order desires as 
a desire “that a desire one already has be effective in producing action,” for 
example, a desire that one’s desire to behave consistently with one’s commitment 
to compassion is actualized. Developing a moral will means that an agent has 
                                                   
38 Augusto Blasi, “Moral Character: A Psychological Approach,” in Character 
Psychology and Character Education, eds. Daniel Lapsley and Clark Power (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 67-100. 
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made moral desires especially his own because he identifies his self-identity with 
moral desires.  
 Blasi argues that the will is often fragmented, depending on the desires 
that an agent has. The will is structured around desires, so if an agent does not 
have a “wholehearted commitment” to the moral good, the will may be divided. 
For example, if an agent has desires to get ahead in his career as well as desires to 
be just and fair and those desires at some point come into conflict, that agent’s 
will is divided. Depending on which desires are more important to the agent, or 
even just which desires become salient in a particular situation (which can be 
affected by situational features), the agent may behave morally or self-
interestedly. Only an agent with a fully (undivided) moral will has a wholehearted 
commitment to the moral good and has no conflicting desires (or conflicting 
desires strong enough to overwhelm moral desires). Moreover, an agent with an 
undivided moral will “so identifies with his or her [moral] commitments, 
cherished values and ideals” that he or she will construct around them the sense 
of a central, essential self.39 Since the agent has an undivided commitment to the 
moral good, the agent’s moral self-concept then becomes central for that agent’s 
self-identity. 
Different individuals may choose different moral values around which to 
structure their will and center their sense of self. For example, some agents may 
structure their will around the values of justice and equality, while others may 
structure it around compassion and empathy. For this reason, moral identity can 
vary in content; that is, whereas one person may see being compassionate as 
central to his moral identity, another may feel that being just or fair is what is 
                                                   
39 Blasi, “Moral Character,” 92. 
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important to his moral identity. The moral identity of each agent can be unique 
depending on the moral traits emphasized by the agent.  
Blasi discusses two different forms of integrity: integrity of identity and 
integrity of responsibility. Blasi refers to both components as “integrity” but I 
refer to these two components as “integrity” and “responsibility” respectively in 
order to distinguish them.  
Integrity is not specifically a moral virtue; it is a result of conscious 
concern and intentional care to avoid contradictions between things we say and 
do and those commitments on which our sense of self was constructed, no matter 
what those commitments.40 Integrity refers to a person’s serious concern for “the 
unity of his or her subjective sense of self, as manifested in consistency with one’s 
chosen commitments.”41 Agents with moral commitments are not the only agents 
that can have integrity. An agent who cherishes misanthropic values and 
commitments and who has constructed his self-identity around these values can 
also have integrity as long as he is concerned about avoiding contradictions 
between his behavior and his values. For example, if he believes in harming 
people, then he will intentionally avoid helping people. 
An agent with moral integrity is an agent that has structured his will and 
sense of self around moral values and has serious concern for behaving 
consistently with his moral will. If an agent has invested and identified himself 
with particular desires and he cares about behaving consistently with those 
desires, he is motivated to behave consistently with those desires not only for the 
sake of the desire itself, but because going against the desire would feel like a 
                                                   
40 Blasi, “Moral Character,” 90. 
 
41 Augusto Blasi, “Moral Character: A Psychological Approach,” in Character 
Psychology and Character Education, eds. Daniel Lapsley and Clark Power (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 67-100. 
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betrayal or even a loss of identity. According to Blasi, integrity provides the agent 
with extra moral motivation in case the agent’s moral will on its own is not 
enough to motivate the agent to behave morally. 
According to Blasi, responsibility is when an agent makes himself (as 
opposed to others or outside circumstances) responsible for ensuring that his 
moral commitments and his behavior are consistent. An agent that has developed 
responsibility feels that he is personally responsible for maintaining his moral 
integrity. Responsibility is often expressed through “notions of obligation and 
necessity: I must, I have to.”42 For example, if a responsible agent sees a person in 
need of food or water he will not assume that someone else can provide the 
person with food and water, he will provide the food and water himself. After all, 
even if one formulates a judgment that a particular action in the correct one in a 
certain situation, it is a different matter whether one feels that it is up to them to 
undertake that action. Blasi writes that when a “person cares about morality to 
the point of wanting that his or her moral desires be effective not only in the 
present situation, but also in the future, the person makes himself or herself 
responsible for actualizing his or her moral desires.” 43  
Responsibility and integrity are very closely linked. If an agent has 
constructed his sense of self around certain values and behaving inconsistently 
with those values will result in feelings of loss of identity or betrayal, then it is 
likely that the agent will make himself responsible for ensuring that he behaves 
consistently with those values. Moral integrity provides extra motivation to 
behave consistently with one’s moral will and responsibility provides the agent 
                                                   
42 Blasi, “Moral Character,” 92. 
 
43 Blasi, “Moral Functioning,” 342. 
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with the belief that it is up to him to ensure that he behave consistently with his 
moral commitments. Like integrity, responsibility is not necessarily a moral 
virtue as it can be felt about all types of commitments. 
Willpower is essentially a type of self-control, a result of “interlocking 
skills, mainly cognitive in nature.”44 Willpower is “composed of those dispositions 
that play an instrumental role in sustaining effective behavior.”45 Some of these 
dispositions are the ability to break down goals into plans, delay gratification, 
exercise impulse control, keep one’s attention focused, distance oneself from the 
concrete present, persevere in the face of adversity, keep distant goals in mind, 
monitor one’s action and its outcomes, and engage in effective role taking and 
information processing (among others). Will power can be used for both moral 
and non-moral purposes but Blasi argues that it is necessary in order for an agent 
to behave consistently with his moral commitments. It is debatable whether an 
agent with an undivided moral will actually needs willpower in order to behave 
consistently with his desires (as he has no competing desires) but an agent with a 
fragmented moral will does need to have willpower to behave consistently with 
his commitments and resist temptation from situational features or other goals or 
values. 
Blasi refers to these components as separate components because an 
agent can have willpower, integrity, and responsibility without necessarily caring 
about morality. An agent may have a moral identity that includes moral will, 
integrity, and responsibility yet he may lack the willpower to make his behavior 
consistent with his moral commitments. An agent may also have moral desires 
                                                   
44 Blasi, “Moral Character,” 74. 
 
45 Daniel Lapsley, Moral Psychology (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 229. 
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that are not as central to his sense of self as other desires and so may have a 
fragmented moral will with only partial integrity and responsibility for those 
moral commitments. For example, an agent may desire to be compassionate but 
perhaps does not see being compassionate as an essential part of himself (or has 
a competing desire that prevents him from exercising compassion) so he lacks 
integrity and only occasionally feels responsible for ensuring that he behaves 
compassionately. However, it is unlikely that an agent with a moral will that is 
undivided will lack moral integrity and it is unlikely that an agent who has moral 
integrity will lack moral responsibility. Having an undivided moral will seems to 
make it more likely than an agent will develop at least some integrity and 
responsibility, making his moral identity central to his sense of self. If that agent 
also develops willpower, he is morel likely to display cross-situational behavioral 
consistency. 
Moral understanding also plays a large role in Blasi’s model of global self-
identity. According to Blasi, moral actions are “responses to situations as 
interpreted according to moral reasoning.”46 That is, one responds to a moral 
situation in part depending on one’s moral knowledge or understanding. Blasi 
does not believe that agents necessarily consciously deliberate their moral 
actions, instead moral understanding can be a “nature-like part of one’s 
personality, affecting action, especially in more common instances, directly and 
habitually.”47 An agent can employ his moral knowledge or understanding when 
making a decision about how to behave without doing so consciously, particularly 
when the situation is one with which the agent is familiar. Blasi also argues that 
                                                   
46 Blasi, “Moral Cognition and Moral Action,” 196. 
 
47 Blasi, “Moral Cognition and Moral Action,” 196. 
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moral understanding plays a part when one is determining whether one is 
responsible for performing a particular action, specifically in relation to one’s 
global self-identity. This will depend on what self-concepts are central to the self. 
Agents with moral character or whose moral identity is central to their sense of 
self will probably feel greater responsibility for behaving morally (consistently 
with their moral values and commitments) than others whose moral identity is 
not as important in their global self-identity. 
 
Blasi’s Model and Social-Cognitive Theory 
 According to social-cognitive theory, how an agent reacts in a situation 
depends in part on the psychological features of that particular agent, (following 
Mischel) specifically the agent’s encodings, expectancies and beliefs, affects, goals 
and values, and self-regulatory competencies and plans. Different agents will 
react differently to the same situation depending on the interaction of the 
situational factors in that situation and the agent’s CAU’s.  
According to Blasi’s theory, in order for an agent to behave consistently 
with moral values, some of the goals and values that an agent must have are 
moral goals and values. Moreover, an agent must have the belief that those moral 
values and goals are central (to some extent) to his concept of self-identity. The 
agent must also have a goal of behaving consistently with those goals and values 
and must believe he is responsible for behaving consistently with those goals and 
values. Finally, he has to develop some skills (necessary for willpower) to ensure 
that he is effective at behaving consistently with his goals and values.  
Mapped out according to Mischel’s social-cognitive theory, a moral agent 
must have certain encodings, expectancies and beliefs, affects, goals and values, 
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and self-regulatory competencies. An agent with a moral will has emotions, goals, 
and values consistent with the moral good. An agent with an undivided moral 
will, will also come believe that his moral identity is central to his sense of self. If 
he develops integrity (as it is likely if he has an undivided moral will) and the 
expectancy that if he behaves inconsistently with his moral will, if he does behave 
inconsistently, he will feel as if he has betrayed his self-identity or even lost some 
part of his identity. He must also have the belief that he is personally responsible 
for ensuring that he behaves consistently with his moral will. An agent with high 
centrality of moral identity that develops certain self-regulatory competencies, or 
willpower, will be more likely to behave consistently with his moral will across 
situations.  
Blasi does not mention the role of emotion in his model of moral identity 
except to mention that the moral will is a deep affective and motivational 
orientation toward morality. According to Mischel, emotions influence social 
information processing and reactions can occur immediately and automatically, 
triggering cognitions and behaviors associated with those emotions. The 
emotions of an agent with a moral will are already oriented toward morality so 
the emotions that influence social information processing and reactions should 
be emotions oriented toward morality.  
This brings us back to chronically accessible schemas. Agents with moral 
commitments will also be more likely to concern themselves with moral behavior 
in different types of situations and thus form chronically accessible moral 
schemas. Agents with a high centrality of moral identity will be more likely to 
notice the morally relevant details of a situation because moral schemas are more 
chronically accessible (or easily primed) for them. Having chronically accessible 
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moral schemas will in turn affect how an agent will construe situations in which 
he finds himself in the future, reinforcing the moral schemas the agent has 
already developed. 
Mischel also mentions that emotions can affect coping behavior, self-
regulation, and the pursuit of long-term goals. This seems to refer to both 
positive and negatively valenced emotions. For example, fear of embarrassment 
or confrontation may keep Jones from standing up for a cause he believes in. 
Although Blasi does not address this problem directly, following his theory, an 
agent with a divided moral will may succumb to temptation or other motives 
generated by other self-concepts the agent has. However, an agent with an 
undivided moral will is likelier to have developed integrity and responsibility, 
which should give the agent extra motivation (beyond being motivated by his 
beliefs, goals and values, and moral will) to behave morally. Agents also need to 
develop willpower to help them be more likely to behave consistently to their 
moral commitments even in the face of competing pressures. 
 
Evidence for Blasi’s Theory of Moral Identity 
Moral Exemplars 
According to Blasi, individuals who have high centrality of moral identity 
are more likely to behave consistently with their moral commitments. Moral 
exemplars might be an example of individuals with high centrality of moral 
identity. Kyle Matsuba and Lawrence Walker’s study in 2005 might be a case in 
point. Matsuba and Walker defined a moral exemplar as “a person who has 
shown extraordinary moral commitment” and conducted a study on young moral 
exemplars between the ages of 18-30 with the purpose of determining what 
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motivated these individuals. They contacted a diverse number of organizations 
ranging from health, to social, to human and animal rights organizations and 
asked them to nominate people who fit the description of a moral exemplar. They 
then interviewed 40 moral exemplars and 40 comparison individuals in a 2hr life 
narrative interview.48  
The life narratives of the moral exemplars revealed both a higher 
centrality of moral identity (measured by the degree to which a person adopts a 
particular identity as a basis for his or her self-definition) and a greater sense of 
personal responsibility than the 40 “comparison” individuals. Moral exemplars’ 
life narratives had greater awareness of the suffering of others in childhood, more 
empowerment themes, more sacrificial redemptive experiences (experiences 
where they had had to make sacrifices so that others could benefit), and greater 
ideological depth and emphasis on future goals that focused on the betterment of 
society. Matsuba and Walker found that not only were moral exemplars currently 
more involved in prosocial activities, they planned on continued involvement in 
prosocial activities in their community.  
Having greater ideological depth means that personal beliefs and values 
are more central to their self-identity, and moral exemplars value the betterment 
of society and have the belief that it is a worthy cause. For moral exemplars, the 
beliefs and values central to their self-identity are moral beliefs and values; this 
seems to imply that their moral identity is an important part of their self-identity. 
According to Blasi, agents with high centrality of moral identity often develop the 
belief that they have to behave consistently with the values and commitments 
important to their self-identity (what Blasi termed “integrity”) and this in turn 
                                                   
48 Differences were most evident in life-narrative data, suggesting greater sensitivity of 
life-story approach for this type of study. 
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often leads to the development of feelings of personal responsibility. The moral 
exemplars in Matsuba and Walker’s study exhibited a greater sense of personal 
responsibility for trying to better society. Once the exemplars had constructed 
their self-identity around moral values, they developed feelings of integrity and 
responsibility.  
This was not an isolated study. In 2007, psychologists Lawrence Walker 
and Jeremy Frimer did a study on adult moral exemplars typifying either brave 
or caring personalities. The participants in this study were recipients of a national 
award in Canada for either the Medal of Bravery or Caring Canadian Award (both 
civilian awards). Walker and Frimer interviewed 25 brave exemplars, 25 caring 
exemplars, and a matched comparison group of 50 who matched the exemplars 
on gender, ethnicity, education and age and who were drawn from the general 
community. The participants filled out a number of questionnaires and 
interviewed with the experimenters for 2 hours.49 Using a typology developed by 
psychologist Dan McAdams, Walker and Frimer focused on themes of agency and 
communion.50 According to McAdams, agency encompasses a “wide range of 
motivational ideas, including the concepts of strength, power, expansion, 
mastery, control, dominance, achievement, autonomy, separation, and 
independence.”51 Self-mastery refers to the individual striving to master or 
control the self. Communion refers to motivational ideas concerning 
                                                   
49 Participants responded to the Revised Interpersonal Adjective Scales and Personal 
Strivings List questionnaire, as well as the two-hour interview adapted from a life-review 
protocol developed by McAdams. 
 
50 See Dan McAdams, “What Do We Know When We Know a Person?” Journal of 
Personality 63 (1995): 365-396. 
 
51 Dan McAdams, Barry Hoffman, Elizabeth Mansfield, and Rodney Day. “Themes of 
agency and communion in significant autobiographical scenes,” Journal of Personality 
64 (1996): 339-377. See p. 346. 
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interpersonal connections such as “love, friendship, intimacy, sharing, belonging, 
affiliation, merger, union, care, and nurturance.” McAdams wrote that at its 
heart, communion involved “different people coming together in warm, close, 
caring, and communicative relationships.”52 
Walker and Frimer found that as a group, moral exemplars tended to have 
stronger motivational themes of both agency and communion. Walker and 
Frimer concluded that the agency themes probably reflected the fact that their 
actions required control (willpower), awareness of the self as agent, and a 
willingness to assume responsibility in the pursuit of one’s goals, reflecting a 
greater sense of personal responsibility. The communal aspects on the other 
hand, may have indicated the exemplars’ focus on helping others, reflecting the 
importance of moral desires for the exemplars. While both groups of exemplars 
scored high on these motivational themes in their life-narratives, the caring 
exemplars scored higher in communal themes than did the brave exemplars. 
 
Centrality of Moral Identity and Moral Motivation 
Psychologists Karl Aquino, Americus Reed, Dan Freeman, and Vivien Lim 
conducted a number of studies created to test the relationship between moral 
identity, situational factors, and moral behavior and to explain how situational 
factors and high centrality of moral identity can jointly influence moral 
behavior.53 Aquino et al. argue that the claim that situational factors influence 
behavior is one of the “foundational assumptions of social psychology.”54  
                                                   
52 McAdams et al., “Themes of Agency and Communion,” 346. 
 
53 Karl Aquino, Americus Reed II, Dan Freeman, and Vivien K. G. Lim, “Testing a 
Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behavior: the Interactive Influence of Situations and 
Moral Identity Centrality,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97, no.1 
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Aquino et al. based their studies around Blasi’s moral identity model. 
Since centrality of moral identity is measured by the degree to which a person 
sees his moral identity as a basis for his or her self-definition, the greater the 
centrality of the identity, the higher the extent to which a knowledge structure 
tends to be readily accessible for processing and acting on information. Aquino et 
al. argue that their studies can show how centrality of moral identity can 
moderate the influence of situational factors on moral behavior. 
Aquino et al. base their studies on three assumptions. The first 
assumption is that moral identity is a powerful source of moral motivation 
because people generally desire to maintain self-consistency; thus, someone 
whose self-identity is organized around moral traits or characteristics should be 
motivated to behave in a moral manner to maintain this self-identity.55 The 
second assumption is that people balance multiple facets of their identities of 
which only a subset, known as the “working self-identity,” can be held in 
consciousness at any given time. Consequently, the influence of any single facet 
of identity, including an individual’s moral identity, will be a function of how 
accessible that facet of identity is in any given situation. The third and final 
assumption is that situational factors may active a person’s moral identity, just as 
they may also activate alternative facets of identity.  
Aquino et al. define moral identity as the cognitive schema a person holds 
about his or her moral character that is stored in memory as a complex 
knowledge structure consisting of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral 
                                                                                                                                           
(2009): 123-141. Aquino et al., 2009, p. 124, define moral behavior as “actions that 
demonstrate social responsiveness to the needs and interests of others.” 
 
54 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 123. 
 
55 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 124. 
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scripts. Since agents acquire knowledge structures through life experiences, and 
experiences vary from person to person, the centrality or importance of moral 
identity for an agent’s overall self-identity also differs from person to person. 
Following Blasi’s model, Aquino et al. also postulate that for individuals for 
whom moral identity occupies greater centrality within the global self-identity, 
being a moral person is perceived as more self-definitional relative to other self-
concepts and so is activated more strongly and more frequently than other self-
concepts. Aquino et al.’s model assumes that when moral identity is activated it is 
likelier to influence moral behavior. However, situational factors can affect which 
self-concept is activated and thus which self-concept will have more influence on 
moral behavior. 
In order to test this hypothesis, Aquino et al. decided to examine the joint 
influence of 1) situational factors that activate or prime moral identity and 2) 
centrality of moral identity on the intentions of participants to perform a moral 
behavior. A major assumption of Aquino et al.’s model is the idea that prosocial 
or benevolent goals are incompatible with self-interested or financial 
achievement goals. This suggests that the simultaneous activation of the moral 
identity and a self-interested facet of identity within the working self-identity 
might produce conflict in the individual. In order to alleviate this state, people 
could deactivate one of the incompatible facets of identity.  
Moreover, because for people with high centrality of moral identity, moral 
identity is already active within the working self-identity, Aquino et al. 
hypothesized that the effects of situational factors priming moral identity (i.e. 
situational factors that activate moral identity by making it salient in the working 
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self-concept) should be stronger for individuals for whom moral identity has low 
centrality. 
Aquino et al. examined how trying to recall and then review a list of the 
Ten Commandments (the moral prime) would influence participants’ willingness 
to initiate a cause-related marketing program that would benefit others at 
personal cost. The participants were ninety-two undergraduate business students 
from the University of Delaware who participated for course credit. The study 
consisted of two parts: an online survey containing a measure of centrality of 
moral identity (among other demographic measures) taken at least twenty-four 
hours prior to participation in the experiment, and an in-lab priming experiment. 
For the in-lab priming experiment the participants had to complete the following 
study tasks: (a) general knowledge items, (b) measures of the current accessibility 
of moral identity within the working self-identity, (c) measures of intention to 
enact a moral behavior, and (d) demographic items. 56  The only difference 
between the control condition and the prime condition was that participants in 
the control condition just had to list the five largest cities in the United States, 
while the ones in the moral prime condition also had to list as many of the Ten 
Commandments as they could remember.57  
                                                   
56 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 124. In order to measure moral 
identity, Aquino et al. used Aquino and Reed’s Internalization subscale. This subscale 
consists of a list of characteristics that are supposed to capture lay construals of a moral 
prototype. The participants are asked to think about someone who possesses these traits 
and then are asked how they feel about those characteristics in relation to themselves. 
The participants were then asked to rank five items listed in terms of how closely those 
items were descriptive of them at the time that they were filling out the survey. These 
items consisted of a variety of identities that might be relevant to a student sample and 
included “a moral person,” “a student,” “a successful person,” “a family member,” and “an 
independent person” with the item of interest being “a moral person.” 
 
57 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 127, write that “the use of the Ten 
Commandments as a moral prime was based on the notion that thinking about the moral 
principles associated with the commandments should activate morally relevant 
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Finally, experimenters presented the participants with the following 
scenario: 
Please imagine that you are the brand manager for a 
breakfast cereal company. Recently, you were approached 
by the American Cancer Society (ACS) to initiate a cause-
related marketing program. Specifically, ACS would like 
you to donate 25 cents to a special fund for cancer 
prevention each time one of your products is purchased. 
According to your research department, adoption of the 
program is likely to cost more than it earns through an 
incremental sales increase. Consequently, if you choose to 
initiate the program, you would be less likely to earn a 
year-end bonus.58 
 
The scenario is set up with two competing motives: one moral and the other self-
interested. If the brand manager initiates the program, he will be doing the moral 
thing because his company will be donating 25 cents every time a product is 
purchased to a worthy cause. On the self-interested side, perhaps it would be wise 
to initiate the program because other companies that have initiated cause-related 
marketing have sold more products, thus making more profit (or at least breaking 
even). However, the research department has discovered that there are likely to 
be more sales of the product in the future, which means your company will be 
donating more money over time (since the agreement is that the company will 
donate money every time a product is purchased). If the company continues to 
sell more products, eventually the company will be paying out more money than 
it is earning in profits. You may keep this from the head of the company in order 
to initiate the cause-related marketing and do a good deed, but eventually when it 
is noticed that the program costs more than it earns you will feel the 
consequences of this bad business decision by not receiving a year-end bonus. 
                                                                                                                                           
knowledge structures in memory, including the moral self-schema, thereby increasing the 
accessibility of moral identity within the working self-identity.”  
 
58 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 128. 
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Participants were asked how likely they would be to choose to initiate the 
marketing program and how likely they would be to initiate cause-related 
programs in general.  
The effect of the moral prime was stronger on people who had reported 
having a moral identity that was relatively low in centrality than it was for people 
whose moral identities were high in centrality. Aquino et al. explain that this is 
because for the former group, their moral identities were less likely to be 
accessible within their working self-identity in absence of moral primes.  
The reverse also held true in Aquino et al.’s second study, where they used 
the financial incentive of $100 (a self-interest prime) to entice the participants to 
act in a deceptive manner in order to receive the money. Aquino et al. believe 
these primes work by making different identities (moral or self-interested) more 
salient and thus more likely to influence behavior.59 Aquino et al. found that 
consistent with their predictions, all participants in the financial incentive 
condition exhibited a lower level of current accessibility of moral identity than 
did participants in the control condition. This held true for both participants with 
low and high centrality of moral identity. The decreased accessibility of moral 
identity appeared to have resulted from an increase in the accessibility of self-
interested facets of identity as, “the average ranking of the clever and pragmatic 
options provided by [financial] incentive participants was significantly higher 
than the average ranking provided by [control] participants.” Thus, the presence 
of a financial incentive appears to have increased the accessibility of self-
                                                   
59 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 138. 
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interested facets of identity while also decreasing the accessibility of moral 
identity.60 
Whereas in the second study subjects were merely asked about their 
intention to behave deceptively in order to receive money, in the third study the 
subjects actually had to negotiate a job salary and engage (or not) in deceptive 
behavior in order to earn from 50 to 150 dollars. In the third study, the 
manipulation varied depending on the amount of money the subject could earn. 
The experimenters randomly assigned two subjects to the role of either job 
candidate or manager. To create a situation in which participants playing the 
manager’s role would have an opportunity to lie, the instructions for the 
candidate’s role explicitly stated that job stability was an important issue for the 
candidate and that they should not accept any salary offer from the manager 
unless they received a verbal guarantee from the manager that they would remain 
at the same job for at least 2 years. The instructions for the candidate also 
indicated that the candidate should ask the manager a question regarding job 
stability at the beginning of the negotiation prior to discussing starting salary. 
This feature of the simulation forced managers to decide whether to lie about the 
fact that the job the candidate was applying for would be definitely eliminated in 
6 months.61 
The results of Study 3 were similar to the results of Study 2. The presence 
of a self-interest-promoting situational factor like a financial incentive increased 
people’s willingness to lie to another person during an actual negotiation, i.e., it 
decreased the current accessibility of moral identity within the working self-
                                                   
60 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 130. 
 
61 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 132. 
 
 216 
concept. Moreover, this effect was more pronounced for participants with higher 
as opposed to lower centrality of moral identity (see Figure 2) even though their 
moral performance was better than those with low-centrality of identity. For 
subjects with lower centrality of moral identity, the financial incentive made little 
difference. The number of subjects who engaged in deceptive behavior in the 
control condition versus the financial incentive condition was similar whereas for 
the subjects with high centrality of moral identity there was a larger variation in 
the numbers between the control condition versus the financial incentive 
condition.62  
 
Figure 2 Number of subjects who lied in experimental versus control condition. 
Source: Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 132. 
 
In Aquino et al.’s final study, the subjects were thirty-three undergraduate 
business students from the University of Washington. At least 24 hours before 
                                                   
62 Aquino et al., “Testing a Social-Cognitive Model,” 134 coded concealing the truth and 
not answering as somewhat better than lying although not as good as telling the truth. 
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their experimental session, the subjects had to fill out an online survey including 
measures of centrality of identity. For the second part of the session, 
experimenters randomly assigned participants to either the moral prime or 
control group. Both groups completed what experimenters claimed was a writing 
task. Experimenters gave the participants a matrix that contained nine words 
(each of which subjects had to write four times) listed in the first column; in the 
moral prime condition, the words reflected moral traits whereas in the control 
condition, the words denoted household items. Afterwards, subjects had to 
complete a task that included making a series of investment decisions. On each 
decision trial, every member in a single condition would have to decide whether 
to allocate 10 points to either a “joint” account or a “personal” account. The 
points in the personal account would earn no interest but would not be shared, 
while the points in the joint account would earn interest but would be distributed 
equally among all members in the condition. Participants had to make 20 
decisions divided into five trial blocks. After participants had made decisions 
during the first trial block, they were informed that most of the other members in 
their group had opted to invest in the personal account. Subjects were told that 
this was the case after each trial block.  
Results showed that subjects with lower centrality of moral identity who 
completed the moral priming task initially cooperated more often compared to 
participants in the control condition. However, as subjects continued to receive 
feedback about the sustained selfish behavior of other group members, only 
participants with higher centrality of moral identity reacted to the moral prime in 
a way that sustained their cooperation in the face of others defection, whereas the 
moral prime did not have a significant impact on continued cooperation in the 
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face of others defection for subjects with a lower centrality of moral identity (see 
Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Mean levels of cooperation across trials. Source: Aquino et al., “Testing a 
Social-Cognitive Model,” 137. 
 
Subjects with high centrality of moral identity initially exhibited higher 
levels of cooperative behavior but feedback about the selfish behavior of others 
quickly reduced their level of cooperation. Subjects with lower centrality of moral 
identity exposed to the moral prime exhibited a similar pattern. Only subjects 
with a high centrality of moral identity exposed to a moral prime sustained 
cooperative behavior in the face of selfish behavior from others.  
Aquino et al.’s study shows a clear relationship between moral identity 
and moral behavior. Subjects with higher centrality of moral identity were more 
likely to behave morally than were subjects with lower centrality of moral 
identity. Moreover, through the use of moral priming, moral identity (or other 
self-concepts) can be made salient in the working self-concept and thus more 
likely to influence behavior. Finally, Aquino et al.’s fourth study is evidence for 
the claim from social-cognitive theory that psychological factors and situational 
features interact to motivate and produce behavior. In this case, the self-concept 
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of moral identity interacted with the situational feature of feedback about the 
selfishness of others in one’s group to produce a particular behavioral response. 
 
Moral Identity and Behavioral Inconsistency 
How can someone endorsing Blasi’s model explain the lack of cross-
situational behavioral consistency exhibited by most individuals? Is endorsing 
Blasi’s model tantamount to asserting that few people care about morality?  
Blasi argued that agents with high centrality of moral identity were more 
likely to display behavioral consistency. Having high centrality of moral identity 
is correlated with having an undivided moral will, integrity, and responsibility. 
An agent also needs to have developed willpower and have some kind of moral 
knowledge. Each of these components requires a number of skills and/or 
psychological features. Lacking any of these, an agent may fail to behave 
consistently morally across a number of different situations. Some agents may 
have low-centrality of moral identity, valuing other things over moral values and 
defining their self-identity according to those things they value. An agent might 
lack a strong sense of integrity of responsibility and not feel responsible for 
making his behavior consistent with his moral values or he may lack any of the 
skills necessary for willpower. Even some agents that care about behaving 
consistently with their moral commitments may deceive themselves into 
believing they are behaving consistently with their moral values if they lack moral 
knowledge.  
One of the components of Blasi’s model is integrity, the need for self-
consistency, a powerful motivator for most people. Failing to act in accordance 
with one’s values is to act opposed to one’s self-identity; the more important 
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those values are, the more an action opposed to those values will result in having 
to update one’s self-identity, resulting in feelings of loss of identity.63 
Psychologists William Swann, Christine Chang-Schneider, and Katie McClarty 
point out that individuals are more apt to resist changing beliefs about the 
elements of their self-identity that they perceive as highly important to their self-
identity. Moreover, most individuals seek evaluations that confirm their self-
identity (even if the self-identity is negative) and resist challenging feedback that 
tells them they are not the kind of persons they believe themselves to be.64 
Individuals can be motivated to maintain their self-identity by external as well as 
                                                   
63 Blasi, “Moral functioning.” See also Albert Bandura, Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian 
Vittorio Caprara, and Concetta Pastorelli,  “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the 
Exercise of Moral Agency,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 2 
(1996): 364-374; Daniel Batson, Diane Kobrynowicz, Jessica Dinnerstein, Hannah 
Kampf, and Angela Wilson, “In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72, no. 6 (1997): 1335-1348; William 
Swann Jr., Christine Chang-Schneider, and Katie Larsen McClarty, “Do People’s Self-
Views matter? Self-identity and self-esteem in everyday life. American Psychologist 62, 
no. 2 (2007): 84-94; Kristen Monroe Renwick, “Morality and a Sense of Self: the 
Importance of Identity and Categorization for Moral Action,” Journal of Political Science 
45, no. 3 (2001): 491-507; and James Detert, Linda Klebe Trevino, and Vicki L. Sweitzer, 
“Moral disengagement in Ethical Decision Making: a Study of Antecedents and 
Outcomes,” Journal of Applied Psychology 93, no. 2 (2008): 374-391. 
See also David Bersoff, “Why Good People Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated 
Reasoning and Unethical Behavior,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25, 
(1999): 28-39. 
David Bersoff postulated that failure to live up to one’s self-identity (or at least one 
aspect of one’s self-identity), either in the eyes of others or in one’s own eyes leads to 
diminished self-esteem particularly if that self-identity is highly important. This would 
mean that for someone with high moral identity centrality, maintaining a view of oneself 
as a moral person would not only be very important, it would be vital to the maintenance 
of one’s self-esteem.  According to Bersoff, “maintenance of self-esteem or self-worth has 
been characterized as being among the strongest and most persistent of human goals” (p. 
28).  
While this has clear implications for people whose moral identity is of central 
importance, Bersoff believes that maintenance of self-esteem includes “sustaining a 
phenomenal experience of oneself as being moral, good, and stable” not just in the case of 
people with high moral identity centrality but in general. Although presumably it would 
be of higher importance to people whose moral identity is more central to their self-
identity. (Bersoff, “Why Good People,” 24).  
 
64Swann Jr. et al., “Do People’s Self-view’s Matter?”  86. 
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internal sanctions.65 Individuals are motivated to maintain their self-identity not 
only in the eyes of others but also in their own eyes. 
However, if self-identity is so important to people and a moral identity is 
at least of some importance to most people, how do we explain how some people 
freely choose to adopt unethical courses of action because of small situational 
influences, many times without any apparent resulting guilt or remorse?  
Below, I argue that we do not have to accept the claim that most people 
simply do not care about morality at all because there are a number of 
psychological mechanisms that may explain how an individual can fail to exhibit 
cross-situational behavioral consistency in regards to various moral values while 
still valuing moral values to some extent.  
 
Derailing Moral Identity 
Motivated Cognition 
One way that an agent can deceive himself into thinking he is not 
behaving contrary to his moral identity is through motivated cognition. 
According to psychologist David Bersoff, “a redefinition or distorted construal of 
an unethical action as being morally acceptable often precedes and fosters 
decisions to act in an unethical manner among people.”66 This is known as 
“motivated reasoning” or “motivated cognition.” There are a number of 
mechanisms that can explain how an averagely moral individual (or even an 
                                                   
65 See Bersoff, “Why Good People”; David Bersoff, “Explaining Unethical Behavior 
Among People Motivated to Act Prosocially. Journal of Moral Education 28, no. 4 
(1999): 414-428; Batson et al., “In a Very Different Voice”; Swann et al., “Do People’s 
Self-Views Matter?” 
66 Bersoff, "Explaining Unethical Behavior,” 414. The definition that Bersoff gives of 
construal is: “the process in which general moral values are brought to bear on specific 
situations,” e.g. self-interest vs. moral values. 
 
 222
individual with somewhat high centrality of moral identity) can use motivated 
cognition to commit unethical actions without updating his self-identity.  
 
Neutralization 
One type of motivated cognition is “neutralization,” or rationalizing one’s 
unethical behavior as situationally appropriate.67 An agent erroneously 
characterizes his actions as being in accord with his moral identity. There are a 
number of different strategies that an agent can use to neutralize an unethical 
action such as denying personal responsibility, denying that any harm has been 
done, or denying that there is even a victim.   
Bersoff conducted a study to see whether people could be “vaccinated” 
against neutralization-like reasoning by making moral features of the situation 
more salient. The study consisted of 120 college age participants who were 
promised a fee of $6.25 for their participation in a psychology experiment 
purportedly about cognition. However, when the participants went to receive 
their money, the individual handing out the money gave them $8.25 instead. 
Bersoff was interested in seeing how many people would return the money and 
under what conditions. 
In the control condition, the subjects did a number of tasks measuring 
memory and learning. In the other five conditions, subjects received what Bersoff 
termed “antineutralization manipulations.” In one condition, participants were 
encouraged to criticize someone else for using neutralizations to justify a 
completely unrelated action outside the moral domain. This was to induce the 
                                                   
67 He takes this terminology from studies on delinquent youths such as Gresham Sykes 
and David Matza’s, “Techniques of Neutralization,” American Sociological Review 41, no. 
5 (1957): 664-670. 
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“would-be neutralizers to judge and criticize arguments similar to those they 
might have been tempted to use themselves, [so that] they should have had a 
more difficult time using versions of these same neutralizations to justify their 
own action.” In this condition, between the tasks measuring memory and 
learning the experimenters claimed a distraction task was needed to see if the 
subjects’ memory and learning was increased in the second round versus the first 
round. The distraction task consisted of a short vignette about a man and woman 
who worked in the same office. The woman had a crush on a man who obviously 
had no interest in her. Participants had to evaluate five rationalizations the 
woman used to justify her belief in the man’s interest in her despite the evidence 
to the contrary. In the second condition, experimenters told subjects that the 
money they were receiving was being paid out of pocket by a graduate student 
conducting the research. In the third condition, the individual handing out the 
money asked the subject if they had received the correct amount instead of just 
laying out the money on the counter.   
Bersoff found that as experimenters increased the antineutralization 
manipulations one at time, the more likely were people to point out the 
overpayment. Bersoff proposed that this was because the participants were free 
to use motivated cognition in the control condition, but each of the 
manipulations made it harder to construct and accept biased moral acceptable 
characterizations of keeping the money.68  
 
                                                   
68 Bersoff, “Why Good People,” 50. Bersoff also points out at the end of the article that 
another possible for the participants being less and less likely to not point out the 
overpayment might be that the antineutralizations themselves made the act of not 
pointing out the overpayment more objectively unethical. However, he points out this 
could be evidence of motivated cognition. Perhaps it is harder to perform motivated 
cognition the more objectively unethical an act becomes. 
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Categorization  
Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely conducted another study on 
motivated reasoning that showed similar results. Mazar et al. referred to the type 
of motivated reasoning they were studying as “categorization.” According to 
Mazar et al., categorization works when people categorize their actions into more 
compatible terms (often non-moral terms) in order to find rationalizations for 
their actions. For example, if I behave in a way that goes against my moral 
commitments, I may categorize that action as falling under the social domain 
(social rules) instead of under the moral domain. Using categorization, people 
can perform actions they wouldn’t ordinarily consider moral, such as cheating, 
while avoiding any negative self-signals that might affect their self-identity 
negatively.69  
According to Mazar et al., two aspects of categorization determine when 
an individual can and cannot use it to rationalize their action: its malleability and 
its limit. Behaviors that have malleable categorization are those that allow people 
to reinterpret them in a self-serving manner. How malleable the categorization 
for a certain behavior is depends on the context. Mazar et al. give the example of 
stealing a pencil worth $.10 from a friend, versus stealing $.10 out of a friend’s 
wallet. The former offers more possibilities to categorize the action in non-moral 
terms such as terms of friendship like, “He’s my friend, this is something friends 
do,” whereas the latter does not. Mazar et al. argue that the higher the 
malleability, the easier it is to be dishonest without updating the self-identity. 
Moreover, some actions may be inherently less malleable than others are and 
                                                   
69 Because Bersoff’s definition of neutralization is so broad (rationalizing one’s behavior 
as situationally appropriate) categorization may in fact be the same mechanism as 
neutralization, or one of many possible mechanisms an individual can use to achieve 
neutralization. 
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cannot be easily categorized, while others still cannot be categorized at all. This is 
where the idea that categorization has an inherent limit comes in, the idea that 
one can only “stretch the truth” so far. While this mechanism may help in 
categorizing minor transgressions of morality, it probably would not be useful for 
larger transgressions.70  
Mazar et al. also postulated there is another mechanism that might 
counteract agents categorizing their non-moral actions into more acceptable 
terms: how much attention people pay to their own standards of conduct. If 
people are attentive to their own moral standards, their moral identity is more 
likely to be salient in their working self-identity (as defined by Aquino and Reed 
above, this is the subset of self-concepts held in consciousness at any one time) 
than if they are inattentive to their moral standards. When their moral identity is 
salient in their working self-concept, people are more likely to update their global 
self-identity (particularly their moral identity) in response to their actions.  
If people are reminded of their own standards of morality (activating the 
moral identity), then they are less likely to act out of self-interested or other 
motives because their self-interested identity is not salient. Individuals whose 
will includes both moral and self-interested desires may be more susceptible to 
this type of reasoning as there are competing desires within their will. Self-
interested self-concepts may be activated and self-interested motives made 
salient over moral motives. However, perhaps people with high centrality of 
moral identity may be less likely simply to categorize actions inconsistent with 
their moral commitments into more acceptable terms than the general 
                                                   
70 See Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely, “The Dishonesty of Honest People: a 
Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance,” American Marketing Association 45, (2008): 633-
644. 
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population because they have an undivided moral will that includes less (or no) 
competing desires and a moral identity that is more often salient in their working 
self-identity. 
 
Moral Disengagement 
Psychologist Albert Bandura agrees with the idea that people get 
themselves to behave according to their moral standards by anticipating positive 
or negative self-reactions but also argues that these reactions do not influence 
behavior if not they are not activated in the first place. If acting callously towards 
someone usually results in a negative self-reaction, the negative self-reaction 
provides the agent with some motivation not to behave callously. However, if 
there is a psychological mechanism that can help me behave callously toward 
someone without generating a negative-self reaction, I may behave callously after 
all. Moreover, the processes Bandura cites by which self-sanctions can be 
disengaged can result in unethical behavior ranging from the mundane bad 
behavior to very injurious behavior including the murder or torture of others.  
Bandura describes seven different mechanisms through which 
disengagement from negative self-reactions can be achieved: moral justification, 
euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison, attribution of blame, 
dehumanization, disregarding or distorting of consequences and displacement or 
diffusion of responsibility. Moral justification is a process of reconstruing harm 
to others in ways that make it appear morally justifiable, while euphemistic or 
morally neutral language is used to make reprehensible conduct seem less 
harmful or even benign; for example, killing civilians in a war being referred to as 
“collateral damage” or lying to business competitors being called “strategic 
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misrepresentation.” Using advantageous comparison, an individual will compare 
an unethical behavior to even more harmful conduct, thus making the original 
behavior seem acceptable. With displacement of responsibility, people view their 
actions as springing from social pressures or the dictates of others rather than 
something for which they are personally responsible. When individuals disregard 
or distort consequences or harmful effects of actions, they avoid facing the harm 
they cause or simply minimize it. Dehumanization involves making victims seem 
bestial or less than human and attribution of blame means blaming victims for 
harm that befalls them.71  
Bandura assumes that all of these mechanisms of moral disengagement 
work by disengaging self-sanctions. It is possible that processes of moral 
disengagement work by making other aspects of identity (such as self-interested 
aspects of identity) salient while suppressing moral identity. The mechanisms 
themselves can sometimes be triggered or, at least, their use facilitated by various 
situational factors.  
It is not clear whether some individuals are more likely to use moral 
disengagement mechanisms than others, however, it is possible that individuals 
that lack personal responsibility, integrity, or an undivided moral will may be 
more likely to use moral disengagement. Lacking personal responsibility, an 
agent may blame others for his failure to behave consistent with his moral 
commitments. An agent may also act out of other competing motives (instead of 
moral motives) if he has a fragmented moral will that includes competing self-
concepts. Finally, an agent may lack the schemas to tell him how to behave 
consistently with his moral commitments in a particular situation. This may be 
                                                   
71 See Bandura et al., “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” and Detert et al., “Moral 
Disengagement in Ethical Decision Making.” 
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due to lack of experience with a particular situation or simply a failure to realize 
that he is engaging in self-denial and not behaving consistently with his moral 
commitments, which may be due to a failure to reason about how to behave 
consistently with one’s moral commitments, a failure in moral understanding.  
 
Moral Hypocrisy 
According to Blasi’s theory, an individual can care somewhat about 
morality without necessarily caring too deeply about it. Blasi claimed that 
depending on an agent’s values, goals, beliefs, etc., moral values might be more or 
less important to that agent’s self-identity. Not all agents that care about morality 
care deeply about it and have a high centrality of moral identity. Some agents 
may value moral goals less than others do and may not believe that morality is as 
central to their self-identity as others do. How much one cares about morality, 
and thus centrality of identity, comes in degrees.  
Some agents may only care about appearing moral (in their own eyes and 
the eyes of others) without really being so. This may be because their moral 
commitments are not central to their global self-identity and so they are merely 
preoccupied with keeping up the appearance of being moral for other reasons. 
Psychologist Daniel Batson and a group of his colleagues were interested 
in discovering how often people were motivated to act morally because of moral 
considerations. They wanted to discover whether it was moral hypocrisy or moral 
integrity that was really motivating moral behavior. Moral hypocrisy occurs when 
an agent convinces himself and others that he is serving principle while actually 
 229
serving himself.72 Moral hypocrisy sometimes involves only the deception of 
others, while in other cases it involves self-deception as well.  
For this study, 80 female general psychology students at University of 
Kansas were divided across three studies. After filling out questionnaires with 
measures on justice and relationship-care perspectives and measures of personal 
responsibility, the subjects were assigned to three studies. In all three studies, the 
subjects received a written statement telling them to assign a task for themselves 
and one other person in the study whom they would never actually meet.  
In the control task, the subjects were not given any instructions on how to 
assign the tasks. Most subjects assigned a positive consequences task to 
themselves and a neutral consequences task to the other person despite only one 
person saying that this was the most moral way to assign the tasks. For the 
positive consequences task, the subject would receive a raffle ticket for each 
correct response while for the neutral consequences task they would not. 
Moreover, the experimenters told the subjects that most people found the neutral 
consequences task boring.  
In the first variation, experimenters included a coin and an explicit 
statement that most participants believe that flipping a coin was the most 
moral/fair way to give each person an equal chance at the positive consequences 
task. This measure was supposed to bring out the moral nature of the situation 
and provide participants the opportunity to appear moral without necessarily 
being so. Experimenters found that ten flipped the coin and ten did not. Of the 
ten that flipped, only one assigned the positive consequences task to the other 
person, suggesting people’s self-interest still won out. Despite this, six of the 
                                                   
72 Batson et al., “In a Very Different Voice,” 1336. 
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people who did not flip said flipping the coin was most morally right and only one 
person said assigning oneself the positive consequences task was most moral.  
In the last variation, another paragraph was added to the statement, 
informing participants that they could also choose to accept the experimenter’s 
assignment of the tasks. Experimenters randomly assigned some participants the 
positive consequences task (assigned positive condition), and others the neutral 
consequences task (assigned neutral condition). The subjects could accept or 
reject the experimenter’s assignment. If the subject rejected the assignment, he 
could assign himself and the other subject whatever he wanted or flip a coin in 
order to decide how to assign the tasks. Again, this was to bring out the moral 
nature of the situation and provide an opportunity to appear moral without being 
so. In the assigned positive condition, seventeen of the twenty subjects accepted 
the experimenter’s assignment. In the assigned neutral condition, eleven of the 
twenty subjects accepted the assignment, while the other nine subjects rejected 
the assignment. Of those nine subjects, six flipped a coin but still assigned 
themselves the positive consequences task (considering this is more than chance, 
some of them appear to have done so for the sake of continuing to appear moral) 
and three just assigned themselves the positive consequences task. This was 
despite none of the subjects having said that assigning the positive consequences 
task to oneself was the most moral.  
Batson et al. concluded that if one’s ultimate goal is to uphold moral 
principle, then having the opportunity to appear moral without having to incur 
any cost should not affect one’s behavior because the appearance of morality 
without the costly outcome does not reach the goal of upholding moral principle. 
However, if one’s ultimate goal is merely to gain the self-benefit of appearing 
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moral while, if possible, not incurring any personal cost (i.e. moral hypocrisy) 
then having this opportunity should affect one’s behavior. Batson et al. concluded 
that many people may engage in moral hypocrisy (at least, for situations where 
the consequences of not doing the moral thing are trivial).  
Batson et al.’s  results may show that many individuals are in fact only 
interested in merely appearing to behave morally while failing to do so (at least in 
situations where the consequences of not behaving morally are minimal). 
However, it is unclear whether the subjects in this study engaged in self-
deception or merely in deceiving others.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that social cognitive theory provides a better personality 
structure for grounding a normative theory of character that meets the 
requirements of psychological realism because unlike trait theory, social cognitive 
theory is useful for mapping out the psychological structure of particular 
individuals. Walter Mischel’s framework depicts a more realistic conception of 
personality that can help ground such a theory. Mischel proposed a theory of 
personality that incorporates patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behavior, 
construal, and the beliefs, expectancies, goals, and self-regulatory competencies 
that become “activated within the individual in the continuous stream of 
interactions with situations” into the personality framework.73 Rather than trying 
to determine whether the situation or the psychological factors of a particular 
                                                   
73 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” 4. Self-regulatory 
competencies refer to control mechanisms that operate in response to social sanctions or 
self-reactive influence. The major self-regulatory mechanism operates through self-
monitoring of conduct, judgment of conduct in relation to personal standards and 
environmental circumstances and affective self-reaction (the emotion an individual feels 
in response his own conduct). (See Bandura,“Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought,” 
68.) 
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individual determined behavior, Mischel’s framework assumes that behavior 
stems from both, particularly the interaction of individual psychological factors 
with particular situational features. In the next chapter, I outline a theory of 
character grounded in Mischel’s framework for personality. 
Moreover, I also argued that Blasi’s theory of moral identity provides the 
possible necessary components for moral character. Blasi theorized that moral 
identity was just one possible self-concept (among many others) that can become 
activated by situational features. According to Blasi, moral identity requires 
integrity, moral desires, and moral will and a number of skills and psychological 
features make up each of these components. Blasi argues that moral identity 
helps motivate moral behavior. There is evidence for Blasi’s theory in studies on 
moral exemplars, studies on the influence of moral identity on moral behavior, 
and even studies on psychological mechanisms for self-deception. In the next 
chapter, I specify the necessary components of a specifically moral character 
based in Blasi’s theory of moral identity. 
Finally, I argued that in order to support Blasi’s theory of moral identity 
we need not accept the conclusion that few people care about morality although 
we may have to accept the conclusion that few people care deeply about morality. 
There are several psychological mechanisms that agents with lower degrees of 
centrality of moral identity can use to avoid updating their global self-identity 
after behaving in a way opposed to their moral commitments. Moreover, as Blasi 
argued, moral identity is less central to the global self-concept of some 
individuals than it is in others so that moral concerns and commitments are 
simply less likely to motivate the behavior of some individuals compared to 
others. 
 233 
Chapter 7 
NON-IDEAL VIRTUE AND A SCALAR THEORY OF CHARACTER 
 
In this chapter, I formulate a theory of character and a non-ideal theory of 
virtue based mostly in social cognitive conceptions of character. In Chapter 5, I 
argued that the strongest response to the situationist critique comes from the 
argument from psychological factors. However, the argument from psychological 
factors describes a conception of virtue that is no longer quite Aristotelian. In 
Chapter 6, I argued that social cognitive theory provides a better personality 
structure for grounding a normative theory of character that meets the 
requirements of psychological realism. I also argued that Augusto Blasi’s theory 
of moral identity provides us with some of the possible necessary components for 
a theory of virtue. 
In this chapter, I formulate a scalar conception of character grounded in 
social-cognitive theory (particularly Mischel’s CAPS theory) and traditional trait 
theory. I argue that because there are multiple aims in character attribution, a 
theory of character that meets those multiple goals has a place for both trait 
theory and social-cognitive theory.  
I also formulate a theory of virtue grounded in a scalar conception of 
character and based partially on Aristotelian trait theory and partially on Blasi’s 
theory of moral identity. I argue that virtue comes in degrees and that when we 
talk about virtue, we are usually talking about one of two things: virtue that is 
normatively but not empirically adequate and virtue that is both normatively and 
empirically adequate. The first type, ideal virtue, is a description of perfect virtue 
at the highest end of the virtue scale and thus cannot describe the type of virtue 
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that imperfect agents actually have. The second type, non-ideal virtue, is a 
description of virtue somewhere between the high and low end of the virtue scale 
that is imperfect and somewhat frail to circumstance and luck but is a more 
accurate description of the type of virtue that agents actually have. 
 
A Scalar Conception of Character 
Social-cognitive theory and Trait Theory 
Psychologists have lately contrasted the social-cognitive model of 
personality to the trait model of personality. As I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the trait model of personality measures individuals on different 
personality dimensions, usually as compared to other people, while the social-
cognitive model of personality charts the particular personality structures of an 
individual as defined by the interaction of the individual’s psychological factors 
with his environment.  
However, psychologists Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill argue that these 
two approaches might be complementary and mutually informative, as well as 
capable of integration.1 Each approach to personality seems best suited for a 
different goal. Trait theory seems useful for studying the differences in traits 
between individuals. For example, trait theory would be useful for determining 
how compassionate Matt is when compared to Alan. This might tell me whether 
Matt or Alan is more likely to act compassionately in any given situation, 
although my estimation of which of the two men is more likely to display 
compassion is based on mere probability. If I find that Alan is generally more 
                                                   
1 Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill, “The Development of the Moral Personality,” in 
Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology, eds. Darcia 
Narvaez and Daniel Lapsley (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), 185-213. 
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compassionate, I might guess that Alan is more likely than Matt to act 
compassionately in a particular situation. However, if I am interested in making 
an accurate prediction about Alan’s compassionate behavior in a particular 
situation, I have to know more about his particular personality structure, not just 
how he compares to others. Following social-cognitive theory, I would have to 
know a little about Alan’s CAU’s. Why does Alan construe situations the way he 
does? What sort of situational factors usually activate his sense of compassion? 
Trait theory is not useful for accurate prediction of behavior or even for 
understanding the particular behavior of an individual. Trait theory gives us a 
general picture of the personality of an individual, while social-cognitive theory 
maps out the particular details of an individual’s personality. 
 
The Goals of Character Attribution 
 Just as there are multiple aims in personality theory, if we reflect on the 
goals of character attribution, we realize there are multiple aims in character 
attribution. Some of the traditional aims of character attribution are the 
explanation and prediction of behavior, communication and collection of 
information, and moral appraisal and judgment. 
One of the aims of character attribution is explanation and prediction of 
behavior. For example, if I want to explain why Matt acts the way he does, I may 
turn to his character for an explanation. Suppose I notice that Matt never goes 
out to lunch with his coworkers. Perhaps, I have also noticed that Matt speaks 
very quietly and seems to embarrass quickly. He rarely speaks to his coworkers 
unless spoken to yet he generally seems considerate and kind. I conclude that 
Matt is not arrogant or antisocial but merely shy. If one of Matt’s coworkers were 
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to ask me why Matt never eats lunch with anyone, I may cite one of Matt’s 
character traits as an explanation. Moreover, if I have known Matt a long time 
and know that he is somewhat shy, I may be able to make some predictions about 
his behavior in future situations. 
We also use character attribution to divulge and collect information about 
others. In the previous example, I communicated Matt’s shyness to one of his 
coworkers as an explanation of his behavior. His coworker in turn is collecting 
information from me about Matt, perhaps not just in order to understand him 
better, but also so that she can decide how to act towards Matt in the future. 
Perhaps Matt’s coworker in interested in pursuing a friendship with Matt but will 
decide whether to do so based on the information she learns about Matt. 
Finally, we also use character attribution for the purposes of moral 
appraisal and judgment. If I say of Alan that he is kind, then I am attributing a 
certain type of moral character trait to him that entails certain expectations about 
how Alan will think and behave. Character traits are generally defined and 
restricted by a particular set of beliefs, values, and behaviors. The range of 
acceptable behavioral or psychological dispositions may widen or narrow 
depending on the particular trait in question, but for every trait there are 
psychological dispositions and behaviors that fall outside the acceptable range. 
For example, if I have attributed a character trait of kindness to Alan, I do not 
expect that he would kick small animals or refrain from giving someone thirsty 
something to drink for his own amusement.  
Considering we use character attributions to satisfy a number of different 
aims, the structure of character should reflect the different aims of character 
attribution. Above I named three different aims that fit roughly into two 
 237
categories, prescriptive and descriptive. The primary intent of explanation, 
prediction, and communication and collection of information is to give or receive 
a description of someone’s character. Meanwhile, limitations on the types of 
psychological and behavioral dispositions that characterize a particular trait are 
implied in evaluation and judgment. 
I propose a scalar structure of character that satisfies both the descriptive 
and prescriptive aims of character attribution by including both conditional and 
Aristotelian (or robust) traits that reflect the social-cognitive and trait approaches 
from personality theory.2 Conditional traits are mostly useful for fulfilling the 
descriptive aims of character attribution. Robust traits are useful for fulfilling 
prescriptive aims of character attribution as well as some cases of communication 
and collection of information.  
 
Robust traits 
Robust traits track the trait theory approach in personality theory and are 
useful for defining and limiting the types of behaviors, beliefs, values, goals, 
motivations, etc., that fall within the purview of a particular trait for the purposes 
of moral appraisal and judgment or when making broad character descriptions in 
conversation. 
Robust traits provide a paradigmatic framework against which to evaluate 
conditional traits. A robust trait is cross-situationally consistent and includes all 
the definitive characteristics of a particular trait. So for example, the definition of 
a robust trait of compassion might be something like: the psychological and 
behavioral disposition to perform beneficent actions in each and every situation 
                                                   
2 Although I am borrowing John Doris’s term “robust traits,” my definition of robust 
traits is not exactly the same as Doris’s. 
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in which beneficent actions should be performed. This description includes 
having CAU’s consistent with compassion, moral understanding, an undivided 
moral will, integrity, and responsibility. So for example, a person possessing a 
robust trait of compassion would have goals  and values consistent with 
compassion, would have emotions and affective responses consistent with 
compassion (likely sympathy and/or empathy), would understand what 
compassion required of him in each and every situation, would believe and expect 
that his actions would be effectual and would benefit other people, would have 
the self-regulatory mechanisms necessary to go through with his decision to 
behave compassionate, etc. The robust trait of compassion sets the standard for 
the ideal psychological and behavioral dispositions of an agent possessing that 
particular trait to the highest degree. A robust trait of compassion is a model of 
the psychological and behavioral dispositions of an agent possessing a perfect 
trait of compassion. An agent possessing a robust trait would never fail to act 
compassionately (and/or would never fail to have the right sort of psychological 
dispositions relevant to compassion) in all situations in which compassion was 
required. Obviously, the consistency requirements of psychological and 
behavioral dispositions relevant to compassion are extremely high, improbable 
for most agents.  
However, robust traits are merely ideal models setting a standard for the 
perfect possession of a trait, not an accurate description of the character traits of 
actual agents. For comparison, in trait theory in psychology, trait theorists do not 
expect that subjects will score one hundred percent in any of the traits that are 
usually measured. As mentioned earlier, the assumption of trait theory is that 
everyone has every (or most) trait(s) and an individual personality is made up of 
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the degrees to which an individual has each of the traits. Robust traits merely set 
the high standard against which actual performance is measured.  
There is a difference between what robust traits actually are and the way 
in which we use the language of robust traits. Although robust traits refer to the 
highest degree possible of a particular trait, in common parlance, we also use the 
language of robust traits when communicating appraisal or judgment of 
character. For example, I may claim that my friend Alan is compassionate, 
making a judgment about his character. I am saying that Alan has the type of 
psychological or behavioral dispositions that characterize the trait of compassion.  
Considering the definition given above of robust traits and the fact that we 
often seem to use robust character traits to describe people, does that mean that 
when we attribute a certain character trait to an agent we are claiming that the 
agent possesses a robust character trait? When I attribute a particular trait to an 
agent, do I believe they will never fail to have the correct psychological and 
behavioral dispositions that characterize that trait? If I call Matt “friendly,” do I 
mean that he is friendly on every occasion and would never fail to be friendly? 
Surely not. As it is often said, humans are not perfect. Instead, I am making a sort 
of judgment about the likelihood of that Matt will be friendly or that Alan will be 
compassionate. I am claiming that they are more likely than not to behave 
according to the trait I use to describe them. Perhaps I make this judgment as a 
sort of comparison such as “Alan is compassionate when compared to other 
people” or “on the whole, Alan is more compassionate than others.”3 
                                                   
3 Moreover, when I make a general character appraisal such as “Alan has a good 
character,” I would usually justify that appraisal in terms of the types of traits that Alan 
possesses (and whether those traits are positively or negatively valenced). For example, if 
I say of an agent that he has “good character” or is a “good person,” I may justify this 
general appraisal of the agent’s character by giving a list of positively valenced traits such 
as compassion, kindness, bravery, etc. If I were to describe Alan as lazy, mean, or petty, I 
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The language of robust traits provides us with a way to give a broader 
description about the behavioral dispositions of a particular agent. Robust traits 
are useful when trying to describe how likely an agent is to display behavior 
relevant to some trait x in a situation that elicits x relevant behavior or, 
alternately, how likely that agent is to display x relevant behavior in any given 
situation as compared to others in a population. When I describe Matt as being 
“friendly,” I may merely mean that Matt is friendly when compared to other 
people or that he is more likely to be friendly than not. I may be evaluating Matt’s 
possession of the behavioral and psychological dispositions that characterize 
friendliness and making the judgment based on this information of the degree to 
which Matt has the trait of friendliness. Even if I know that Matt is not very 
friendly when in a large group of strangers, I may mean merely that Matt is 
friendlier than others are or that he is friendly most of the time. Perhaps I am 
merely comparing the degree to which Matt possesses the trait when compared to 
other people. Matt seems to possess the trait to a higher degree when compared 
to his peers because he values friendliness and seems to act friendly in a greater 
number of circumstances than his peers do. I may also describe him as such 
merely to save time in my description or even out of a sense of discretion for his 
sake.4  
                                                                                                                                           
would seem to be implying that Alan has a bad character. I rarely describe someone as 
“friendly but only in situations of x, y, and z types.” I merely say of someone that he is 
“friendly” or “compassionate” or “brave.”  
 
4 Philosophers Rachana Kamtekar and Owen Flanagan have argued that trait terms like 
“helpful” or “honest” are economical from the point of view of communication and 
information processing and storage.. See Rachana Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue 
Ethics on the Content of our Character.” Ethics 114, no. 3 (April 2004): 468-9, 478; Owen 
Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1991), 299.  
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The language of robust traits is economical for communication and useful 
for information processing in day-to-day contexts when extra information will 
not be useful. For example, suppose my friend Matt is supposed to come to my 
office to pick me for lunch. While I am waiting for him in the lobby, I run into one 
of my coworkers, Mary, and ask her how she’s doing. When Matt shows up, I 
introduce the two before going off to lunch with Matt. Later, in talking about 
Mary to Matt, I describe her as “helpful” despite being aware that Mary is helpful 
to people she knows but is also rather shy around strangers and not quite as 
helpful in situations with them. When I say, “Mary is helpful,” I am fully aware 
that Mary is not always helpful. I do not suddenly expect that Mary will be 
helpful in situations involving strangers. However, since Mary is helpful for the 
most part, and since it is likely Matt will never see Mary again anyway, there 
seems to be no reason to mention how Mary’s shyness overcomes her helpfulness 
around strangers. Calling Mary helpful is an economical way to communicate 
that Mary is often helpful and has certainly been helpful to me in the past. I do 
not have to go into elaborate details about when Mary acts helpfully and when 
she does not. Moreover, perhaps I feel it unnecessary and indiscreet to tell Matt 
about Mary’s shyness. Since the information will be of no use to him and may be 
embarrassing to Mary, I may withhold that information out of a sense of 
discretion.  
However, since Matt lacks any personal or contextual information, he will 
probably understand “helpful” to mean that Mary is helpful all or most of the 
time. This is the default meaning of the concept. We assume this minimal or 
“default” meaning of trait terms is implied when we lack other information. Since 
Matt understood helpful to mean possessing the robust trait of helpfulness, 
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lacking other information that I withheld, he might be surprised at Mary’s 
behavior if he ever runs into Mary in a situation where her shyness overcomes 
her helpfulness. Matt does not know that Mary is not helpful when she feels shy 
and that she feels shy in particular situations. My robust trait description does 
not help Matt understand why Mary is not helpful in a particular situation. Nor 
would it help him to predict how Mary would act in any single situation where 
helpfulness was required. Because robust trait descriptions are not highly specific 
or accurate, they are not as useful in helping to understand a particular 
individual’s behavioral or psychological dispositions or in helping with the 
prediction of future behavior.  
 
Conditional Traits 
Conditional traits track the social-cognitive approach and are useful for 
compiling (or communicating) a more accurate description of the character of a 
particular agent. Conditional traits can help us explain and predict individual 
behaviors with greater accuracy. Moreover, conditional traits provide us with a 
more accurate description about the behavioral dispositions of a particular agent. 
Whereas robust traits indicate the highest degree of a possible trait that an agent 
can develop, conditional traits indicate that an agent has only developed a 
particular trait to a lesser degree than a robust trait because he has only 
developed part of the components of that trait. 
This approach to character increases our accuracy in predicting the 
behavior of an individual, even in a particular circumstance, by providing us with 
a richer understanding of the goals, beliefs, values, and motivation of that 
particular individual. By understanding the psychological factors and history that 
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contributed to that individual’s particular construal of different situations, we can 
truly come to understand his character. If we understand how an individual 
construes specific situations and what kinds of situational factors activate 
different psychological factors, we can be more successful in predicting how that 
individual will act in a particular situation.  
 However, actually acquiring all the information necessary for this level of 
accuracy in every situation requires a great amount of knowledge of the 
psychological factors of the individual, including how he perceives the world and 
why he perceives the world that way, and this sort of knowledge could take years 
to discover. One could only gain this sort of information about another agent 
through years of friendship or some other close relationship with that agent. At 
the very least, one would need to do a longitudinal study of the individual’s 
behavior to detect patterns in his behavior from situation to situation. While it is 
not impossible to acquire this information, it is more information than one is 
likely to acquire from merely observing the individual’s behavior in one or two 
cases. 
 If we want to map the particular character of a single individual, we would 
use the social-cognitive approach to do so, parceling out conditional traits for a 
particular individual according to psychological situations. So for example, we 
might note that Jones is friendly in situations that he finds familiar (in Jones’s 
case, “familiar” situations are those that he has had experience with before) but 
also withdrawn and unresponsive in situations that he finds unfamiliar. Jones is 
also friendly in situations with small groups of people but not in situations with 
large groups of people. Perhaps Jones lacks courage or social skills, or he only 
believes in being friendly with people he is familiar with, and this hinders him 
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from being friendly in some situations. The more we know about Jones’s beliefs, 
values, goals, motivations, etc., the more we can understand his character. 
 Conditional traits are also useful for communication and collection of 
more accurate information about character and behavior. As I mentioned in the 
previous section, robust traits are useful for broad descriptions of character in a 
variety of situations where detailed descriptions are either not possible, not 
necessary, or are simply indiscreet. Conditional traits describe specific pairings of 
an agent’s psychological factors with specific situational influences, so 
conditional traits are useful for determining the cause of an agent’s behavior and 
predicting future behavior. If I wanted to communicate information about an 
agent’s character that was specific to a certain type of situation (e.g. at office 
parties), then I would use conditional traits to do so. I could say for example, 
“Jones is distant and unapproachable at parties.” If I knew Jones well enough to 
have discovered the cause of his behavior I might add, “Jones doesn’t feel 
comfortable being around that many people at once, so he gets irritable and/or 
disoriented” or something more general like, “Jones is uncomfortable around 
large groups of people.” If I want to be able to understand and predict Jones’s 
future behavior at office parties, I could pay special attention to his behavior at 
office parties and perhaps even ask Jones about past experiences at office parties 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of his behavior and character. 
 In the next section, I formulate a theory of virtue grounded in a scalar 
conception of character that is both normatively and empirically adequate. I 
argue for a theory of virtue by degrees and maintain that social responsibility, 
moral identity, and practical wisdom are crucial in the development of stronger 
forms of virtue. 
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A Non-Ideal Theory of Virtue 
 The premise that grounds the situationist critique of virtue theory is the 
assumption that if traditional virtue theory is grounded in a particular conception 
of character, character traits according to that theory must resemble the structure 
of a virtue, being cross-situationally consistent and displayed even in diagnostic 
situations (what Doris termed a robust trait). If virtues are just a type of robust 
character trait and people do not generally have robust character traits, then they 
also cannot have the virtues. This assumes that robust character traits are 
descriptive; that they are an accurate description of the types of character traits 
that individuals can and do have. However, I have argued that robust traits are 
not descriptive, but rather prescriptive. Robust traits are only used descriptively 
as a sort of shorthand way of stating that a particular individual is more or less 
likely than his peers to show behavior relevant to that particular trait but we 
generally do not assume that most people actually have robust traits. 
 Just as there are two types of traits to satisfy different goals, there are two 
different ways that we talk about virtue that meets two different purposes. I begin 
from the claim that virtue comes in degrees. I argue that this is so because agents 
generally develop virtue slowly over the course of time and experience and since 
virtue requires a variety of components, an agent may have developed a few (but 
not all) of these and thus still have some virtue.  
 There are two basic “types” of virtue that track the ways in which we talk 
about virtue: ideal virtue and non-ideal virtue. Ideal virtue is a description of the 
highest degree of virtue, while non-ideal virtue is a description of any type of 
virtue that is not ideal virtue. Ideal virtue is primarily normative and prescriptive 
but not empirically adequate. An agent with ideal virtue will have all of the goals, 
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beliefs, and values consistent with each virtue (i.e., he will have developed all of 
the virtues robustly) and will exhibit cross-situationally consistent behavior. 
Moreover, an agent with ideal virtue will not be dependent on his social networks 
in order to maintain his virtue, as he will have developed the cognitive abilities 
necessary to make his behavior consistent with his moral commitments. Non-
ideal virtue is both empirically and normatively adequate, although flawed and 
not ideal. Non-ideal virtue is supposed to describe the type of virtue that agents 
actually have. An agent with non-ideal virtue might have fully developed some 
virtues but not others (some virtues may be robust while others are merely 
conditional or even non-existent) or he may have developed only some of the 
goals, beliefs, and values consistent with each virtue. He is not likely to exhibit 
cross-situationally consistent behavior, especially for all of the virtues. Agents 
with non-ideal virtue may be more dependent on their social networks to help 
them maintain their virtue. For this reason, non-ideal virtue is frail, susceptible 
to circumstance and luck. 
 
Developing Virtue 
One of the reasons I argue that virtue comes in degrees and that there are 
two distinct types of virtues is because of the way people actually develop virtue 
and character in general. Most people begin by acquiring conditional traits, or 
conditional virtues, and displaying trait-relevant behavior in only some situations 
where such behavior is called for without displaying it in all situations. 
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Conditional virtues are similar to what Robert Adams refers to as “modules of 
virtue.”5  
Conditional virtues have only been developed in reference to certain 
situations but not others, so an agent may display a particular virtue in only some 
situations but not others because of the way that he construes those situations. 
An agent may construe situations x and y in a similar way while construing 
situation z to be markedly different and so requiring different behavior from 
what he would display in x and y. The agent may have a different perception of 
the three situations merely because he has not had enough experience with 
situation z to notice how the situational features that make it similar to situations 
x and y or he may lack the goals, beliefs, values, or critical thinking skills to 
attempt to generalize from situations x and y to other situations. 
 For example, suppose that Jones had a rough childhood that taught him 
to be distrustful of both his parents and his peers. Consequently, Jones has a 
hard time feeling empathy for others and this keeps him from feeling or acting 
kindly toward others. Jones is deeply distrustful of others and is rude and 
disrespectful towards most people. However, Jones is surprisingly polite and 
respectful towards individuals working in supermarkets. This is only so, however, 
because after having worked at a supermarket himself and having the good 
fortune of being treated with dignity and respect by his superiors and his peers 
there, he comes to have the belief that people who work in supermarkets are 
“good people” and “worthy of trust.” 
 Jones has learned to be genuinely respectful of workers at supermarkets. 
Unfortunately, he has not learned to generalize his behavior to include other 
                                                   
5 Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 125-130.  
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people in other sorts of situations. Jones may still be blameworthy for having 
failed to generalize across situations, but he at least has a module of the virtue of 
respect in his respect toward workers in supermarkets. 
 Suppose that Jones later acquires another module of the virtue of respect 
by learning to respect those that work at other types of shops, even if he is still 
distrustful and disrespectful of others in other situations. Jones may eventually 
learn to respect people in all kinds of contexts by slowly acquiring modules of 
virtues contextualized by types of situation. The more modules pertaining to the 
virtue of respect that Jones acquires, the more likely he is to display that virtue in 
any particular situation and so acquire a more robust virtue of respect. 
 Agents acquire various traits or virtues over time depending on factors 
like their upbringing, their environment, their social networks and influences, 
and the goals, beliefs, and values that they develop. Moreover, as I argue below, 
in order to develop and maintain virtue, agents require a variety of skills that 
enable them to learn from their experiences (or the experiences of others) and 
deliberate on how to behave consistently with their moral commitments as well 
as other abilities that help them to behave consistently with their moral 
commitments. 
 
Ideal Virtue 
 Just as robust traits set the ideal standard for particular traits, ideal virtue 
sets the ideal standard for virtue. Ideal virtue is a standard against which to 
measure lesser degrees of virtue. Agents with ideal virtue are not dependent on 
their social networks in order to maintain their virtue, exhibit behavioral 
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consistency across all (or at least most) situations, and have the ability to behave 
consistently with virtue even in psychologically strong situations. 
 I have argued that virtue comes in degrees and that ideal virtue sets the 
standard against which we can measure lesser degrees of virtue. Ideal virtue 
requires that an agent has fully developed all of the virtues. An agent must 
develop all of the virtues and he must develop all of them robustly.6 An agent that 
has developed half (or even most) of the virtues robustly does not have ideal 
virtue, nor does an agent who has developed all of the virtues if the virtues are 
not robust.  Rather than ideal virtue being on a single scale, we might measure 
the degree to which an agent has developed each of the virtues on one scale for 
each virtue, and how many of the virtues he has developed on a separate scale. An 
agent will have ideal virtue only if he has developed each of the virtues to the 
highest degree. If the agent lacks one of the virtues, then he has non-ideal virtue 
to some degree. 
 
Structural and Motivational Virtues 
First, I need to discuss an important distinction made by some 
philosophers and psychologists: the distinction between structural and 
motivational virtues.7  
According to philosopher Robert Roberts, there are essentially two types 
of virtues: substantive virtues and virtues of willpower. According to Roberts, 
                                                   
6
 As I mentioned in the previous section, robust virtues are fully developed virtues. In 
order for an agent to have a robust virtue he must have developed all of the psychological 
and behavioral dispositions consistent with that virtue to the highest degree. 
7 See Robert Roberts, “Willpower and the Virtues,”  Philosophical Review 93, no. 2 
(1984): 227-47; Augusto Blasi “Moral Character” in Character Psychology and Character 
Education, eds. Daniel Lapsley and Clark Power (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2005), 67-100; and Robert Adams, A theory of Virtue, 33-4. 
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substantive virtues are “the psychological embodiment of ethical rules—the 
substance of the ethical patterns of behavior and judgment and emotion” while 
virtues of willpower are “the capacities by which a person copes with…trials in the 
interest of the moral and prudential life.”8 Roberts argued that courage, patience, 
and self-control were virtues of willpower because they could be used in the 
service of good as well as evil ends. 
Robert Adams makes a similar distinction. Adams defines structural 
virtues as “structural features of the way one organizes and manages whatever 
motives one has,” along similar lines as Roberts’s virtues of willpower.9 Adams 
argues that the excellence of structural virtues is the ability and willingness to 
govern one’s behavior in accordance with one’s values, commitments, and ends. 
He contrasts this with “motivational virtues” (similar to Roberts’s substantive 
virtues), which are defined by “motives which in turn are defined by goods that 
one is for in having them, as benevolence, for example, is defined by the motive of 
desiring or willing the good of others.”10  
Augusto Blasi makes a distinction between “specific traits,” or “lower-
order virtues,” and “general traits,” or “higher-order virtues,” corresponding with 
the distinctions between motivational and structural virtues above. Higher-order 
virtues provide the “motivational underpinning, the stability and generality of 
character traits” while lower-order virtues provide “the moral meanings” (see 
Figure 1 below).11 To explain what he means, Blasi gives the example of the 
                                                   
8 Roberts, “Will Power and the Virtues,” 227. 
 
9 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 33. 
 
10 Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 33-37, 133, 136-8. 
 
11 Blasi, “Moral Character,” 70. 
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exercise of truthfulness (lower-order virtue), particularly in situations of conflict. 
According to Blasi, exercising truthfulness in situations of conflict may require 
determination, willpower, self-control, independence from social pressure, or 
integrity (higher-order virtues) as well as the motivation to be truthful (a lower 
order virtue). Lower-order virtues seem to require at least one or another of the 
higher-order virtues in order to have stability and motivational strength. Blasi 
presents the following list (see Table 3): 
 
Table 3 Higher-order versus lower-order virtues.  
 
Lower-order virtues Higher-order virtues 
 
Empathy 
Compassion 
Politeness 
Respectfulness 
Thoughtfulness 
Kindness 
Generosity 
Altruism 
Friendship 
Loyalty 
 
Obedience 
Law-abidingness 
Civic-mindedness 
Honesty 
Conscientiousness 
Truthfulness 
Fairness 
Justice 
Courage 
Humility 
 
Will Cluster 
Perseverance 
Determination 
Self-discipline 
Self-control 
Willpower 
 
Integrity cluster 
Responsibility 
Accountability 
Self-consistency 
Sincerity 
Integrity 
Principledness 
Transparency of 
Oneself 
Honesty with 
Oneself 
Autonomy 
 
Source: Blasi, “Moral Character,” 71. 
 
He then divides the higher order virtues into two categories, those that 
form a network around the concept of willpower (such as determination, self-
control, resistance to temptation, and perseverance) and those that form a 
network around the concept of integrity, or the tendency to maintain a high 
degree of internal self-consistency. In this category, he places self-consistency, 
being a person of one’s word, autonomy of thinking, and independence in action 
and thought (autonomy).12  
                                                   
12 Blasi actually includes responsibility as a part of integrity. I list it as a separate 
component of virtue because of its importance to behaving consistently with virtue and 
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As mentioned in Chapter 6, Blasi notes that willpower and integrity are 
not necessarily moral traits on their own. Willpower is a system of self-regulation 
and as such is not inherently moral, although it is necessary to maintain 
behavioral consistency. However, willpower can also be used to carry out 
pragmatic or evil goals. As for integrity, Blasi defines it as a “person’s serious 
concern for the unity of his or her subjective sense of self, as manifested in 
consistency with one’s chosen commitments.”13 It is a result of a conscious 
concern about and intentional care to avoid contradictions between what we say 
and do and those commitments on which we have constructed our self-identity. 
Integrity, like willpower can be used for good as well as evil purposes, depending 
on the will of the agent. 
 Although the terminology and definitions differ somewhat, the basic idea 
is the same: some virtues are inherently moral while some are not. Motivational 
virtues are inherently moral, providing moral meanings, motivation, and the 
substance of the moral good, while structural virtues are not inherently moral but 
are necessary to help ensure that the agent behaves consistently with the 
motivational virtues. 
 
The Structure of Ideal Virtue 
 I argue for a structure of ideal virtue grounded in a scalar theory of 
character, and borrows from both Blasi’s theory of moral identity and the 
traditional conception of character.  
                                                                                                                                           
because I believe it includes a number of abilities and skills related, but not identical to, 
those necessary for integrity. 
 
13 Blasi, “Moral Character,” 90. 
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Ideal virtue requires that an agent has developed: 1) an undivided moral 
will (beliefs, values, emotions, and goals consistent with all of the virtues), 2) high 
centrality of moral identity,  3) practical deliberation (or the ability to deliberate 
well about what certain traits or virtues require and how to make one’s actions 
consistent with one’s moral commitments, 4) integrity, 5) autonomy in thought 
and behavior, 6) self-transparency, 7) willpower (self-regulatory mechanisms), 
and 8) a strong sense of personal responsibility (this includes expectancies or 
beliefs about one’s self-efficacy). An agent with ideal virtue will also need a 
lifetime of experiences in order to have formed the schemas (or encodings in 
Mischel’s terms) that would help him know how to behave consistently with his 
moral commitments across different situations. The components of ideal virtue 
can be broken up roughly into 1) motivational virtues: including the goals, values, 
feelings, and desires that motivate the moral will, high centrality of moral 
identity, and 2) structural virtues: including practical deliberation, integrity, 
willpower, autonomy, self-transparency, and personal responsibility. 
 
Moral will  
An agent with ideal virtue must have a will that includes beliefs, emotions, 
goals, and values consistent with the virtues.14 He must have both first and 
second order desires consistent with the virtues while lacking competing desires 
(or competing desires important enough to his self-identity that they can 
overwhelm moral desires). This first component tracks Augusto Blasi’s idea of an 
undivided moral will and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle’s idea of the moral virtues 
(training our desires to want what is morally good). The goals, values, beliefs, and 
                                                   
14 I will not speculate on which motivational virtues belong in this category. 
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emotions that make up the moral will motivate the agent to behave consistently 
with the moral good. For example, an agent that believes compassion is good, 
values compassion, has emotions consistent with compassion (such as sympathy 
or empathy), and desires to behave compassionately is motivated to behave 
compassionately. Moreover, having a moral will motivates the agent to behave 
consistently with the virtues for the right reasons. Even if an agent behaves 
consistently with all of the virtues, if he does so for his own selfish reasons or 
other reasons not consistent with the virtues, then he is not actually virtuous at 
all. 
 
High centrality of moral identity 
An agent with ideal virtue will also feel that those goals, beliefs, values, 
and desires are an important part of his self-identity. This second component 
tracks Augusto Blasi’s idea of centrality of moral identity. An agent with an 
undivided moral will is likely to have high centrality of moral identity because 
moral desires are very important to him. High centrality of moral identity 
provides the agent with some additional motivation to behave consistently with 
his moral desires because developing high centrality of moral identity usually is 
correlated with the development of integrity and responsibility. 
High centrality of moral identity is an important part of ideal virtue 
because, according to Blasi, when an agent’s moral identity has high centrality in 
his global self-identity, that agent’s moral values, beliefs, and desires are central 
to that individual’s concept of self-identity so his moral values, beliefs, etc., are 
more likely to motivate him than other competing desires. If the agent’s moral 
identity is not as important to him as other self-concepts (such as self-interested 
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self-concepts), then he may be motivated to behave in ways inconsistent with his 
moral will because his moral identity is not salient in his working self-identity 
when necessary (or because it is deactivated by the presence of a self-interested 
self-concept). According to Aquino and Reed’s experiments, subjects with higher 
centrality of moral identity were more likely to exhibit behavior consistent with 
moral commitments than were subjects with lower centrality of moral identity. 
 
Integrity  
If certain values are central to an agent’s self-identity, the agent is also 
likely to develop integrity, or serious concern for behaving consistently with his 
moral will. A betrayal of those moral desires would be like a betrayal of the self. 
The purpose of this component is to give the agent extra motivation to behave 
consistently with his moral will. According to Blasi, integrity is not necessarily a 
moral virtue because an agent need not have a moral will at all to have integrity. 
An agent with a will that is not moral can also have serious concern for behaving 
consistently with his will. Integrity is a structural virtue and is part of moral 
character only when an agent’s will is fully (or partially) moral. 
According to Blasi, integrity actually includes a number of different 
smaller virtues, including autonomy (of thought and behavior) and the ability to 
be honest with oneself about one’s motives. These two virtues are especially 
important considering some of the social-psychology literature I have discussed 
in previous chapters. Due to their importance in maintaining virtue, I list these 
two as individual virtues separate from integrity. 
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Autonomy 
 If an agent has beliefs, goals, emotions, and values consistent with a 
certain virtue, then he needs to develop autonomy in thought and behavior to 
ensure that he behaves consistently with those beliefs, goals, etc., instead of 
giving in to the temptation to conform socially. Autonomy is important because 
of the problem of social influences I discussed in Chapter 5. I argued that 
succumbing to social influences was a weakness that many agents appear to 
share. This is especially problematic because social influences can be disastrous 
in certain situations, influencing agents to behave inconsistently with their 
previous moral commitments. We are used to looking to others around us for 
information about how we should behave, especially in unfamiliar situations. We 
perceive others in our environment as a sort of audience to our actions and are 
used to trying to keep our opinions in line with those of others in our group. 
While we may be able to depend on our social networks for the development and 
maintenance of our virtue (as some philosophers have argued), this is not an 
ideal solution. Depending on others to help us develop or maintain our virtue 
leaves us at the mercy of moral luck, vulnerable to negative social influences. The 
wrong kind of social settings or relationships can easily damage our virtue. If 
social influences are especially problematic for many agents, then it seems 
necessary to develop autonomy in thought and behavior to help counteract this 
problem.  
 
Self-transparency   
 The ability to be honest with oneself about one’s motives is also important 
considering the psychological mechanisms that can help an agent engage in self-
 257
deceptive behaviors in order to allow the agent to behave inconsistently with his 
moral commitments without updating his self-identity. As I discussed in the last 
chapter, even agents with a moral will may behave inconsistently with their moral 
commitments by deceiving themselves into believing that they are not actually 
behaving contrary to their moral identity at all. In order to counteract the use of 
these psychological mechanisms, an agent needs to be able to reflect honestly on 
his own motives and discern what is truly motivating him. 
 
Personal responsibility  
An agent with high centrality of moral will needs to have made himself 
responsible for acting consistently with his moral values, beliefs, and desires. The 
agent must feel personally responsible for making sure he behaves according to 
his will.  Personal responsibility is not specifically a moral virtue either since, for 
example, an agent with a will including only self-serving desires can feel 
personally responsible for making sure he behaves according to those desires. 
Responsibility is a structural virtue; it is only when responsibility is used in the 
service of a moral will that it becomes part of moral character. 
This purpose of this component is twofold: first, an agent who feels 
personally responsible for behaving consistently with his moral will be less likely 
to shirk his responsibility as a moral agent in the face of competing demands, and 
second, an agent that feels responsible for his own actions will be less likely to 
place moral responsibility for his actions on the shoulders of others.   
An agent that feels personally responsible for actualizing his moral desires 
will feel a greater sense of responsibility in ensuring that he makes the world 
around him consistent with those desires. For example, suppose that Alan values 
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helping and has the desire that the world is a place where individuals who need 
help receive help. Without feelings of personal responsibility, he may walk by a 
person struggling to lug heavy groceries into a car and merely think to himself, 
“That’s awful, that poor person needs help. I hope someone helps him with those 
groceries.” If on the other hand, he feels personally responsible for ensuring that 
his moral desires are actualized he will be less likely to place that responsibility 
onto the shoulders of others and help the person himself. This is important to 
virtue considering that psychologists have documented diffusion of responsibility 
as being largely responsible for bystander effects. 
Moreover, an agent who feels personally responsible for his actions will be 
less likely to behave in ways inconsistent with his moral commitments by 
assuming that someone else is responsible for the consequences of his actions. 
For example, some psychologists like Maury Silver and John Sabini, one of the 
reasons that subjects complied in the Milgram experiment was that people didn’t 
feel fully responsible for what happened to the victims.  Subjects in the Milgram 
experiment seemed to feel that as long as the experimenter claimed responsibility 
for any consequences to the victim, they were absolved of any responsibility for 
whatever happened to the victim.15 However, if the subjects had felt personally 
responsible for ensuring that the victim was not harmed, they would not have 
assumed that having the experimenter claim responsibility automatically 
absolved them of any responsibility. 
 
 
                                                   
15 See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 7-
8, 145-147. Milgram himself actually comments on how feelings of loss of responsibility 
are in part responsible for the behavior of compliant subjects. 
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Willpower 
An agent with ideal virtue will not only feel personally responsible for 
avoiding contradiction between his moral will and his behavior, he will also have 
the willpower necessary to avoid contradiction and maintain his moral character. 
This component tracks Blasi’s definition of willpower and Mischel’s definition of 
self-regulatory mechanisms.16 Blasi includes perseverance, determination, self-
control, and self-discipline as all related to willpower. Willpower is an important 
part of moral character because it helps agents cope with temptations from fear, 
pleasure, perhaps even social influences.  
Willpower is not necessarily a moral virtue either, since an agent need not 
have a moral will to develop self-regulatory mechanisms. It is debatable whether 
an agent that has developed an undivided moral will need to exercise willpower 
considering that he has no conflicting desires (specifically desires conflicting with 
his moral desires), but the agent will need willpower in order to develop ideal 
virtue in the first place. 
 
Practical deliberation 
The component of practical deliberation closely resembles Aristotle’s 
account of practical wisdom. However, practical deliberation is not necessarily a 
moral trait as it is merely the ability to deliberate or on what certain traits or 
virtues require and how best to behave consistently with those traits and virtues. 
An agent can develop the cognitive skills and abilities necessary to behave 
                                                   
16 Augusto Blasi, “Moral Character,” in Character Psychology and Character 
Education, ed. Daniel Lapsley and Clark Power (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2005), 74-5. 
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consistently with his traits, even if those traits are non-moral or even opposed to 
morality. 
However, in conjunction with a moral will, practical deliberation takes the 
form of something like Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom. According to 
Aristotle, practical wisdom is the ability to deliberate well in order to be able to 
behave consistently with the moral virtues in particular situations. In other 
words, practical wisdom is necessary to help us put our moral desires into action 
in a variety of situations, including unfamiliar situations. According to Aristotle, 
practical wisdom was characterized by the ability to reflect on virtue and what 
virtue really required of agents in general and in specific situations. However, 
Aristotle’s definition of practical wisdom does not specify the type of cognitive 
abilities necessary to maintain virtue. Augusto Blasi, on the other hand, 
hypothesized on some specific abilities necessary to ensure behavioral 
consistency with ones moral commitments. Some of these abilities are: 1) 
understanding of the common good and how it is related to individual interests, 
2) holding universal principles beyond the mere laws of society, and 3) 
monitoring one’s beliefs and the processes by which they were acquired and 
accepted, and (this includes having the ability to bracket one’s trusting attitude 
and instead questioning one’s (and others) motives so as to not allow for unfair 
justifications or self-deception).17 However, the general idea behind Aristotle’s 
definition of practical wisdom and Blasi’s list of cognitive abilities is the same: a 
                                                   
17 Augusto Blasi, “The Moral Functioning of Mature Adults,” in Personality, Identity, 
and Character, eds. Darcia Narvaez and Daniel Lapsley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 431.  
The last set of abilities sound like Blasi’s idea that an agent needs to be honest with 
himself about his motives (part of integrity). Blasi states a fourth set of abilities as well, 
the ability to control fear and anxiety, to resist social pressure, to be autonomous in 
thinking and action, to be courageous when courage is needed. This set seems to include 
autonomy (part of integrity), and several abilities necessary for willpower. 
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virtuous agent requires some particular cognitive abilities, some type of 
reasoning skills, in order to understand what morality requires and behave 
consistently with his or her moral commitments across different situations. 
Practical deliberation is necessary in order to help the agent deliberate on 
what each of the virtue truly requires and how best to put his goals, beliefs, 
desires, etc., into action in particular situations. Furthermore, an agent with 
practical deliberation can learn how to generalize his actions from one situation 
to another. For example, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, some of the subjects who 
stopped the Milgram experiment were people who had lived in Europe during the 
Nazi occupation and had apparently learned about obedience and compliance 
from their experiences. Both subjects appear to have learned about the 
potentially terrible consequences of unquestioningly obeying authority and 
applied what they had learned to this particular case. 
Moreover, as I argued in Chapter 5, practical wisdom may be helpful in 
curbing unwanted social influence. Social influence is one of the situational 
features with the most power to influence our behavior; individuals can even be 
influenced to behave inconsistently with their goals or values. The problem of 
social influences is especially pernicious because we naturally look to others for 
information, support, or help. Moreover, social networks can be beneficial in 
producing and maintaining virtue. An agent with practical deliberation knows 
what the right thing to do is in a particular situation, as well as why it is the right 
thing to do. In strong situations, where unfamiliar settings, social pressures, or 
other situational influences might lead an agent to believe action x is consistent 
with having a certain virtue like justice or compassion when it is actually not, an 
agent with practical wisdom should be able recognize the action that is actually 
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consistent with those virtues. Practical deliberation would help to counteract the 
influence of potentially dangerous social influences.  
Finally, an agent with ideal virtue will be a virtual expert in the moral 
domain of life since he will have formed chronically accessible schemas in the 
moral domain over time and experience. Because agents with an undivided moral 
will have made their moral identity central to their self-identity, their moral 
identity is more often salient and so they are more likely to notice the morally 
relevant details of a situation. Agents who have moral commitments that are an 
important part of their self-identity, feelings of integrity and personal 
responsibility toward fulfilling those commitments, and the cognitive abilities 
necessary to ensure that they behave consistently with those commitments may 
in time develop a kind of expertise in regards to behaving consistently with their 
moral commitments.18  
Psychologists Nancy Cantor and John Kihlstrom theorize that different 
individuals differ in the “elaborateness and accessibility of their knowledge in 
task-relevant domains” including the moral domain.19 The more often an agent 
deliberates about his moral commitments and how best to behave consistently 
with his moral commitments, the more likely that he is to become an expert in 
that domain of his life. An agent that is an ‘expert’ in some domain of his life can 
                                                   
18 Philosopher Nancy Snow makes a similar claim in Virtue as Social Intelligence: An 
Empirically Grounded Theory. Snow argues that the virtuous person that seems to be 
able to behave virtuously effortlessly and almost automatically is simply a type of ‘expert’ 
in the moral domain. His actions seem effortless because they have become somewhat 
habitual to him. His actions are still a result of moral motivation and practical wisdom, 
but he has become familiarized with moral situational cues (since they are salient to him) 
and determined the correct responses (defined as “responses consistent with virtues”) to 
different situational cues over time. 
 
19 Nancy Cantor and John F. Kihlstrom, Personality and Social Intelligence (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987), 5. 
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come up with strategies to reach his goals more easily than an agent who is a 
‘novice’ in that domain of his life. Experts in the moral domain will have 
“considered alternative goals and strategies and can arrive at a pragmatic 
solution to the life task more easily than non-experts.”20 According to Cantor and 
Kihlstrom, “to the extent that individuals have elaborate, well-integrated, 
relatively consensually-validated and self-relevant expertise in a life-task domain, 
they should be able to find creative ways to pursue their goals with ease.”21 If an 
agent is an expert in a particular domain, then he has greater resources available 
to him to make his behavior consistent with his moral commitments. 
To sum up, an agent with ideal virtue will have the psychological factors 
consistent with the virtues and will value moral commitments as an important 
part of his life and self-concept. An agent with ideal virtue will also have a strong 
concern for behaving consistently with his moral will and will make himself 
responsible for behaving according to those values. Finally, an agent with ideal 
virtue will self-regulatory mechanisms to help him cope with temptations of 
various sorts and cognitive abilities to deliberate on how best to make his 
behavior consistent with his goals, affects, values, and desires.  
Ideal virtue is very similar to Aristotelian virtue. According to Aristotelian 
virtue theory, a virtue is a disposition to perform the right action, for the right 
reason, from a firm and unchanging character. An agent requires both practical 
wisdom (the ability to deliberate well) and the moral virtues in order to be 
virtuous. For ideal virtue, an agent needs practical deliberation (defined roughly 
similar to Aristotle’s version of practical wisdom) and a moral will (or beliefs, 
                                                   
20 Cantor and Kihlstrom, Personality and Social Intelligence, 6. This sounds similar to 
descriptions of an agent who possesses Aristotelian practical wisdom. 
 
21 Cantor and Kihlstrom, Personality and Social Intelligence, 239. 
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goals, affects, and values consistent with the virtues). Moreover, since an agent 
with ideal virtue requires high centrality of moral identity and moral identity 
requires a moral will, an agent with high centrality of moral identity will perform 
a moral action for the right reason from a firm and unchanging character.  
 
Features of Ideal Virtue 
Robust  
An agent with ideal virtue exhibits robust virtues. He values morality as 
an important part of his self-identity and has cognitive and affective factors 
consistent with each of the virtues, as well as autonomy, self-transparency, 
integrity and a sense of personal responsibility for making certain his behavior is 
consistent with his moral commitments and the cognitive skills necessary to help 
him behave consistently with his moral commitments. Cantor and Kihlstrom 
argue that experts in a particular domain are more likely to maintain “intentional 
consistency,” exhibited by behaving consistently with their goals and 
commitments. Together these components ensure that the agent will behave 
consistently with his moral commitments across different situations, resulting in 
cross-situationally consistent (robust) virtues.  
 
Autonomous 
Since an agent with ideal virtue has the cognitive skills necessary to help 
him deliberate well about how to behave consistently with his moral 
commitments, the agent will have the skills necessary to discern what behavior 
will be consistent with his moral commitments even in psychologically strong 
situations. An agent with ideal virtue has the ability to deliberate well about a 
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situation and weigh costs and consequences correctly and so he is less likely to be 
baffled into behaving inconsistently with his moral commitments by unfamiliar 
or ambiguous situations or circumstances. Moreover, an agent with ideal virtue 
has a strong sense of personal responsibility and will be less susceptible to 
assuming else is responsible for their actions. This is also in part because an 
agent with ideal virtue need not rely on social influences to help him discover the 
action consistent with virtue in any particular situation.  
Agents with ideal virtue are not dependent on their social networks for 
information on how to behave consistently with their moral commitments and 
this helps to counteract the possibly negative effects of social influences. Agents 
with ideal virtue have a commitment to behave consistently with their moral 
commitments and the cognitive skills necessary to ensure that commitment. They 
can deliberate on how to behave consistently with their moral commitments in a 
specific situation without having to rely on information from others. Moreover, 
they are autonomous, determined, and self-disciplined, not easily swayed by the 
temptation to conform to social-influences. Experience and practical deliberation 
have made them virtual experts in the moral domain and so they do not need to 
rely on information from others to know how to behave morally in any particular 
situation. 
 
The Normative and Empirical Adequacy of Ideal Virtue 
 Ideal virtue is normatively but not empirically adequate. The robust traits 
required for ideal virtue set the paradigmatic framework against which 
conditional traits are measured. However, robust traits are not accurate 
descriptions of the kinds of traits agents actually have (or, perhaps, are even 
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capable of having). Ideal virtue then is difficult or even impossible to acquire. 
This is consistent with both the situationist critique and traditional virtue theory. 
Ideal virtue is difficult to acquire and comes only with a lifetime of experience 
and learning from one’s mistakes. As I argued in Chapter 5, the development of 
moral virtue and practical wisdom is subject to moral luck in various ways. Even 
Aristotle maintained that young people could not be virtuous because they lacked 
the life experience necessary to develop practical wisdom. Aristotle argued that 
practical wisdom was developed through habit, experience, and good 
deliberation, as well as a commitment to the virtues. Lacking any of these, an 
agent might also lack practical wisdom. The types of life experiences, upbringing, 
social environments, or moral luck that an agent has had in her life will in part 
determine whether she will develop practical wisdom or not. If an agent has had a 
limited amount of life experiences, then she may have only learned how to behave 
consistently with her values in a limited number of circumstances. As I argued in 
Chapter 6, unfamiliar or psychologically powerful situations can confuse or baffle 
agents and lead them to act in ways that are inconsistent with various beliefs, 
values, or commitments they have. Some of the main factors in psychologically 
powerful situations are ambiguity, social influences, and a subject’s unfamiliarity 
with the situation. 
Even if an agent values and desires to display a particular virtue, the agent 
also needs to have developed structural virtues like practical deliberation and 
willpower to behave consistently with her values and desires. However, some 
structural virtues, like practical deliberation, are developed through time and 
experience. Consequently, an agent that has not experienced situations of type A, 
for example, may be unprepared to deal with them. He may not know how to 
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behave consistently with his values, goals, and beliefs in those situations. Once he 
has experienced one or two situations of type A, he may be able to deliberate on 
the types of situational factors present in type A situations as well as the proper 
response in those situations (proper being defined here as consistent with the 
agent’s moral goals, beliefs, and values). If this agent were to come across another 
situation of type A, he would know how to behave consistently with his goals, 
values, and beliefs. However, upon first encountering a situation of type A, the 
agent may not know how to behave and this may lead him to behave 
inconsistently with his previous desires or commitments. An agent who is unsure 
of how to behave in a situation may also succumb to social pressures and behave 
inconsistently with his previous commitments and desires, only feeling regret for 
having done so when he has had time to reflect on the consequences of his 
actions. 
 For example, suppose that Alan is generally a compassionate person. In 
most types of situations, Alan behaves compassionately. Moreover, he believes 
compassion is a good thing, holds it in high value, and has a commitment to 
behaving compassionately. However, Alan has never encountered a situation of 
type A before, for example, a situation that is unfamiliar and ambiguous. To take 
an example from the social-psychological literature, let’s say that one day, while 
riding the subway, Alan sees a somewhat shabbily dressed man that smells of 
alcohol and is holding a bottle wrapped in a paper bag. He watches as the man 
stumbles and falls down. Seconds go by and the man neither gets up nor asks for 
help. No one moves to help him. Alan deliberates on whether compassion 
requires him to help or not. He looks to his companions in the subway car but no 
one gets up to assist the fallen man and most people even seem to be ignoring 
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him. Following their cues, and perhaps subconsciously assuming that other 
people are at least averagely moral, Alan decides not to help. 
 If later Alan found out that the man was having a stroke and died as a 
result of not receiving aid in a timely fashion, Alan may be more likely to offer 
help in a similar situation in the future. If Alan reflects on why he didn’t help 
(ambiguity of the situation), he may learn to be more cautious in situations in the 
future that are ambiguous or be less likely to assume that people around him 
have any more idea of how to act in those types of situations than he does. On the 
other hand, if Alan never hears about the man again, he may come to conclusion 
that his decision to help was the correct one and may continue not to help in 
similar situations in the future. 
 Suppose that Alan recounts his experience on the subway to you and you 
see his failure to help the fallen man as a failure in compassion. Does Alan’s 
failure to help the fallen man in the subway mean that Alan is not really 
compassionate? Can Alan have a robust virtue of compassion even if he fails to 
behave compassionately in ambiguous or unfamiliar situations? If ideal virtue 
requires practical deliberation and an agent with a high centrality of moral 
identity, then an agent with ideal virtue would have helped the fallen man (and 
would behave compassionately in a number of situations). Therefore, Alan does 
not have ideal virtue. Does that mean Alan does not have the virtue of 
compassion at all even if he behaves compassionately in every other type of 
situation?  
I claimed that virtue is a matter of degree, either because an agent needs 
to have developed all of the virtues robustly. If an agent has only developed the 
right moral values, goals, beliefs, etc., in some aspects of his life but not others or 
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if an agent hasn’t developed some of the structural virtues necessary to make his 
actions consistent with his values, goals, and beliefs across different situations, 
then he lacks ideal virtue. Since developing virtue depends in part on the type of 
situations and people to which an agent is exposed, some agents may never 
develop ideal virtue because they are only exposed to a limited number of 
situations and never have a chance to develop virtue specific to particular 
situations. What can we say about an individual like Alan who has developed 
modules of virtue relevant to his specific life circumstances? 
If robust or perfect virtues are merely ideals setting normative parameters 
and most people merely have partial virtue, does this mean that it is impossible to 
be truly virtuous? In the next section, I argue this is not the case by discussing 
virtue that is only cross-situationally behaviorally consistent within the confines 
of predictable life circumstances. 
 
Non-Ideal Virtue 
 Non-ideal virtue refers to any type of virtue that is not ideal, in other 
words, any type of virtue that fails to meet one or more of the requirements of 
ideal virtue. Non-ideal virtue comes in degrees and is often fragmented, socially 
dependent and frail. That means that non-ideal virtue is not cross-situationally 
consistent, requires weak motivational self-sufficiency of character, and its 
maintenance is susceptible to moral luck. 
 
The Structure of Non-Ideal Virtue 
Non-ideal virtue requires that at minimum an agent develop: 1) a moral 
will (at least some of the psychological factors consistent with some of the 
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virtues), 2) a moral identity that is somewhat central to his sense of self, 3) some 
integrity, and 4) some personal responsibility. Agents with higher degrees of non-
ideal virtue will also have developed: 5) some willpower and practical 
deliberation, 6) some self-transparency, and 7) some autonomy in thought and 
behavior in order to ensure that their actions are consistent with their moral will.  
 
Moral will and centrality of moral identity 
An agent with non-ideal virtue needs to have developed a moral will, even 
if his will is fragmented in some way. In other words, an agent needs to have 
some values, beliefs, affects, and desires consistent with the virtues. However, his 
will may also include competing values, beliefs, affects, and desires. An agent 
with non-ideal virtue needs to have a moral identity that is somewhat important 
to his self-identity. His moral identity need not be the most important aspect of 
his sense of self, but it needs to be somewhat central to his global self-identity, 
otherwise, it is unclear just how important his moral commitments really are for 
him. Some centrality of moral identity is necessary in order to ensure that moral 
commitments motivate the agent to some extent rather than other more personal 
values and commitments motivating the agent  
At a minimum, in order to have non-ideal virtue, an agent must have at 
least some cognitive and affective factors consistent with some of the virtues 
(including first and second order moral desires). However, if an agent lacks goals, 
beliefs, affects, values, and desires consistent with the virtues, or does not value 
moral considerations as having any importance to his self-identity, then he does 
not really care or value the virtues at all.  
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Integrity and responsibility  
An agent with non-ideal virtue also needs to have developed some 
integrity and sense of personal responsibility. Otherwise, it is unclear that the 
agent really cares about morality. If he does not have at least some concern for 
behaving consistently with his moral will or lacks feelings of personal 
responsibility for his actions, it calls into question just how much the agent really 
cares about virtue if he will not take responsibility for his own actions. Moreover, 
integrity and personal responsibility are necessary to ensure that an agent 
behaves consistently with his moral will. 
  
Willpower and practical deliberation 
An agent with non-ideal virtue needs to have at least attempted to develop 
some willpower or self-regulatory mechanisms to ensure that he does not 
succumb to every temptation from fear, pleasure, or social influences. An agent 
can also develop some deliberation in order to compensate for lack of willpower 
by recognizing his frailty in the face of certain temptations and avoiding 
temptation altogether. Agents that lack willpower or practical deliberation will be 
more likely to behave succumb to temptations of fear, pleasure, or social 
influences or other pressures from strong situations, thus behaving inconsistently 
with their moral commitments. 
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Autonomy and self-transparency 
 Ideally, an agent with non-ideal virtue will develop some autonomy and 
self-transparency. Although non-ideal virtue can be dependent on social 
networks for its maintenance, as I have argued elsewhere, virtue that is not 
autonomous is susceptible to moral luck. If an agent happens to be unlucky 
enough to find himself in a situation where social influences lead him astray, he 
may behave inconsistently with his previous moral commitments. Self-
transparency, on the other hand, is necessary so that an agent does not deceive 
himself into believing that he is behaving consistently with his moral 
commitments by use of some psychological mechanism that allows for self-
deception (as described in the previous chapter). 
   
Features of Non-Ideal Virtue 
Fragmented 
An agent with non-ideal virtue has fragmented or conditional virtues and 
does not exhibit behavioral consistency across all situations. Fragmentation 
refers to two types of ways in which non-ideal virtue can be fragmented: an agent 
may lack one or more components necessary for a single virtue (or multiple 
virtues) or an agent may have fully developed some virtues but not others (or 
both). For any single virtue an agent may lack some (or all) of the cognitive or 
affective factors consistent with that virtue, some of the structural virtues 
necessary to make his behavior consistent with that virtue, or the practical 
deliberation necessary for ensuring his actions are consistent with that virtue. 
The agent has only partially developed that virtue and may only have partially 
developed all (or even just some) of the virtues. For example, if Matt has a 
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conditional virtue of compassion, he may behave compassionately in situations p, 
q, and r but not in situations x, y, and z.  Alternatively, he may have fully 
developed the virtue of compassion, possessing the psychological factors 
consistent with compassion, a strong sense of personal responsibility to behave 
consistently with compassion, and enough cognitive abilities to behave 
consistently with compassion while at the same time having only partially 
developed the virtue of justice. He may lack the psychological factors consistent 
with justice and simply not care about justice at all or he may lack the cognitive 
skills or sense of personal responsibility to behave consistently with his 
commitment to justice. 
The reason an agent that has non-ideal virtue may have only developed 
some conditional (or robust) virtues but not others is that (according to social-
cognitive theory) we develop our character based partly on our experiences. An 
agent that has not experienced certain types of situations may not develop 
modules of virtue for those particular situations. Depending on our personal 
history and experiences, our upbringing, the particular situations we have been 
in, our temperament, goals, motivations and personal construal, we will be more 
likely to develop some virtues instead of others and some modules of virtue for 
some situations but not others. An agent may also fail to deliberate on what 
features of a situation make that situation similar to other situations. 
 
Socially dependent 
Since agents with non-ideal virtue may not have developed some of the 
structural virtues necessary to behave consistently with one’s moral 
commitments across different situations, non-ideal virtue can also be socially 
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dependent. If an agent lacks autonomy, willpower, or practical deliberation, he 
may be more likely to conform to social influences, even when doing so means 
behaving inconsistently with his moral commitments. Social influences can effect 
an agent in at least three different ways: 1) the agent might turn to those around 
him for guidance on how he should behave in unfamiliar situations, 2) the agent 
can come to perceive others in his environment as a sort of audience to his 
actions, and 3) situational influences can work through “tension systems” that 
help to keep the opinions of the individual in line with those of the group.22 An 
agent that has not developed the ability to deliberate well, or has simply not 
developed schemas for particular types of situations (such as unfamiliar or 
ambiguous situations) may turn to others for information on how to behave. 
Lacking the schemas for unfamiliar or ambiguous situations and the cognitive 
skills that would enable them to discern the action(s) consistent with their moral 
commitments, agents with non-ideal virtue may come to depend on social 
networks and settings in order to maintain their virtue. Agents may also lack the 
autonomy in thought to be able to make up their own mind or the willpower to 
resist the pressures to conform to social influences. Following Maria Merritt, that 
means non-ideal virtue requires only weak motivational self-sufficiency of 
character. Ideal virtue, on the other hand, much like Aristotelian virtue, advances 
a very strong ideal of MSC. 
 
Frail (susceptible to moral luck) 
Finally, since agents with non-ideal virtue are often dependent on their 
social networks to help them maintain their virtue, or lack the cognitive abilities, 
                                                   
22 See section on “Social Influence” in Chapter 5 for more. 
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willpower, or strong sense integrity or personal responsibility necessary for ideal 
virtue, agents with non-ideal virtue have a type of virtue whose maintenance is 
susceptible to moral luck and circumstance in various ways. As I argued above, 
agents that lack practical deliberation, willpower, or strong sense of responsibility 
necessary for ideal virtue may come to depend on their social networks to help 
them maintain their virtue. As I argued in Chapter 5, this is only problematic in 
cases where situational factors influence agents to behave in ways that are 
inconsistent with their previous moral commitments.  
One of the reasons agents are able to behave inconsistently with their 
moral commitments is agents’ failure to take responsibility for their actions (or 
non-actions). As I discussed previously, in situations that are ambiguous or 
unfamiliar, diffusion of responsibility is more likely to take place and in 
situations like the Milgram experiment, agents are likely to conflate moral and 
legal responsibility.  
Moreover, lack of cognitive abilities or willpower, which help maintain 
virtue, may also be problematic as agents that lack the ability to deliberate on 
how to behave consistently with their moral commitments, or the willpower to 
resist pressures to behave inconsistently with moral commitments, may be more 
easily influenced by strong situations.  
 
The Normative and Empirical Adequacy of Non-Ideal Virtue 
There are lower and higher degrees of non-ideal virtue. An agent with a 
very high degree of non-ideal virtue will have developed all of the virtues 
necessary (applicable) in his day-to-day life to some degree and will have a strong 
sense of personal responsibility, integrity, some self-transparency and autonomy 
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in thought and behavior, a fairly high centrality of moral identity, and some 
cognitive abilities necessary to maintain virtue. An agent with a high degree of 
non-ideal virtue will have developed enough virtue to be able to behave 
consistently with his moral commitments in (at least) normal or predictable life 
circumstances. He may be baffled by unfamiliar circumstances or may be led to 
behave inconsistently with his moral commitments by negative social influences. 
The agent with a high degree of non-ideal virtue may lack some cognitive abilities 
necessary to maintain his virtue in strong or unfamiliar situations but he will 
have genuine dedication toward behaving consistently with his moral 
commitments because his moral identity is a central part of his self-identity.  
 A high degree of non-ideal virtue comes closest to approximating ideal 
virtue. The key difference between ideal virtue and a high level of non-ideal virtue 
is that even a high development of non-ideal virtue does not guarantee that an 
agent will be able to behave consistently with the virtues in strong or unfamiliar 
situations. An agent with a high degree of non-ideal virtue has developed enough 
practical deliberation and autonomy to be able to behave consistently with the 
virtues in situations with which he has some experience. The agent may fail to 
behave consistently with virtue in strong or unfamiliar situations because he 
lacks the practical deliberation to make his behavior consistent with virtue in 
those situations.  
The degree to which an agent has developed non-ideal virtue depends on 
the degree to which the agent has developed the six components necessary for 
ideal virtue as well as the life experiences of the agent. Although, non-ideal virtue 
requires at minimum the development of a moral will, some centrality of moral 
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identity, some integrity and personal responsibility, and some attempt made at 
developing practical deliberation and willpower, even if unsuccessful. 
 
Further Arguments in Favor of a Scalar Approach to Character 
The Scalar Approach to Character is Intuitive 
 Conditional traits based in a social-cognitive approach to character can 
account for both the complexity of factors that motivate behavior as well as how 
(despite this) we can often make accurate predictions about the behavior of 
people we know fairly well. Despite how complicated the social-cognitive 
approach to character seems, considering the number of factors that produce a 
mental representation and the sheer amount of situational features that may or 
may not activate that mental representation, we often do predict how a particular 
individual will behave in a particular situation using something like this model.  
 If I have known my friend Matt for years, have observed him in a variety 
of situations, and am an intuitive perceiver, I may perhaps have noted that Matt 
is not particularly talkative or outgoing with people he does not know well despite 
being extremely talkative and outgoing among our group of friends. I might then 
make the inference that Matt is shy in all or most social situations with strangers, 
while he is also outgoing when among his intimates. If I also notice particular 
social situations with strangers in which Matt is talkative, say at work when he is 
in charge of a meeting, or at meetings for the neighborhood watch group for 
which he was named president, I might make some further predictions about 
Matt’s behavior based on inferences about what type of factors the different 
situations have in common and what effect they might have on Matt’s behavior. 
The reason that we notice cross-situational variability in the behavior of those we 
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know well is because we observe the dynamic interaction of an individual’s 
personal variables with some particular features of their environment. 
 
An Explanation for the Fundamental Attribution Error 
 The social-cognitive approach to character can also explain why we 
commit the fundamental attribution error while also being able to predict and 
understand the behavior of people close to us. To recap, the fundamental 
attribution error is our tendency to explain an instance of the behavior of other 
people by reference to dispositions or traits while paying little or no attention to 
the context of the situation. This includes our tendency to assume consistency of 
behavior from one situation to the next. For example, if I observe Mary behaving 
rudely to the stylist at her salon, I may assume that Mary behaves rudely across a 
number of different situations and, furthermore, that Mary is a rude person. I 
attribute her behavior to a personal trait rather than taking into account 
situational features that may also explain her particular behavior. I may also 
assume that she will behave consistently with that trait across different types of 
situations. 
 The reason I might attribute Mary’s action to a personal trait rather than 
to situational features is that I may not have any information about the particular 
situational features that are relevant in this situation. Perhaps Mary is having a 
bad day and the stylist was responding to her grumpily or in an ill-tempered 
manner. If I do not have this information about Mary’s day or the stylist’s 
behavior toward Mary, I can only go by the information that I have. I think to 
myself that the only reason I would behave rudely to a stylist in my current state 
(and without having the information about the stylist’s behavior) would be that I 
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was a rude person. Therefore, observing Mary’s behavior, I attribute similar 
motivation to Mary. When we make judgments about the behavior of others, 
unless we know how they perceive and construe the world, we may instead judge 
their action on our own perception of the world. Psychologists discussing the 
fundamental attribution error have pointed out that when asked to explain their 
own actions, agents will reference personal traits as well as situational features as 
motivating factors whereas when asked to explain the actions of others they 
reference personal traits.23 This seems to imply that agents are aware of the 
influence of situational features on their behavior. However, since we lack 
information about the situational features affecting others, we cannot use this 
information when judging the behavior of others. 
 As for assuming that Mary will behave consistently rudely in other 
situations, we may be able to explain this by considering that from our own point 
of view we behave consistently with our values, goals, and beliefs.24 That is not to 
say we actually do behave consistently with our values and goals across different 
situations. For example, in the previous chapter, I discussed a number of 
psychological mechanisms by which an agent can behave inconsistently with his 
moral commitments while believing that he is behaving consistently with his 
moral commitments. Perhaps we are aware of the effects of situational features 
on our behavior in particular situations but still lack knowledge about the general 
causes of human behavior, including our own. 
                                                   
23 Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspective of Social 
Psychology (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1991), 141 
 
24 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science,” 12. Mischel argues that when asked about 
their behavioral consistency, “people may base their impressions on the inferred 
motivations, beliefs, values, and other mental qualities that account for and explain those 
behaviors” rather than on the behaviors themselves. As long as an agent feels he has been 
consistent in his conditional traits, he feels that he has behaved consistently. He does not 
measure consistency using a robust trait approach but rather a conditional trait approach. 
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 While we may use the social-cognitive approach to character to 
understand our behavior and that of our intimates, we may do so without 
realizing the precise method by which we do so. For people whom we know well, 
we may have some idea about their goals, beliefs, values, and personal construal 
of the world and with this information make some fairly accurate predictions 
about their behavior in a number of situations. We may learn to recognize their 
different conditional traits and how those traits are related to each other. Mischel 
comments that, “a growing body of research suggests that intuitive perceivers 
seem to be more sophisticated personality theorists than most experiments in 
person perception have allowed them to be.”25 For example, to explain the 
responses of significant others in their lives “peoples’ intuitive lay theories 
include beliefs about their if…then…psychological states—“If Bill wants to create 
a good impression, then he acts friendly.”26 As Mischel comments, people will 
make “inferences about the underlying stable personality system that generates 
and explains observed behavioral signatures when they are giving the data to do 
so, and the motivation for expending the effort.”27 In cases where an agent is 
judging the behavior of a stranger that he may not ever see again, the agent lacks 
the necessary information to make an accurate judgment as well as sufficient 
motivation for doing so. 
 
 
 
                                                   
25 Walter, Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science of the Person,” in Annual Reviews 
in Psychology 55, no. 1 (2004): 12. 
 
26 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science,” 12. 
 
27 Mischel, “Toward an Integrative Science,” 12. 
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The Role of Moral Luck 
 The social-cognitive approach to character also acknowledges the 
significant role of moral luck in the formation of character traits. Moral luck plays 
an important part in the development of ideal virtue and both the development 
and maintenance of non-ideal virtue.28 
 According to the social-cognitive framework of personality, our particular 
mental representations of the world depend on a multitude of factors including 
our construal, formed in part by our individual goals, values, and beliefs, which 
are in turn formed in part by our own particular life experiences and other factors 
like temperament, all of which are in part determined by chance. For example, 
suppose there are two people: Jones and Smith. Although Jones was sensitive 
and trusting, a series of bad experiences beginning in childhood and continuing 
throughout his life have taught him to be distrustful and fearful of others. Jones 
is highly sensitive to any kind of disrespect or aggression toward him and afraid 
of showing fear because it might be perceived as weakness, Jones reacts by being 
rude and behaving aggressively instead. Smith on the other hand, grew up in a 
small town surrounded by family and friends. Smith was sweet tempered, and 
had kind loving parents with strong moral values who taught Smith to treat 
others with respect and dignity. Smith was also fortunate enough to have come 
across good friends and peers that never betrayed his trust. Smith is respectful 
and highly considerate of the feelings of others. He does not see aggression or 
                                                   
28 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 15-22, 
1098b10-1101a21. Aristotle also argued that moral luck played a role in virtue. However, 
Aristotle’s idea was that some external goods were important for the development and 
maintenance of eudaimonia. Aristotle argued that virtue required some external goods, 
specifically things like, beauty, friends, family, and good birth for happiness and virtuous 
agents required the means and opportunity to exercise the virtues. 
See also: Martha Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness: Luck in Ethics in Greek Tragedy 
and Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Nussbaum discusses at 
length the role of luck in the development and maintenance of virtue. 
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disrespect in the same sorts of situations that Jones does and he is usually polite 
and respectful across a great variety of situations, instead of just one or two like 
Jones.  
 The differences between Smith and Jones are exaggerated in the 
preceding example to highlight the differences in their respective lives and 
fortunes; however, the differences between the two men need not be as large for 
their character as adults to differ. For example, even with Smith’s mild 
temperament, growing up in a disadvantaged neighborhood with careless or even 
callous parents would have possibly made a large difference. Perhaps if Jones had 
grown up in Smith’s position he would have thought and behaved in a vastly 
different manner as an adult. Perhaps, having even one trustworthy confidant in 
his childhood would have helped Jones to be a different sort of person, one that 
believed in treating people with respect. 
 Of course, even if Jones was unlucky enough not to have moral models to 
emulate or close family in which to confide doesn’t mean Jones cannot change his 
character for the better. Moral improvement is not impossible, even if it may be 
more difficult for Jones than it would be for Smith. However, the desire for moral 
improvement would have to arise spontaneously or because of an experience or 
situation that affected Jones in some significant way. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that Jones may never learn to be as respectful as Smith. Jones may learn to 
behave respectfully while still harboring a deep distrust of others. Since the 
virtues include both a behavioral as well as a motivational component, Jones 
would never fully acquire the virtue of respect unless he was able to change how 
he felt about others.  
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 Moral luck plays a part not only in the development of virtue but also in 
its maintenance. Individuals with non-ideal virtue that have the good fortune of 
never encountering situations akin to the Milgram experiment or the Stanford 
Prison Experiment do not have their compassion really put to the test. If virtue 
contains both a motivational and a behavioral component, an individual who 
never faces such a situation may be considered to have behaved consistently 
compassionate as long as: (1) he acted compassionately in the situations he did 
come across and (2) had the right sort of motivation toward acting 
compassionately whenever it was called for, including in diagnostic situations, 
even if he never actually had the opportunity to act on his motivation. I may say 
of Jones that he is consistently compassionate because he has always acted 
compassionately in predictable situations requiring compassion and has the 
motivation to behave compassionately in any situation requiring compassion. 
However, from a purely practical standpoint, we cannot know whether Jones 
would behave compassionately in a strong situation like the Milgram experiment. 
If Jones tends to look to others in an unfamiliar situation to know how to behave 
(as most agents do), he may be influenced to behave inconsistently with 
compassion in strong situations. 
 Suppose there are two people: Jones and Smith. Jones and Smith both 
have values, beliefs, affects, and desires consistent with compassion. Being 
compassionate is somewhat important to both of them, and both feel some 
concern and personal responsibility for behaving consistently with their moral 
commitment to compassion. However, both men have an imperfect 
understanding of what compassion requires (they lack some part of practical 
deliberation or adequate feelings of personal responsibility). Let’s further 
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suppose that both men live in Nazi-occupied Europe. However, Smith lives in Le 
Chambon (the French enclave that sheltered thousands of refugees during the 
Nazi occupation of France) while Jones lives somewhere in Germany. Despite his 
lack of understanding what compassion requires, Smith, like his fellow 
Chambonnais, ends up aiding refugees in their escape, his commitment to 
compassion bolstered by seeing his fellow countrymen also giving aid to refugees.  
Due to his experience, Smith acquires a greater understanding of what 
compassion requires and perhaps even some knowledge about resisting negative 
social influences. Jones, on the other hand, has no such advantage. He helps no 
refugees, even when given a chance to do so, and sits passively by as some of his 
neighbors or even co-workers are taken from their homes and sent to 
concentration camps. His understanding of compassion and virtue in general 
stays the same. Smith expands his understanding of compassion with the help of 
his social networks, whereas Jones fails to learn anything, perhaps telling himself 
that it is not his responsibility to aid the refugees. Worse, perhaps Jones even 
buys into the Nazi propaganda that Jewish people are somehow less than human 
and not worthy of compassion and so his understanding of compassion is actually 
worsened by the war. 
 However, this is a rather extreme example. Doris gives the example of 
someone having a flirtation with a co-worker.29 Suppose Jones has been flirting 
at work with one of his coworkers. Yet, because he is also married, the 
relationship at work has never gone past simple flirting at the office. However, 
Jones’s wife goes out of town for a couple of weeks and Jones’s coworker asks 
Jones to come over to her house for dinner so that he is not all alone while his 
                                                   
29 John Doris, Lack of Character (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 147-
149. 
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wife is away. Jones ends up beginning an extramarital affair with his coworker, 
justifying the affair using a variety of psychological mechanisms that allow for 
self-deception. Had the circumstances never arisen, Jones would never have been 
unfaithful to his wife and his virtue would not have been negatively affected. 
However, the particular circumstances were too overwhelming for Jones, and he 
could not resist the temptation. Even if Jones lacked willpower, if he had 
practical deliberation, he may have realized that the prudent thing would be to 
avoid temptation altogether and refuse the offer, rather than assume that he 
could withstand temptation. 
 
Conclusion 
 There are multiple aims to both general character attribution and virtue 
theory and these multiple aims and comprehensive theories of character and 
virtue should reflect these multiple aims. 
Some of the aims of character attribution are explanation and prediction 
of behavior, communication and collection of information, and moral appraisal 
and judgment. The fundamental aim of explanation, prediction, and 
communication and collection of information is to give or receive a description of 
someone’s character, while the primary goal of evaluation and judgment is to 
prescribe limitations on the types of psychological and behavioral dispositions 
that characterize a particular trait.  
A scalar structure of character would satisfy both the descriptive and 
prescriptive aims of character attribution by including both conditional and 
robust traits that reflect the social-cognitive and trait approaches from 
personality theory. Robust traits track the trait theory approach in personality 
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theory and are useful for defining and limiting the types of behaviors, beliefs, 
values, goals, motivations, etc., that fall within the purview of a particular trait. 
The language of robust traits is also useful for the purposes of moral appraisal 
and judgment or when making broad character descriptions. Conditional traits 
track the social-cognitive approach and are useful for compiling a more accurate 
description of the character of a particular agent. Conditional traits can help us 
explain and predict individual behaviors with greater accuracy. 
 Moreover, just as there are two types of traits to satisfy different goals, 
there are two ways in which we talk about virtue that meets two different 
purposes. Virtue comes in degrees because agents generally develop virtue slowly 
over the course of time and experience and since virtue requires a variety of 
components, an agent may have developed some of the components without 
having developed them all and thus still have some virtue.  
There are two basic types of virtue: ideal virtue and non-ideal virtue. Ideal 
virtue requires that an agent have developed all of the psychological factors 
consistent with all of the virtues, a moral identity that is central to his sense of 
self, a strong sense of personal responsibility, integrity, willpower, autonomy, 
self-transparency, and the ability to deliberate well about how to make one’s 
actions consistent with one’s psychological factors (like Aristotle’s idea of 
practical wisdom). Ideal virtue is primarily normative and prescriptive but not 
empirically adequate. An agent with ideal virtue would have all of the goals, 
beliefs, and values consistent with each virtue and would exhibit cross-
situationally consistent behavior. Non-ideal virtue tracks the conditional 
approach in personality psychology and is both empirically and normatively 
adequate, although flawed and not ideal. Non-ideal virtue is supposed to describe 
 287
the type of virtue that agents actually have. An agent with non-ideal virtue might 
have some of the goals, beliefs, and values consistent with each virtue (or may 
lack certain virtues) and will probably not exhibit cross-situationally consistent 
behavior. However, agents with higher levels of ideal virtue will have developed 
the ability to behave consistently with their moral commitments, at least in 
situations with which they are familiar. 
Some questions remain unanswered. It is still unclear exactly what 
cognitive abilities are necessary to help agents behave consistently with their 
moral commitments, especially in unfamiliar or psychologically strong situations, 
or what we should say about the role of moral luck in virtue. Accepting the large 
role that moral luck plays in the development and maintenance of both types of 
virtue raises further questions about moral responsibility and moral praise and 
blame. I comment on these questions briefly in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this work was to provide a response to the situationist 
critique of character and to formulate and defend empirically grounded theories 
of character and virtue. In order to do this, I gave an overview of the theory and 
origins of situationism, reviewed experiments and historical cases cited as 
evidence, analyzed a number of responses to both the situationist theory and its 
evidence, and finally presented my own theories of character and virtue.  
I argued that we could respond to evidence from trivial helping situations 
using the argument from choice, a subspecies of the arguments from mood. 
People fail to help in some situations where helping or not helping is trivial 
because they see helping in those situations as morally elective or even merely as 
a matter of personal choice. Virtue theorists might be able to explain inconsistent 
helping behavior in situations of minor need by arguing that not all virtues 
require perfect obligation; that is, that for some virtues, one need only do enough 
of that virtue in order to be considered to have that virtue. However, this 
argument does not work in situations where the consequences of helping or not 
are not trivial or in situations where agents fail to help not out of choice but 
because they are genuinely confused or overwhelmed by situational features. 
I also maintained that there a number of situational features that are 
problematic for many agents, confusing agents and often influencing them to 
behave inconsistently with their previous moral commitments. I argued that 
situational ambiguity, conflicting duties, social influences, and situations 
involving obedience to authority were all problematic for many agents for a 
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variety of reasons. Some agents simply lack experience and do not how to make 
their behavior consistent with their commitments, while others lack personal 
responsibility or the ability to deliberate on whether their behavior is consistent 
with their commitment to a specific moral value or belief. Meanwhile, historical 
cases seem to show that environments (especially long-term or fully immersive 
environments) play a role in the development and maintenance of virtues and 
other character traits. Moreover, behavior seems to be the result of the 
interaction between environment and individual dispositions. This last idea is 
also the main contention of the argument from psychological factors. 
I argued that the argument from psychological factors provides the 
strongest response to the situationist claim that situational rather than 
dispositional features are the major driving force of human behavior. Once we 
understand the role of psychological factors in our behavior, we have an account 
of the effects of dispositional features on our behavior as well as a greater ability 
to explain and predict behavior. However, the argument from psychological 
factors is unable to provide us with a solution to the problem of strong situations, 
though it does point us toward a stronger conception of character, just one that is 
no longer quite Aristotelian. 
I also maintained that social influences account for much of the powerful 
influence of strong situations because humans are social creatures that often look 
to others to guide their own behavior. Since social influences can have positive as 
well as extremely negative effects on the behavior of agents, agents that wish to 
behave consistently with their moral commitments need to have a way to 
counteract negative social influences. Although it is not necessarily inconsistent 
with virtue to depend in part on social influences to maintain virtue, I argued that 
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an agent who is too dependent on social influences has a type of virtue whose 
maintenance is vulnerable to moral luck. An agent must develop practical 
deliberation in order to counteract the powerful psychological effects of strong 
situations that can induce agents to behave inconsistently with their moral 
commitments. 
Based on the argument from psychological factors, I claimed that social-
cognitive theory provided a better structure for character than traditional trait 
theory. Social-cognitive theory is much more useful for mapping out the 
psychological structure of particular individuals, instead of merely providing a 
comparison with other individuals. I argued that Walter Mischel’s Cognitive-
Affective Processing system (CAPS) model in particular provided an excellent 
foundation for an empirically grounded philosophical theory of character that 
would meet the demands of psychological realism.  I also maintained that 
Augusto Blasi’s theory of moral identity could provide us with some of the 
necessary components for a theory of virtue based in social-cognitive theory. 
Finally, I argued that although social-cognitive theory is better suited for 
providing a framework for an empirically grounded theory of character, 
traditional trait (based in Aristotelian virtue theory) might still have a part to play 
in an empirically grounded theory of character. Neither social-cognitive theory 
nor trait theory alone can fulfill the multiple aims of character attribution. The 
fundamental aim of explanation, prediction, and communication and collection 
of information is to give or receive a description of someone’s character, while the 
primary goal of evaluation and judgment is to prescribe limitations on the types 
of psychological and behavioral dispositions that characterize a particular trait. 
Social-cognitive theory best fulfills the aims of explanation and prediction of 
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behavior, and communication and collection of information, while traditional 
trait theory is best for fulfilling the goals of moral appraisal and judgment as well 
as more general communication and collection of information. 
I proposed a scalar structure of character that would satisfy both the 
descriptive and prescriptive aims of character attribution by including both 
conditional and robust traits that reflect the social-cognitive and trait approaches 
from personality theory. Robust traits track the trait theory approach in 
personality theory and are useful for defining and limiting the types of behaviors, 
beliefs, values, goals, motivations, etc., that fall within the purview of a particular 
trait. Robust traits are useful for the purposes of moral appraisal and judgment or 
when making broad character descriptions. Conditional traits, on the other hand, 
track the social-cognitive approach and are useful for compiling a more accurate 
description of the character of a particular agent. Conditional traits can help us 
explain and predict individual behaviors with greater accuracy. 
I also argued that just as there are two types of character traits to fulfill 
the multiple aims of character attribution, there are two ways in which we talk 
about virtue that meets different purposes: ideal and non-ideal virtue. Ideal 
virtue is primarily normative and prescriptive but not empirically adequate. Ideal 
virtue requires an agent to have developed psychological factors consistent with 
all of the virtues, a moral identity that is central to his sense of self, integrity, 
willpower, autonomy, self-transparency, a strong sense of personal responsibility, 
and the ability to deliberate well about how to make one’s actions consistent with 
one’s psychological factors (similar to Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom).  Ideal 
virtue is a description of perfect virtue. 
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Non-ideal virtue, on the other hand, tracks the conditional approach in 
personality psychology and is both empirically and normatively adequate, 
although flawed and not ideal. Non-ideal virtue describes the type of virtue that 
agents actually have. An agent with non-ideal virtue might have only some of the 
goals, beliefs, and values consistent with each virtue (or may lack certain virtues) 
and will probably not exhibit cross-situationally consistent behavior. Agents with 
non-ideal virtue may lack autonomy, self-transparency, some integrity and 
responsibility, willpower or practical deliberation, but must have a moral will and 
must have attempted at least to develop integrity, responsibility, willpower, and 
practical deliberation.    
Non-ideal virtue is fragmented, susceptible to moral luck, and socially 
dependent. An agent with fragmented virtue has merely conditional virtues and 
does not display behavioral consistency across all situations. An agent’s virtue 
may be socially dependent if he lacks willpower, practical deliberation, or 
centrality of moral will. Moreover, because this type of virtue is partly dependent 
on an agent’s social networks for its maintenance, it is susceptible to moral luck, 
namely, the agent’s luck of ending up in a situation with negative social 
influences. Because an agent with non-ideal virtue lacks some of the components 
of ideal virtue, situational features can influence an agent with non-ideal virtue to 
behave inconsistently with some of his moral commitments in strong situations.  
An agent with a high degree of non-ideal virtue will have developed 
enough virtue to be able to behave consistently with his moral commitments in 
(at least) normal or predictable life circumstances, although unfamiliar 
circumstances may baffle him or lead to behave inconsistently with his moral 
commitments by negative social influences. The degree to which an agent has 
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developed non-ideal virtue depends on the degree to which the agent has 
developed the six components necessary for ideal virtue as well as on the life 
experiences of the agent. 
A high degree of non-ideal virtue comes closest to approximating ideal 
virtue. The key difference between ideal virtue and a high level of non-ideal virtue 
is that even a high development of non-ideal virtue does not guarantee that an 
agent will be able to behave consistently with the virtues in strong or unfamiliar 
situations. The agent with a high degree of non-ideal virtue may lack some 
cognitive abilities necessary to maintain his virtue in strong or unfamiliar 
situations but will have genuine dedication toward behaving consistently with his 
moral commitments because his moral identity is a central part of his self-
identity. 
In Chapter 1, I mentioned that if the situationist critique is right, then 
moral education programs grounded in an Aristotelian conception of character 
are grounded in an erroneous conception of the causes of human behavior. 
However, non-ideal virtue theory specifies the necessary components of virtue 
that could be incorporated into a character-based moral education curriculum. 
Besides being taught goals, beliefs, and values consistent with the virtues, agents 
also need to master critical thinking skills, self-regulatory mechanisms, and a 
sense of personal responsibility for their actions.1 Although agents can ultimately 
                                                   
1
 There are already some theorists in moral education arguing that critical thinking 
skills and self-regulatory mechanisms are a necessary component of a moral education in 
the virtues. In “The Virtues of Will-Power: Self-Control and Deliberation,” philosopher 
Jan Steutel argues that, in addition to virtues of character like compassion, kindness, 
justice, courage, etc, agents also need virtues of willpower in order to be truly virtuous. 
According to Steutel, virtues of willpower include deliberative capacities and powers of 
self-control.  These virtues include crude, subtle, mechanical or reflective, simple or 
complex, psychological techniques or strategies that serve as a corrective function of 
contrary inclinations.  Steutel mentions a number of possible strategies for teaching these 
“virtues of willpower” via moral education programs.  See Jan Steutel, “Virtues of Will-
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only gain practical deliberation through time and experience with a variety of 
different situations, teaching individuals critical thinking skills, skills that help 
with self-regulation and willpower as well as autonomy, self-transparency, and 
personal responsibility may help agents develop practical deliberation over time, 
rather than their failing to learn from their experiences. 
Moreover, agents need to be taught the true causes of human behavior in 
order to learn greater understanding and empathy with the behavior of others as 
well as their own. Moral education programs also need to educate individuals on 
the types of situations that often influence agents to behave inconsistently with 
their moral commitments as well as the psychological mechanisms that we often 
use to deceive ourselves into thinking we are behaving consistently with our 
moral commitments when we are not. 
Furthermore, teaching individuals that most agents have a merely non-
ideal virtue may actually help those individuals behave consistently with their 
moral commitments. Rather than assuming that one’s character can withstand 
temptations of any kind, if we realize that our virtue is partially socially 
dependent and that we are susceptible to various temptations, including 
temptations arising from pressures of social influences, then perhaps we are less 
likely to go willingly into the types of situations that we know to influence most 
                                                                                                                                           
Power: Self-Control and Deliberation” in Virtue Ethics and Moral Education: Routledge 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Education,” eds. David Carr and Jan Steutel 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 125-137. 
See also: Ben Spiecker, “Habituation and Training in Early Moral Upbringing” in 
Virtue Ethics and Moral Education: Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy 
of Education,” eds. David Carr and Jan Steutel (New York: Routledge, 1999), 210-233. 
Spicker argues that through habituation of multi-track instead of single-track habits, we 
can teach children to have a more “sensitive appreciation of their responses to 
circumstances.” Multi-track habits are not unreflective responses learned through 
conditioning and drill, but rather habits that include both an affective and an intellectual 
component and can be tailored to fit different circumstances. 
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agents negatively.  At the very least, we can learn to be wary of our own behavior 
when we find ourselves in psychologically strong moral situations. 
If we accept a non-ideal theory of virtue based on a scalar theory of 
character, then we accept the role of moral luck in the development and 
maintenance of character and virtue. This leaves unanswered questions about 
moral responsibility and moral agency. If moral luck plays a part in the 
development and maintenance of many agents, can we still hold agents morally 
responsible for their actions in psychologically strong situations? Can we be 
considered to have moral agency when influenced by situational features like 
social influences to behave in ways inconsistent with our moral commitments? 
Accepting a non-ideal theory of virtue may require us to adopt a theory of 
moral responsibility that bases responsibility on quality of the will, or coherence 
with a central sense of self or character. Since many individuals are susceptible to 
negative social influences, judging whether they are morally responsible or not 
for their actions may depend on the quality of their moral will, or on whether 
their actions are consistent with their character as a whole. Attributing moral 
responsibility would revolve around the question of whether the agent would 
normally have endorsed an action inconsistent with his moral commitments if he 
had been fully aware that it was inconsistent with his moral commitments. 
Moreover, how are we to assign praise and blame? These questions require 
further research and thought. 
Ultimately, a non-ideal theory of virtue provides us with a more realistic 
picture of human functioning than either trait theory or situationism. Endorsing 
a non-ideal theory of virtue requires one to accept the relative fragility of human 
 296
virtue. Somewhat paradoxically, recognizing the fragility of our virtue may 
actually help us strengthen our virtue. 
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